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PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR CASES
MARTH:A A. FIELD f
On September 28, 1971, Congress extended the draft for two years 1
and made a number of changes in the Military Selective Service Act
of 1967.2 Although provisions relating specifically to conscientious ob-
jectors were largely unaltered,3 procedural rights granted all registrants
will have an effect on the problems of proof and factfinding that have
long vexed the determination of conscientious objector claims. The
most important of these procedural reforms is a requirement that
[i]n the event of a decision adverse to the claim of a registrant,
the local or appeal board making such decision shall, upon re-
quest, furnish to such registrant a brief written statement of
the reasons for its decision.'
j Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1965, Radcliffe;
J.D. 1968, University of Chicago. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
IAct of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, tit. I, § 101 (a) (35), 85 Stat. 353,
amending Military Selective Service Act of 1967 §17(c), 50 U.S.C. App. §467(c)
(1970) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. App. §467(c) (Supp. 1972)). The amendments
also changed the name of the 1967 Act to the Military Selective Service Act. 50
U.S.C.A. App. §451(a) (Supp. 1972), amending Military Selective Service Act of
1967 § 1(a), 50 U.S.C. App. §451(a) (1970).
2 Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, tit. I, § 101(a), 85 Stat. 348-55,
amending Military Selective Service Act of 1967 §§ 1-23, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-73
(1970) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§451-73 (Supp. 1972)). The Act also
amended other aspects of federal law related to the military.
3 The only statutory change relating specifically to conscientious objectors trans-
fers responsibility for administering the civilian work program from local draft boards
to the National Headquarters of the Selective Service System. 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§456(j) (Supp. 1972), amending Military Selective Service Act of 1967 §6(j), 50
U.S.C. App. §456(j) (1970). A recent regulation requires, however, that the State
Director, "under the supervision of" the National Director administer the alternative
service program. 32 C.F.R. § 1660.1 (a) (1972). The duties of the State Director
with respect to the alternative service program are more specifically enumerated at
id. §§ 1660.1(b) - (c). These provisions are set forth in note 10 infra.
The Military Selective Service Act grants plenary rulemaking power to the
President, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (1) (1970), and allows the President to delegate
and provide for the subdelegation of his authority. Id. §460(c). The Act also
creates the Selective Service System and provides that it shall be headed by a
Director. Id. § 460 (a) (1). By regulation, the President has granted the Director
power
[t]o prescribe such rules and regulations as he shall deem necessary for
the administration of the Selective Service System, the conduct of its officers
and employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the
custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.
32 C.F.R. §1604.1(a) (1972). By executive order, the President has granted the
Director authority to make draft regulations. Exec. Order No. 11,623, § 1, 3 C.F.R.
211 (1972). The President retained authority to issue rules himself. Id. § 3.
4Military Selective Service Act §22(b)(4), 50 U.S.C.A. A'. §471a(b)(4)
(Supp. 1972), amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 451(a) (1970).
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This Article will examine the statutory and procedural framework
within which a claim of conscientious objection must be asserted and
will consider various obstacles to reliable factfinding. It will then focus
on the newly-adopted requirement that draft boards reveal their bases
of decision and will evaluate the impact of that requirement on the
operation of the system. Finally, it will suggest a new approach to
dealing with conscientious objector claims.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
A. Selective Service Procedures
Section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 ex-
empts from combatant service any person "who, by reason of religious
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war
in any form." ' Church training or membership is not required; the
Supreme Court has held that a person's objection is sufficiently "re-
ligious" if it "stem[s] from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs about what is right and wrong and . . . these beliefs [are]
held with the strength of traditional religious convictions." 6 Total op-
550 U.S.C. App. §456(j) (1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 456(j) (Supp.
1972). The section provides:
Nothing contained in this title . . shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces
of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this
subsection, the term "religious training and belief" does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral
code. Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service
because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local
board shall, if he is inducted into the armed forces under this title . . . be
assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or shall, if he
is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant
service, in lieu of such induction, be ordered by his local board, subject to
such regulations as the President may prescribe, to perform for a period equal
to the period prescribed in section 4(b) [24 months] such civilian work con-
tributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest . . .
and any such person who knowingly fails or neglects to obey any such order
from his local board shall be deemed, for the purposes of section 12 of this
title . . . to have knowingly failed or neglected to perform a duty required
of him under this title ....
6 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (opinion of Black, j.).
The Court so held despite the statutory provision limiting the meaning of "religious
training and belief." See note 5 supra. It held also that the only persons excluded are
"those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not
rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon
considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency." Id. at 342-43. The statutory
construction that led to this result will be explored more extensively. See text
accompanying notes 112-33 infra.
Although Mr. Justice Black's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court was
joined by only three other Justices, the test it adopts for conscientious objection was
concurred in by a majority of the Court. Mr. Justice Harlan did not accept the
conclusion that the test adopted could be arrived at as a matter of statutory con-
struction, but he considered the statute unconstitutional and adopted the same test as
Mr. Justice Black "not as a reflection of congressional statutory intent but as patch-
work of judicial making that cures the defect of under-inclusion in §6(j) ... "
398 U.S. at 366-67 (concurring opinion).
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position to the use of force in any and all circumstances is not necessary;
one's objection need only extend to "war in any form." 7
A person meeting this test for conscientious objection may be
classified I-A-0 8 and, if inducted, he will be assigned to service that
does not require killing or bearing arms. Typically, I-A-O's serve as
medics, though they may work in other noncombatant jobs as, for
example, cooks or truck drivers.' If, however, a man's conscientious
objection extends also to noncombatant service he will be classified I-0
and exempted from all military service." Instead of military service,
the 1-0 registrant who would otherwise be inducted is required to
perform "such civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the
national health, safety, or interest as the [National] Director may deem
appropriate . . . ... " The registrant performing alternate civilian
7 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1971) (emphasis added);
Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 389-90 (1955); see United States v.
Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 740-42 (9th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Carroll, 398 F.2d
651, 655 (3d Cir. 1968). In practice, however, a registrant who does claim total
nonviolence may have less- difficulty getting his claim sustained. Reisner, Selective
Service Appeal Boards and the Conscientio s Objector Claimant: Congressional
Standards and Administrative Behavior, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 521, 537.
8 By regulation, each registrant is classified in one of several enumerated classes.
32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.1-.2 (1972). Classification I-A-O includes
every registrant who would have been classified in Class I-A but for the fact
that he has been found, by reason of religious, ethical, or moral belief, to be
conscientiously opposed to participation in combatant training and service in
the armed forces.
37 Fed. Reg. 5121 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1622.11).
9 An executive order defines noncombatant training as "any training which is not
concerned with the study, use, or handling of arms or weapons" and noncombatant
service as:
(a) service in any unit . . .which is unarmed at all times; (b) service in
the medical department of any of the armed forces, wherever performed; or
(c) any other assignment the primary function of which does not require the
use of arms in combat; provided that such other assignment is acceptable to
the individual concerned and does not require him to bear arms or to be
trained in their use.
Exec. Order No. 10,028, 14 Fed. Reg. 211 (1949), 50 U.S.C. Apr. §456 (1970).
10 37 Fed. Reg. 5121 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1622.14).
1150 U.S.C.A. App. §456(j) (Supp. 1972), amending 50 U.S.C. APP. §456(j)
(1970). New regulations, in addition to generally subdelegating the National Direc-
tor's authority to administer the civilian work program to the State Director, see
note 3 supra, provide that "[tihe State director of the State in which a registrant is
registered will have primary responsibility for the initial placement of the registrant
in alternate service." 32 C.F.R. § 1660.1 (b) (1972).
The registrant is able to play an active role in selecting his job assignment.
He may submit proposed jobs to the State Director. If a proposed job is approved,
a work order is issued. 37 Fed. Reg. 5127 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
§§ 1660.3, .7(b)). If the job is not approved, the registrant may seek review of
that decision. 32 C.F.R. § 1660.7(e) (1972). The 1-0 registrant may accept a job
anticipating that it will be approved as alternate service. If he is correct, he will
receive credit for the time he has worked (but only time after he was classified 1-0)
prior to approval. Id. § 1660.7(d). Only if a registrant has (a) taken a job that
is subsequently disapproved; or (b) not submitted any approved jobs to the State
Director within 60 days from the time he was classified 1-0 will he be ordered to
take a specific alternate service job. Id. §§ 1660.7(c), (e).
Government jobs and jobs with charitable or nonprofit organizations that are
primarily for the benefit of the public, id. § 1660.5, are among those that qualify for
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service is paid by the employer at the going rate for his job.' The
period of this service is two years 's-the equivalent of the active duty
period of the inducted soldier, combatant or noncombatant. 4
A man must register for the draft at age 18.15 Each registrant is
assigned to a local draft board, the board of his permanent place of
residence.'" Registrants are to be classified as soon as possible after
they first register.' 7  Early classification is facilitated by the recent
creation of the I-H holding category, a preliminary classification of all
registrants who are "not currently subject to processing for induction
.. ..,,1 By executive order, a random selection sequence determines
the order of draft eligibility.'" Those registrants whose lottery num-
bers are sufficiently high may remain indefinitely in class I-H; those
fulfilling the alternate service requirement. In determining whether a particular job
is acceptable for alternate service five factors are to be considered:
(1) National Health, Safety or Interest. The job must fulfill specifications
of the law and regulations.
(2) Noninterference with the competitive labor market. The registrant cannot
be assigned to a job for which there are more numerous qualified appli-
cants not in Class 1-0 than spaces available. This restriction does not
prohibit the approval of special programs such as Peace Corps or VISTA
for alternate service by registrants in Class 1-0.
(3) Compensation. The compensation will provide a standard of living to the
registrant reasonably comparable to the standard of living the same man
would have enjoyed had he gone into the service.
(4) Skill and talent utilization. A registrant may utilize his special skills.
(5) Job location. A registrant will work outside his community of residence.
Subparagraphs (3), (4), and (5) of this paragraph are waiverable by
the State director when such action is determined to be in the national interest
and would speed the placement of registrants in alternate service.
Id. § 1660.6 (as amended by 37 Fed. Reg. 5127 (1972)). Many of the same criteria
had been developed earlier. See Local Board Mem. No. 64, Sms.. SERv. L. REP. 2183
(1962, amended 1968) (rescinded, 5 Sm.. Smv. L. REP. 8 (1972)) ; Local Board Mem.
No. 98, Smr. Smv. L. REP. 2200:7 (1969) (rescinded, 5 SEL. Smv. L. REP. 8 (1972)).
12 32 C.F.R. § 1660.6(3) (1972), quoted in note 11 supra, suggests, however, that
jobs in which the registrant is well compensated should not be approved. The pro-
vision is waivable, however. Moreover, there is probably not a great difference
between the serviceman's standard of living and that obtainable via most alternate
service jobs when the market values of room and board are added to the serviceman's
wages.
13 32 C.F.R. § 1660.7(d) (1972).
'4Military Selective Service Act §4(b), 50 U.S.C. App. §454(b) (1970), as
amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §454(b) (Supp. 1972). Inductees, however, are subject
in addition to a reserve commitment not applicable to alternate service workers.
Id. §4(d), 50 U.S.C. Ap,. §454(d) (1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §454(d)
(Supp. 1972). Proposals to add a similar burden to conscientious objectors were
dropped from the 1971 amendments. See H.R. REP. No. 433, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1971).
'5 Military Selective Service Act § 3, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 453 (1970), as amended,
50 U.S.C.A. App. §453 (Supp. 1972).
1632 C.F.R. § 1613.12 (1972). There are more than 4,000 such boards in the
country. CENTRAL COmmITTEE FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJEcTORS, HANDBOOK FOR COX-
SCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 10 (1968).
1732 C.F.R. §1623.1 (1972).
'1 Id. § 1622.18.
'9 Proclamation No. 3945, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,017 (1969), 50 U.S.C. App. § 455
(1970); Exec. Order No. 11,497, 32 C.F.R. § 1631.1 (1972).
19721
874 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
with lower numbers will be reclassified out of the I-H category-as
I-A unless they are eligible for another class.2°
The proper classification of a man whose lottery number is below
the I-H cutoff is determined from information he provides in the Reg-
istration Questionnaire (Form 100) 21 which he receives when he reg-
isters. 22  The form calls for general information about the registrant-
such as his occupation and marital status-which is relevant to pos-
sible deferments or exemptions.23 It includes a question on the subject
of conscientious objection: "Do you claim to be a conscientious ob-
jector based on moral, ethical or religious beliefs which prevent your
participation in combatant and/or noncombatant military service ?" 24
A registrant who answers affirmatively is furnished Form 150 and
instructed to submit it to his board.25
On Form 150 the registrant must indicate whether his conscien-
tious objection extends to noncombatant service and, if so, the reasons
why.26  He must also describe his belief; why it is sufficiently religious,
moral, or ethical; how and from what sources he acquired it; and the
ways in which he has manifested it.27  In addition to Form 150, the
registrant may present all relevant written information regarding his
conscientious objection, and he may submit references in support of
his claim.
2
1
The registrant who receives Form 150 in response to a conscien-
tious objector claim on his Registration Questionnaire must return it
20 Selective Service Registrants Processing Manual § 622.18 in SEL. SERV. L. REP.
2622:1 (1972).
2137 Fed. Reg. 5121 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1621.9). See
Selective Service Registrants Processing Manual § 613 in SEL. Smv. L. REP. 2613:1
(1972). For a discussion of the Manual, which sets out a new procedure, see
5 SEL. SERV. L. REtP. 3 (1972). The Registration Questionnaire was formerly called
the Classification Questionnaire [Form 100]. 32 C.F.R. § 1621.9 (1971).
22 Selective Service Registrants Processing Manual § 613.4 in SEL. Smv. L. REP.
2613:1 (1972).
23 For a copy of Form 100, see SEL. SEav. L. REP'. 2156:3 (1972). Under the
old system, shortly after a man registered, his local board sent him this form. The
order in which the forms were sent was determined chronologically by birth date.
32 C.F.R. § 1621.9 (1971).
24 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 2156:3 (1972). Form 100 was in need of updating because
it failed to inform the registrant that moral or ethical beliefs may entitle him to
conscientious objector status. See United States v. VanCleve, 4 SEL. SERV. L. REP.
3494 (D. MINN., Aug. 30, 1971). The new form bears a revision date of Nov. 5,
1971. SEL. Smv. L. REP. 2156:3 (1972).
2532 C.F.R. § 1621.11 (1972).
26 Form 150, 37 Fed. Reg. 487 (1972).
2 7 Id.
28 See 37 Fed. Reg. 5121 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1621.12). The
old Form 150 provided space to list references who could provide the board with
further information regarding the registrant's conscientious objection. Form 150
(superseded), SEL. SERV. L. REP. 2156:14 (1968). The submission of references has
been of some importance in having a claim sustained; see Reisner, supra note 7, at
538, and registrants would be well-advised to continue to list them and submit letters
from them.
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within thirty days.2 9' But his draft board will not necessarily consider
the conscientious objector claim as soon as the form is received. The
regulations require that a registrant be given the lowest classification
to which he is entitled."0  I-A-available for induction-is the highest
classification. I-A-0 and I-0 are the next highest, in that order."'
If, therefore, the registrant's questionnaire establishes grounds for some
lower classification-such as a student deferment, a hardship deferment,
or a sole surviving son exemption-his conscientious objector claim
will not be considered; it will be held in abeyance until such time as it
becomes relevant to his status.3
A man who has not made a conscientious objector claim at the
time of registration may still do so at any time prior to the mailing of
his induction notice by writing to his local board and requesting Form
150.33 If at the time he files the form his status is I-A, and if his sub-
mission makes out a prima facie case for conscientious objector status,
the board is obliged 4 to reopen his classification to pass on the new
claim.
35
It is advantageous to file a conscientious objector claim as soon
as possible, for a board is more likely to trust the sincerity of a claim
that is promptly made. 30  A claim made shortly before induction may
29 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 2156:14.1 (1968).
30 32 C.F.R. § 1623.2 (1972).
31Id.
3 2 Draft boards do not uniformly follow this rule, however. Some seem to pass
on conscientious objector claims as soon as received. See, e.g., United States v.
Owen, 415 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1969).
33 See 32 C.F.R. § 1621.11 (1972) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 5123 (1972) (to be codified at
32 C.F.R. § 1625.2) ; notes 304-06 infra & accompanying text.
34 Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970). See 37 Fed. Reg. 5123 (1972)
(to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2). It is of moment to the registrant whether
the board denies his claim after reopening or whether it refuses to reopen. If the
board reopens and then denies the claim, the registrant has the same rights of personal
appearance and appeal as after the initial classification. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.11 (1972).
If the board refuses to reopen, however, no appeal is possible and the registrant is
subject to immediate induction.
A rule that a board could reopen or not, in its discretion, would permit a board
to deny appeal rights of all but its initial classifications. The difficulty with a rule
allowing a registrant to force a board to reopen simply by submitting information,
whether or not that information proves true, is that on its face it empowers a
registrant, who cannot be drafted while appeals are pending, 37 Fed. Reg. 5124 (1972)
(to be codified at 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.6 (appeal to appeal board), 1627.7 (1972)
(appeal to Presidential Board) (formerly 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.41, 1627.8 (1971)), to
delay his induction indefinitely. The Supreme Court was satisfied that the board's
power not to reopen where claims are "plainly incredible," coupled with the statutory
criminal penalties for registrants who make false statements to their board, were
sufficient to protect against this tactic. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 418
n.7 (1970).
35 If, however, the registrant holds a lower classification when he files the form,
the question of his conscientious objection should be held in abeyance. See text
accompanying notes 29-32 supra & note 32.
30 Common sense indicates that this would be true, and empirical studies of draft
board operations show that the factor may be critical. See Reisner, supra note 7,
at 536; Rabin, Do You Believe in a Supreme Being-The Administration of the
Conscientious Objector Exemption, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 642, 680.
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well seem a calculated evasion." A board is not entitled to deny a
claim, however, simply because it is filed late,38 so long as it is filed
prior to the mailing of an induction order.39
The registrant can have all information relevant to his classifica-
tion placed in his Selective Service file by sending it in writing to the
board.40 When his conscientious objector claim becomes relevant to
his classification, the local board considers whether to grant the claim
"on the basis of the official forms of the Selective Service System and
such other written information as may be contained in [the registrant's]
file . ... " 41 The file will include the registrant's classification
questionnaire, his Form 150, his correspondence with his board, and
any material he has submitted to aid the board in arriving at a proper
classification. It may also include unsolicited information from third
parties 42 and information gathered by the board. The board can sup-
plement an inadequate file by requesting a registrant to provide added
information,4" by requesting other governmental agencies to provide
information,44 or by issuing subpoenas directing "any person" to testify
37 See United States ex rel. Hemes v. McNulty, 432 F.2d 1182, 1187 (7th Cir.
1970) (dictum); United States v. Pritchard, 413 F.2d 663, 666 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 995 (1969) ; Bishop v. United States, 412 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.
1969) ; United States v. Henderson, 411 F.2d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 916 (1970). Heroes, Pritchard, and Henderson are of questionable validity.
In these cases, the courts were apparently willing to allow the registrants' sincerity
to be thrown into question by the fact that the registrants had waited until their other
deferment possibilities were exhausted before seeking I-0 status. Other cases have
rejected this conclusion on the ground that 32 C.F.R. § 1623.2 (1972) precludes con-
sideration of a 1-0 claim if another deferment is available. United States v. Ruther-
ford, 437 F.2d 182, 184-86 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lemmens, 430 F.2d
619, 624 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bornemann, 424 F.2d 1343, 1347-48 (2d
Cir. 1970). See United States v. Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299, 1305-06 (4th Cir. 1970)
(en banc) (discussing possible reasons why, in light of § 1623.2, those with other
deferments may not choose to claim 1-0 status); United States v. Wingerter, 423
F.2d 1015, 1019 (5th Cir. 1970).
38 Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 702-03 (1971). See United States ex rel.
Hemes v. McNulty, 432 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (7th Cir. 1970) (dictum) ; United States
v. Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299, 1305 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc) ; cf. United States ex rel.
Lehman v. Laird, 430 F.2d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1970) (delay until Vietnam service was
imminent was not, standing alone, a reason for denial of 1-0 claim) ; Capobianco v.
Laird, 424 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 402 U.S. 969 (1971)
(remanded for reconsideration in light of Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971))
(fact that claim was made after induction notice was received was not, standing
alone, sufficient to deny reopening of registrant's classification).
39 Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971) ; 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1972). See
notes 304-06 infra & accompanying text.
40See 37 Fed. Reg. 5121 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. §§ 1621.12,
1622.1(a)); 32 C.F.R. § 1625.1 (a) (1972).
4132 C.F.R. § 1623.1(b) (1972).
42See 37 Fed. Reg. 5121 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. §§ 1621.12,
1622.1 (a)).
4332 C.F.R. § 1621.13 (1972).
44 Id. § 1621.14. The local board can itself request information from local agencies.
It must request the State Director to obtain information from state or national
welfare or governmental agencies. Id.
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before it and to produce relevant documents. 45  Information within the
personal knowledge of any board member may also be considered.
46
In all cases, however, information the board receives must be reduced
to writing and placed in the file for it to be legitimately considered.
47
Its inclusion in the file is deemed to give the registrant notice that it is
before the board.
48
While the board has power to seek out for itself information per-
taining to the proper classification of a registrant, the regulations im-
pose on it no duty to do so. Since under the regulations the registrant
bears the burden of convincing the board that he is entitled to a classi-
fication lower than I-A,49 the board has little incentive to supplement
an inadequate file; if information in the file is insufficient to show
whether or not the registrant is entitled to a deferment or exemption,
the registrant has not made his case, and the board may properly deny
his claim."0
A registrant dissatisfied with the board's classification has a right
either to appeal immediately 1 or to appear personally before the
board.52 The Selective Service System depicts the personal appearance
451d. § 1621.15.
46 Id. § 1623.1 (b).
47 Id.
48 Id. § 1641.5 (1972). The registrant is not informed when the local board
receives information, whether favorable or not. But he does have the right to inspect
his file at any time, id. §§ 1606.32(a) (1), 1670.8(a) (1), which is deemed to give him
notice. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 295 F. Supp. 673, 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
One recent case suggests, however, that the registrant is not deemed to have notice
of adverse information when he is "justifiably unaware" of its insertion in his file.
United States v. Fisher, 442 F.2d 109, 115-16 (7tlh Cir. 1971) (registrant incorrectly
informed by board employee that nothing had been added to his file). Similarly, in
United States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 1969), the court said:
While we may charge literate registrants with knowledge of information with
which they are directly confronted, such as that contained on registration or
classification cards, we may not expect a working knowledge of selective
service regulations or inquiry at the office of the local board to guard against
information received from an outside source.
The court held that the registrant before it had been
denied a basic procedural right when he was classified by the local board and
the appeal board without first being apprised of adverse information in his
file and being given an opportunity to rebut it.
Id. at 389.
49 See 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10 (1972) ("In Class I-A shall be placed every registrant
who has failed to establish to the satisfaction of the local board, subject to appeal
hereinafter provided, that he is eligible for classification in another class."). See also
id. § 1623.2; 37 Fed. Reg. 5121 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1622.1).
50 Similarly, the regulations provide that "the board shall proceed with the regis-
trant's classification whenever he fails to provide the board in a timely manner with
any information concerning his status which he is requested or required to furnish."
32 C.F.R. § 1623.1(b) (1972). The old regulations specifically provided for classifica-
tion whenever Form 100 was not returned in time. 32 C.F.R. § 1623.1(b) (1971).
5137 Fed. Reg. 5123 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1626.1). No appeal
is allowed from the initial I-H classification. Id.
52 Id. 5122 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(a)). The new regulations allow
conscientious objector claimants to make a personal appearance before classification
instead of following classification, at their option. Id. (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
1972]
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as an opportunity for the registrant to "discuss his case with his local
board members as he would with his neighbors." " The regulations
provide:
At any such appearance, the registrant may present evi-
dence, including witnesses, may discuss his classification, may
point out the class or classes in which he thinks he should have
been placed, and may direct attention to any information in
his file which he believes the local board has overlooked or to
which he believes it has not given sufficient weight. The reg-
istrant may present such further information as he believes
will assist the local board in determining his proper classifica-
tion. Such information shall be in writing, or if oral, shall
be summarized in writing by the registrant and, in either
event, shall be placed in the registrant's file. 4
The personal appearance is closed to the public,55 and procedural
protections are far more limited than is customary in proceedings in-
volving critical administrative determinations."5 The aim of such a
procedure, according to General Hershey, is to keep the System "simple
enough so that the average citizen can see how it works." " Prior to
the 1971 amendments, it was discretionary with the local board whether
to allow "person [s] to appear before it with or on behalf of a regis-
trant," 58 and the registrant was typically the only witness at the per-
sonal appearance. The amendments provide that "[s] ubject to reason-
able limitations on the number of witnesses and the total time allotted
to each registrant, each registrant shall have the right to present wit-
§ 1624.1(b)); see 50 U.S.C.A. Asp. § 471a (b) (1) (Supp. 1972). The 1971 amend-
ments provided, for the first time, that a quorum of the board-that is, a majority
of the board's members-must attend the personal appearance. 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§ 471a(b) (3) (Supp. 1972), amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 471a(b) (1970). Previously
the presence of one board member was sufficient. See 32 C.F.R. § 1624.2 (1971).
53 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, THE CLASSIFICATION PROCESS 158 (Special Mono-
graph No. 5, 1950).
5437 Fed. Reg. 5122 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. §1624.4(b)). The
right to present evidence and witnesses was not included under the old regulations.
32 C.F.R. § 1624.2(b) (1971).
55 For a discussion of the rationale and the regulatory basis for this practice,
see Reisner, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Administrative Procedures and
Judicial Review, 35 U. CaI. L. REV. 686, 697-98 (1968).
56 Although the 1971 amendments provided that Selective Service System regula-
tions must be prepublished, they continued the System's exemption from the operation
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Military Selective Service Act § 13(b), 50
U.S.C.A. App. §463(b) (Supp. 1972), amending 50 U.S.C. App. §463(b) (1970).
That exemption may originally have been unthinkingly granted to the System. See
Note, The Selective Service, 76 YALE L.J. 160, 183 n.133 (1966).
57 Hearings on S. 4164 Before the Senate Military Affairs Comm., 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 384 (1940).
5832 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1971); see Uffelman v. United States, 230 F.2d 297,
303 (9th Cir. 1956) (upholding local board's refusal to allow registrant to present
two witnesses).
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nesses on his behalf before the local board." 9 The amendments do
not, however, change the provision of the regulations denying the reg-
istrant representation by legal counsel,"0 although the Senate version of
the bill would have granted "the right to be accompanied and advised
by private counsel." 6-
The regulations do not provide for the personal appearance to be
transcribed. Even when the board clerk keeps minutes of the meetings,
they are not generally made a matter of public record. If a registrant
asks the board to allow him to bring his own stenographer, the board
may acquiesce or not, in its discretion. 2 But a registrant does have
the right, after the hearing has been concluded, to prepare his own
summary of what transpired and to submit it for inclusion in the file.63
The board, of course, may also place a summary in the file. After the
personal appearance, the board again decides on the registrant's classi-
fication and informs him of its decision." The registrant who has had
a personal appearance and wishes to contest his classification further
has a right to appeal. 5
There are ninety-four appeal boards 6 and a Presidential Appeal
Board, formally named the National Selective Service Appeal Board.
While every registrant may appeal to his appeal board, there is a right
to seek further review before the Presidential board only if the appeal
59 Military Selective Service Act §22(b)(2), 50 U.S.C.A. APP. §471a(b) (2)
(Supp. 1972), amending 50 U.S.C. APP. §471 (1970). A registrant who "does not
speak English adequately" has a right to appear with an interpreter. 37 Fed. Reg.
5122 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1624.4(d)).
6037 Fed. Reg. 5122 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1624.4(e)). In
United States v. Weller, 309 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1969), the registrant argued
that the regulation denying him the right to have his retained attorney accompany
him at the personal appearance was not authorized by the Selective Service Act and,
if authorized, was unconstitutional. The Court found for the registrant, seemingly
on both grounds. 309 F. Supp. at 56. The government appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court of the United States, but that Court concluded, after argument, that
it lacked jurisdiction. It remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. 401 U.S. 254 (1971).
6 1 See H.R. REP. No. 433, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1971).
62 See O'Brien v. Resor, 423 F.2d 594, 598 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Tittlerud, 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3283 (D. Minn. 1969). The board may not allow
the registrant to tape record his personal appearance. Letter to all State Directors
(00-43) from Daniel J. Cronin, Assistant Deputy Director, Operations, Oct. 26,
1971, SEL. SERv. L. REP. 2200:89.
63 37 Fed. Reg. 5122 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1624.4(b)).
64 Id. (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1624.6). A majority of the local board is
the necessary quorum when voting on a classification. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.56 (1972).
The National Director prescribes the number of members of the local board. Id.
§ 1604.52. A 3- to 5-member board is typical. Until the recent regulations, a local
board had to consist of at least 3 members. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.52(a) (1971).
6537 Fed. Reg. 5123 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1626.1). The regis-
trant who decides not to exercise his right to a personal appearance may also contest
the action of his local board before an appeal board. Id. (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
§§ 1626.1, 2). See note 181 infra.
66 See 32 C.F.R. § 1604.21 (1972); CENTRAL CoMMTTEE For CONscIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS, HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 10 (1970).
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board is divided. 7 The registrant is not the only person who can ap-
peal. The State and National Directors of the Selective Service may
appeal at any time.
68
The new regulations provide that when the National or State Di-
rector decides to appeal, he "shall place in the registrant's file a written
statement of his reasons for taking such appeal." 6" When the regis-
trant appeals, he "may attach to his appeal a statement specifying the
reasons he believes the classification inappropriate, directing attention
to any information in his file which he believes received inadequate con-
sideration, and setting out more fully any information which was sub-
mitted." 70 Prior to the amendments, the appeal board was to classify
the registrant anew solely on the basis of the evidence contained in his
file. 7 ' The 1971 statutory amendments, however, created for the first
time the right to a personal appearance before both the appeal board 7?
and the Presidential board.73  Both appellate bodies may now consider
information presented by the registrant during his personal appearance. 74
A quorum of the appeal board must attend the appearance, 7 but there is
no right to present witnesses at that stage.76
When a registrant has exhausted his appeals within the Selective
Service System, he can pursue the issue of classification further only
by presenting enough new information to require a reopening.
77
B. Avenues of Judicial Review
A registrant whose conscientious objector claim has been finally
denied within the Selective Service System has several alternatives open
to him. He may refuse to submit to induction and defend an ensuing
67 37 Fed. Reg. 5124 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1627.1 (b)).
68 Id. 5123 (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1626.1). Before the new regulations,
the government appeal agent, whose general duty was to advise and aid both regis-
trants and local board members as to applicable law, had a right to appeal local
board decisions. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.2(a) (1971). The appeal agent's duties were
described in id. § 1604.71. The new regulations abolish the position of government
appeal agent. 36 Fed. Reg. 23,375 (1971).
6937 Fed. Reg. 5123 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (a)).
70 Id. (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (e)).
7132 C.F.R. § 1626.24 (1972).
72 Military Selective Service Act, §22(b) (1), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §471a(b) (1),
amending 50 U.S.C. Ap. § 471 (1970) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 5123 (1972) (to be codified at
32 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (c)).
73 Military Selective Service Act, §22(b) (1), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §471a(b) (1)
(Supp. 1972), amending 50 U.S.C. App. §471 (1970). 37 Fed. Reg. 5124 (1972)
(to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1627.3(d)). The statute allows an appearance before
"any appeal board of the Selective Service System." In view of the regulation, it is
a moot issue whether this includes the National Board.
7437 Fed. Reg. 5124 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. §§16 26.4(g)(3),
1627.4(g) (3)).
75 Id. (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1626.4(e)).
76Id. (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1626.4(d)).
77 See note 34 supra.
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criminal prosecution on the ground that he was erroneously classified.7"
If he loses he will be subject to a maximum penalty of five years' im-
prisonment and a $10,000 fine.79 The registrant may, instead, give up
the battle, accept his classification, and enter the military. Finally, he
may accept induction but petition for habeas corpus immediately upon
entering the military." The ground for relief will be that his induc-
tion was illegal because it resulted from misclassification. The regis-
trant will be assigned to duties involving minimal conflict with his as-
serted beliefs while the petition is pending."1 If he loses, however, he
will be in the military and subject to court-martial for refusal to obey
orders."2
78 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
'19 Military Service Act §12(a), 50 U.S.C. App. §462(a) (1970), as amended,
50 U.S.C.A. App. §462(a) (Supp. 1972). Although the statute sets that maximum
sentence, another section provides, "[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law,
any registrant who has failed or refused to report for induction shall continue to
remain liable for induction and when available shall be imnmediately inducted . .. ."
Id. §4(a) 50 U.S.C. App. §454(a) (1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §454(a)
(Supp. 192). Pursuant to the statute, an executive order directs that those failing
or refusing to report for induction be inducted as soon as available. Exec. Order
No. 11,360, 32 Fed. Reg. 9787, 9789 (1967) (codified at 32 C.F.R. §1631.7(c)
(1972)). If this order were complied with, a man who had served a prison sentence
or paid a fine for refusing to submit to induction would be ordered again to submit
and if he refused be subject repeatedly to the maximum sentence. See McGraw v.
United States, 156 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1946). That result, coupled with restraints
placed on the Department of Justice's power to decline to prosecute, see Military
Selective Service Act §12(c), 50 U.S.C. App. §462(c) (1970), as amended, 50
U.S.C.A. App. §462(c) (Supp. 1972), appears to have been the purpose of section
4(a), which was added to the statute in 1967. See H.R. RFP. No. 267, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 43 (1967) (sectional analysis of Military Selective Service Act § 1 (a) (b),
50 U.S.C. App. §454(a) (1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §454(a) (Supp.
1972)).
80 See Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946).
SDep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6, §VII(c), SEx. SERv. L. REP. 2330
(Aug. 20, 1971).
82The efficacy of relief by habeas has sometimes been questioned. In Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), which involved the issue whether habeas was
the sole avenue to judicial review of a misclassification or whether misclassification
could serve as a defense to a criminal prosecution for refusal to submit to induction
as well, Mr. Justice Murphy, in a concurring opinion, said that the habeas remedy
may be quite illusory in many instances. It requires one first to enter the
armed forces and drop every vestige of civil rights. Military orders become
the law of life and violations are met with summary court-martial procedure.
No more drastic condition precedent to judicial review has ever been framed.
Many persons with religious or conscientious scruples are unable to meet
such a condition. But even if a person is inducted and a quest is made for a
writ of habeas corpus, the outlook is often bleak. The proceeding must be
brought in the jurisdiction in which the person is then detained by the
military, which may be thousands of miles removed from his home, his friends,
his counsel, his local board and the witnesses who can testify in his behalf.
Should he overcome all these obstacles and possess enough money to proceed
further, he still faces the possibility of being shifted by the military at a
moment's notice into another jurisdiction, thus making the proceeding moot.
There is little assurance, moreover, that the military will treat his efforts to
obtain the writ with sympathetic understanding. These practical difficulties
may thus destroy whatever efficacy the remedy might otherwise have and cast
considerable doubt on the assumption that habeas corpus proceedings neces-
sarily guarantee due process of law to inductees.
Id. at 129-30.
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Although the law makes these alternatives 3 available to regis-
trants who have exhausted their remedies within the Selective Service
System,"4 there is some question whether it is factually consistent with
his claim for a conscientious objector whose sincere claim has erro-
neously been rejected within the Selective Service System to accept in-
duction. Does the fact that a man enters the military itself demonstrate
that he does not entertain scruples of sufficient depth and sincerity to
entitle him to conscientious objector status? Is it disqualifying even
when the purpose of entering is to seek relief by habeas corpus?
At first blush it would appear that the man who objects only to
combatant service could in good conscience enter the military to chal-
lenge his classification, but that accepting induction would belie the
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 108
(1971), claimed that in-service remedies are inadequate because of military intolerance
towards conscientious objectors. He documented this with tales of atrocities the
military has committed on conscientious objectors from World War I up until the
present. He also claimed that military factfinders do not have the sensitivity to the
rights involved to be entrusted with the administrative determination whether a man
is a conscientious objector, and that it will be more difficult for a man to prove his
conscientious objection once in the military where he is away from friends who could
provide evidence for him. The Court, by contrast, thought in-service procedures
adequate and military tribunals as sensitive to conscientious objectors' rights as are
draft boards. 402 U.S. at 104 n.8.
83 There is a final method whereby a classification may be reviewed judicially
and that is by preinduction suit by the registrant for declaratory and/or injunctive
relief. It is obviously preferable to many registrants who can afford to bring such
suits to determine their status before making the decision whether to submit to induc-
tion. Preinduction suits do, however, contravene a basic policy against allowing
"litigious interruptions" to the induction procedure, Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S.
549, 554 (1944), and they are not generally allowed. See Military Selective Service
Act § 10(b) (3), 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§ 460(b) (3) (Supp. 1972). While the precise limits on which cases will permit of
preinduction relief have not yet been drawn, see Fein v. Selective Serv. Local Bd.
No. 7, 40 U.S.L.W. 4280 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972) ; Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd.
No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970) ; Boyd v. Clark, 393 U.S. 316 (1968) ; Clark v. Gabriel,
393 U.S. 256 (1968); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233
(1968); Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967),
that form of relief will not be available to the bulk of conscientious objectors, if,
indeed, it is available to any of them. See Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968).
84 As a general rule, a man can receive judicial review of the correctness of his
classification, either by way of habeas corpus or as a defense to a criminal prosecution,
only if he has exhausted his remedies within the Selective Service System. Military
Selective Service Act § 10(b) (3), 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (1970), as amended,
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. 1972). Edwards v. United States, 395 F.2d
453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968); DuVernay v. United States, 394
F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 394 U.S. 309
(1969) ; cf. Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968) ; Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S.
549 (1944). The exhaustion principle is not limited to presently available adminis-
trative remedies; cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ; if a registrant fails to pursue
his appeals he is permanently precluded from judicial review; cf. Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver [of a constitutional right] is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.").
The general rule does, however, have exceptions; see McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185 (1969); cf. Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460
(1970) ; Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968), which,
despite recent Supreme Court pronouncements, are of uncertain scope. Compare
McKart v. United States, supra, with DuVernay v. United States, supra.
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claim of the registrant who seeks total exemption. 5 This depends,
however, on the basis for the I-0 claimant's objection to noncombatant
service. If he says it conflicts with his conscience to wear a military
uniform or to be any part of an organization that participates in war,
the sincerity of his claim is at least somewhat called into question by
his entry into the military to contest his classification. A more limited
objection to noncombatant service-that the registrant cannot, because
of his beliefs, personally contribute to the war effort, as he would, for
example, by helping cure injured persons who would eventually return
to combat-is not, however, necessarily inconsistent with acceptance
of a brief period of service in the military.
It may be objected, however, that the only rational reason for a
registrant (whether he claims I-0 or I-A-0 status) to choose habeas as
a means of contesting his classification instead of defending a criminal
prosecution is to give himself the opportunity to avoid a prison sentence
and become a cooperating member of the military in case he fails in
his conscientious objector claim. A willingness to cooperate, even
though induced by the threat of imprisonment for noncooperation, may
conceivably be inconsistent with a valid conscientious objector claim.
If it is, any conscientious objector claimant, I-A-0 or 1-0, who enters
the military to contest his classification thereby reveals that he does not
qualify as a conscientious objector, unless a reason other than ability
to avoid a prison sentence can explain his choice of the habeas route.8 6
Under two hypotheses it might be rational for the registrant to
contest his classification by habeas even if he planned to refuse to co-
operate in the event his petition failed. It might be rational if the
registrant were more likely to prevail in a habeas proceeding than in
defending a criminal prosecution on the ground of misclassification .
7
85 This is so because the registrant seeking alternate service must claim that it
violates his convictions to serve in any military capacity.
86 The analysis is complicated somewhat by the fact that even persons who do
defend a criminal prosecution rather than seek habeas may be given the opportunity
to avoid imprisonment and cooperate with the military after they are convicted by
being paroled into the armed forces. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1643.1-.13 (1972), as amended,
37 Fed. Reg. 5125 (1972). A registrant does not, however, have a right to parole
into the military, and such parole is not uniformly offered a convicted registrant.
(If the government did afford it uniformly it would allow a criminal prosecution to
serve the function of a preinduction suit-allowing the registrant judicial review of
his classification before his ultimate decision whether to submit-whenever a registrant
was willing to have a conviction on his record. This result should be unacceptable
to the government for the same reasons that it strongly opposes the general avail-
ability of the preinduction remedy. See cases cited note 83 supra.) A man who
decides to defend a criminal prosecution rather than enter the military and seek
habeas must therefore be willing to serve a prison sentence, for he may or may not
have a later opportunity to enter the military. A man who follows the habeas route,
by contrast, will assuredly be given the opportunity to cooperate with the military
if his petition fails.
87 It would seem, however, that the man defending a criminal prosecution is
advantaged. If he is indigent, he will be provided with counsel. Moreover, the
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It also might be sensible for a registrant whose beliefs permitted him
to choose the habeas route if, in the event of losing, he would be better
treated by the system of military justice than by the civil courts. Neither
of these hypotheses, however, has any substantial foundation in com-
mon experience.
Another possible reason for entering the military to contest one's
classification might be to obtain more information on what the military
is like in order to decide whether to cooperate if one's claim is denied.
This justification will not be sufficient, however, if unconditional op-
position to service is considered the sine qua non of entitlement to con-
scientious objector status. 5
Whether a person who accepts induction can qualify as a con-
scientious objector depends ultimately upon the scope of the conscien-
tious objector exemption. Congress could have exempted conscientious
objectors simply because there is a group of persons who will not serve
even under the threat of imprisonment. Under that view Congress'
aim would be to force persons to serve as fully as the threat of imprison-
ment could induce them to serve. 9 Rather than imprison persons when
the threat of imprisonment would not be effective, however, there would
be an alternative form of service, also beneficial to the nation, which
they would, at least under compulsion, perform. If this theory under-
lies the conscientious objector provisions, a person who would make
the choice of entering the military rather than going to prison would not,
by definition, be entitled to conscientious objector status; and no claim-
ant to either I-0 or I-A-O status who was in fact entitled to that status
could enter the military--even if he filed for habeas immediately upon
enteringf 0
government bears the burden of proving the case against him beyond a reasonable
doubt, whereas in habeas the registrant bears the burden of proof. For other dis-
advantages of habeas, see note 82 supra.
88 Concerning the difficult question of the degree of certainty of opposition that
is necessary in order to qualify as a conscientious objector, see Mansfield, Conscien-
tiou Objection-1964 Term, 1965 RELIGIoN & PuB. OaER 3, 19.
89 Under this view of the exemption, the System discovers that it is in error in
denying a man's claim on grounds of lack of sincerity or lack of depth any time the
man goes to prison rather than accepting induction. The System cannot, however,
correct the error. Objectors' willingness to go to prison will prove that they qualify
only as long as prison sentences are actually carried out.
90 Cf. Mr. Justice Black's approach in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970):
Both [Seeger and Welsh] strongly believed that killing in war was wrong,
unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade them to take part in
such an evil practice. Their objection to participating in war in any form
could not be said to come from a "still, small voice of conscience"; rather,
for them that voice was so loud and insistent that both men preferred to go
to jail rather than serve in the Armed Forces. There was never any question
about the sincerity and depth of Seeger's convictions as a conscientious
objector, and the same is true of Welsh.
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PROOF IN CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR CASES
A different interpretation of Congress' underlying purpose in en-
acting the conscientious objector provisions is possible, however: that
Congress decided that even those persons whom threat of imprisonment
might induce to serve should not be coerced to do so if the service
would violate their deeply-held conscientious scruples and if they can
be used in some capacity more in keeping with their beliefs. On this
theory of the conscientious objector provisions, a man does not show
himself disqualified by entering the military rather than going to prison.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit seems to have taken this view. In the recent case of Gruca v. Sec-
retary of the Army,91 it rejected the Government's contention that a
sincere conscientious objector could not allow himself to submit to in-
duction into the Army. The court thought that "a registrant should
have the right to attempt to prove the sincerity of his claim without
risking the obloquy of a prison term if he is unsuccessful." 92
It is unnecessary to resolve the question of congressional purpose,
however, for even if the exemption extends only to persons who prefer
imprisonment to the objectionable service, reasons of policy dictate
against ruling the traditional remedy of habeas corpus unavailable to
the claimant who has entered the military.93 If one were to accept the
view that the conscientious objector claimant who accepts induction
thereby undermines his claim, a man who has been unsuccessful within
the Selective Service System and is unwilling to abandon his claim
would have to refuse induction. If the courts then uphold his clas-
sification, he would be in prison and not in the military. It is surely
more consonant with the ultimate aim of the Selective Service statute-
the mobilization of armed forces-to encourage the registrant to seek
review by habeas. If he does that and loses his claim, the likelihood of
his serving in the military is maximized.9"
Id. at 337. To use the fact that an objector went to jail rather than entering the
military to show his sincerity, or as one factor tending to show sincerity, is distinct,
however, from using failure to go to prison as either conclusive of insincerity or
as one factor tending towards a finding of insincerity.
91436 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971).
92 Id. at 243.
93 Another reason for holding habeas available to a conscientious objector is that
the only inquiry open to a court hearing the habeas petition of a serviceman claiming
that his draft board misclassified him is whether his Selective Service file shows a
basis in fact for the classification his draft board gave him. See text accompanying
notes 96-97 infra. A court giving weight to the petitioner's entry into the military,
occurring subsequent to the Selective Service System's classification, would violate
that standard.
94 This analysis would be undercut only if the unsuccessful conscientious objector
claimant who does accept induction were more troublesome than beneficial to the
military.
It is true, of course, that fewer persons will abandon their claims under a system
where they can be raised without risking imprisonment than if the only avenue of
review in conscientious objector cases were defense of a criminal proscution. The
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C. The Basis-in-Fact Test
Whether the registrant who refuses to accept his Selective Service
classification challenges it in a criminal proceeding or by habeas after
induction, he faces a standard of judicial review that is the "narrowest
known to the law." 5 The evidence a court may consider in reviewing
the correctness of a registrant's classification is limited to evidence
appearing in his Selective Service file. 6 Section 10(b) (3) of the
Military Selective Service Act provides that a court may overturn a
decision of the Selective Service System only if there is "no basis in
fact" for the classification. 7  The statute, however, only represents a
codification of a standard the Supreme Court had earlier enunciated.
The Supreme Court first formulated the "basis-in-fact" standard
for Selective Service cases in Estep v. United States."' The issue in
Estep was whether a registrant who had refused to submit to in-
duction could defend his criminal prosecution on the ground that he
should not have been classified I-A, or whether the only method of
review was postinduction habeas. The lower court had held that the
provision of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 that "the
decisions of . . . local boards shall be final except where an appeal is
authorized in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Presi-
dent may prescribe" precluded judicial review except by habeas. The
Supreme Court ruled against the Government on this point, holding that
a registrant could obtain review in a criminal proceeding. The finality
provision, it said, did not empower the boards to act beyond the powers
the Act and regulations conferred upon them. A registrant could ac-
cordingly defend a charge of refusing to submit to induction by showing
that the board's classification was "lawless and beyond its jurisdic-
tion." " Rather than leave the finality provision without any meaning,
number of persons in the military could conceivably increase under a system where
habeas was not available to conscientious objector claimants. This could happen if
there were a larger number of persons who abandoned claims that would ultimately
have been sustained than the number of persons with losing claims who refused
induction. Even if that occurred, however, the added military personnel would, by
hypothesis, be people who had a statutory right not to be there.
Provisions for parole into the military for persons convicted of refusing induction
do not undercut this analysis. Such parole is not, and cannot be, made uniformly
available to convicted registrants. See note 86 supra. Even when a man is given
the chance to enter the armed forces after conviction, it is reasonable to suppose
that he is less likely to enter the service as a parolee after conviction for refusing
induction than he would be to complete military service if he accepted induction
initially, petitioned for habeas and his petition was denied.
95 Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957). The same
standard of review prevails in preinduction suits, see cases cited note 83 supra.
906 Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947).
97Military Selective Service Act §10(b)(3), 50 U.S.C. Ap1,. §460(b)(3)
(1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. 1972).
98327 U.S. 114 (1946). The Court had earlier formulated the standard in
deportation cases. See cases cited id. at 123 n.14.
99 Id. at 121.
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however, the Court derived from it the "no basis-in-fact" standard of
judicial review: 100
The provision making the decisions of the local boards "final"
means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative
action under this Act the customary scope of judicial review
which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts
are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classi-
fication made by the local boards was justified. The decisions
of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations
are final even though they may be erroneous. The question
of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no
basis in fact for the classification which it gave the
registrant."'°
In theory, the basis-in-fact test seems to mean that any evidence
supporting the board's decision requires a court to affirm regardless of
countervailing evidence in the record."0 2 It is unclear whether the test
is actually deemed to carry that meaning or, if not so extreme, how far
it is from that formulation. What is certain is that the test is intended
to provide for narrower judicial review than the "substantial evidence
test" applied to decisions of most administrative agencies.,0 3  As many
courts apply them, however, the two tests may differ little. 04
100 The deportation cases, where the Court had earlier derived a basis-in-fact
standard of review, see note 98 supra, also involved a statute that characterized the
administrative action as "final." See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 167 (1945)
(Stone, C.J., dissenting).
3.01327 U.S. at 122-23.
102 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 167 (1945) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)
(deportation proceeding) ; accord, 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISmATiVE LAW TREATIsE § 29.07,
at 150 (1958). But see the opinion for the Court in Bridges overturning an admin-
istrative decision that was supported only by "flimsy" evidence. 326 U.S. at 156.
See also text accompanying note 174 infra.
103 The issue under that test is whether there is "substantial evidence" to support
the agency's decision. Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides
that a reviewing court should set aside an agency's determination only if it is
"unsupported by substantial evidence" and that "[i]n making the foregoing deter-
minations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a
party . . . ." Administrative Procedure Act §10(e), 5 U.S.C. §706 (1970). See
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), for the Supreme Court's
construction of the substantial evidence test. See also Jaffe, Judicial Review:
"Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record", 64 HARv. L. Rlv. 1233 (1951).
104 See 4 K. DAvis, supra note 102, §29.07. at 150-52; M. FoRxoscH, TAxisE
oN A miis'rvn LAw § 338, at 727 n.19 (1956) ; Hansen, The Basis-in-Fact Test
in Judicial Review of Selective Service Classifications: A Critical Analysis, 37
BRooiYN L. REv. 453, 471-81 (1971); Comment, The Selective Service System:
An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54 CALIW. L. IZEv. 2123, 2140 (1966) ; Comment,
Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective Service System, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv.
1014, 1023 (1966) (suggesting a "minimum test of legality" is used) ; Note, Selective
Service and Judicial Review, 32 VA. L. REv. 618, 625-26 (1946).
Since the Supreme Court has never clarified the precise meaning of the basis-in-
fact test, lower courts differ considerably in the way they apply it. For cases inter-
preting the test as allowing only very narrow review, see, e.g., Speer v. Hedrick,
419 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); United States v. Pritchard, 413 F.2d
663 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 995 (1969); United States v. Henderson,
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The basis-in-fact standard applies, however, only to factual ques-
tions. This is clear from Estep's pronouncement that a board's juris-
diction is limited by the statute and the regulations, that only its actions
within its jurisdiction are final, and that a registrant can always chal-
lenge a board's action on the ground that it is lawless and outside the
board's jurisdiction.'0 5 Since Estep, moreover, the Court has over-
turned classifications without deference to the Selective Service System
when a board has made a legal error, either by denying procedural
rights to a registrant in the course of classifying him, or by misinter-
preting the legal requirements for a classification.' ° Inasmuch as
Selective Service proceedings are conducted on a relatively informal
basis and board members are chosen as community representatives
rather than experts, it is not surprising that courts have undertaken to
decide questions of law de novo.07
Although courts decide purely legal issues independently of the
System, a registrant cannot prevail by showing a legal error on the part
of the board unless that error has prejudiced him. 08 This doctrine
poses a potentially bigger hurdle for the registrant than the "harmless
error" standard as typically applied. First, some courts require the
registrant to show that the error was prejudicial,0 9 rather than placing
411 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 916 (1970). For cases applying
it more as the equivalent of a substantial evidence test, see, e.g., Annett v. United
States, 205 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1953); Rautenstrauch v. Secretary of Defense, 313
F. Supp. 170 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
105327 U.S. at 120-21.
1o6 See Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955) (legal interpretation);
Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955) (procedural rights); Gonzales v.
United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955) (procedural rights). Justice Minton would have
applied the basis-in-fact test to legal as well as factual questions. He dissented in
all three cases on the ground that although the boards involved may have acted
mistakenly, their judgment was not so unreasonable as to be arbitrary or capricious.
348 U.S. at 396, 406, 418.
107 Cf. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968)
(Harlan, 3., concurring in the result) ; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197-99
(1969).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 337 F2d 800 (3d Cir. 1964); Pate v.
United States, 243 F.2d 99, 104 (5th Cir. 1957). Compare Briggs v. United States,
397 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1968) (denial of physical inspection held prejudicial), with
Edwards v. United States, 395 F.2d 453, 455-57 (9th Cir.) (no prejudice found),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968), and United States ex rel. Lipsitz v. Perez, 372 F.2d
468, 470 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967) (registrant suffered no "actual"
prejudice), and United States v. Bobzien, 306 F. Supp. 1272 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (no
prejudice found). Of course, when the error goes to the board's jurisdiction in the
strict sense, cf. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), prejudice need not be
shown; e.g., Adolfson v. Commanding Officer, 3 SEL. SExv. L. REP. 3311 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (no need to show prejudice when board issued induction order to registrant
not in its jurisdiction).
109 See, e.g., Adolfson v. Commanding Officer, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3311 (N.D.
Cal. 1970) (registrant must show prejudice from omission or violation of procedural
requisites) (dictum). The same practice prevails in criminal cases that are not of
constitutional dimensions; see, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795, 803
(5th Cir. 1970).
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on the government the burden of proving the error harmless."' Second,
some courts hold that classification by the appeal board is independent
of the local board so that errors limited to the local board are per se
harmless."'
II. THE UNRELIABILITY OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
DETERMINATIONS
One firm conclusion can be drawn from experience with the con-
scientious objector provisions: the results have been unreliable. In
part, this is attributable to the difficulties encountered in giving clear
definition to the substantive standard. More serious are the seemingly
intractable problems involved in attempting to apply the standard within
the framework of the Selective Service System.
A. The Standard
For a time, the standard itself was a matter of considerable dispute.
The 1948 version of the Selective Training and Service Act," 2 like the
current statute, said that a person "who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form" would be considered a conscientious objector." 3 It went on,
however, to define religious training and belief:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but
110 The Supreme Court has held that in criminal cases involving federal consti-
tutional error, the beneficiary of the error must show it harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 26 (1967). In civil cases also,
the prevailing rule is that the beneficiary of an error bears the burden of proving it
harmless. See F. J~mns, CivIL PRocFDuRE § 11.3, at 531 (1965).
"'1 See Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub norn. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969) ;
Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d 255, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1966) ; DeRemer v. United
States, 340 F.2d 712, 719 (8th Cir. 1965) (at least where claim was of local board
prejudice). Courts differ, however, on which errors are limited to the local board
and which also infect the appeal board process. At least one court makes an exception
to the inference of appeal board correction when the local board's action "was either
so arbitrary or erroneous as to taint the entire procedure." United States ex rel.
Khamis v. Resor, 3 SEL. SEav. L. Rm,. 3295, 3296 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Some courts
adopt a test of whether the registrant's claim is the type likely to have been corrected
by the appeal board. United States v. Atherton, 430 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1970)
(distinguishing between claims of local board prejudice and claims where appeal
board is likely to be influenced by local board); see Caverly v. United States, 429
F2d 92 (8th Cir. 1970). When the appeal board gives valid reasons for its clas-
sification, appeal board correction of local board errors is usually inferred; cf. United
States v. Carroll, 398 F.2d 651, 654 n.5 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Shevenell,
310 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Me. 1970).
112 This was the popular title of the 1948 draft law. Act of June 24, 1948,
ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604.
"13 Selective Service Act of 1948 § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.
App. §456(j) (Supp. 1972).
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does not include essentially political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views or a merely personal moral code." 4
One point of confusion was whether the exemption was limited to those
with theistic religious beliefs." 5 This was part of the larger problem
of distinguishing between "religious" beliefs and "essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral
code." "'
In United States v. Seeger "'7 the Supreme Court held that the
"Supreme Being" language of the statutory standard did not require
that a man believe in a traditional God to qualify as a conscientious
objector. Instead, the Court said that Congress, "in keeping with its
long-established policy of not picking and choosing among religious
beliefs," 11 had allowed for the exemption of "all sincere religious
beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which
all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." "'
The Court went on to clarify the line of demarcation between beliefs
considered "religious" under the statute and those not deemed re-
ligious. Seeger, together with the more recent case of Welsh v. United
States,2 ' indicates that the primary test of whether a belief is religious
within the meaning of the statute is a functional one; the role that the
belief plays in the life of the possessor is the central element in deciding
whether a registrant's belief is religious "in his own scheme of
things." 121 The test the factfinder must apply is "whether a given
belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption." 12 If it does, the source of his
114 Selective Service Act of 1948 § 6(j), 62 Stat. 613, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.
App. §456(j) (Supp. 1972).
15 Compare United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-180 (1965), with Welsh
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 348-50 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
116 These problems existed also under the 1940 provision, which was simply:
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subject
to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to par-
ticipation in war in any form." Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 § 5(g),
54 Stat. 889. Compare United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.
1944), and United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943), and United States
ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943), with Berman v. United
States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946) (en banc).
"17380 U.S. 163 (1965).
"Isd, at 175.
"9 Id. at 176.
120398 U.S. 333 (1970).
121 380 U.S. at 184-85.
122 Id. at 166. See id. at 184; Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 339-40.
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belief-whether it is internally derived or externally compelled 123 -- is
immaterial.124  Nor need it derive from the teachings of any religious
group, as opposed to the registrant's own reading or contemplation.' 25
There is, however, a substantive as well as a functional dimension
to the test whether a belief qualifies. A purely pragmatic belief-for
example, a belief that the registrant should avoid endangering his life-
cannot qualify even if it occupies a central place in the registrant's life
and scheme of values. Similarly, a belief that war is unwise as a
matter of policy will not suffice. The objection must be conscientious.
Although it may be "founded to a substantial extent upon considera-
tions of public policy," it may not rest "solely upon considerations of
policy, pragmatism, or expediency." 126 It must have some "moral,
ethical, or religious" content in order to qualify.
127
Welsh and Seeger were concerned with the 1948 statute. Congress
amended the statute in 1967, excluding the clause defining religious
training and belief as "an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human re-
lation." 128 Congress' purpose in making this change is quite unclear.
While the amendment would seem most plausibly to show acceptance
of the Seeger holding that theistic belief is not required, the legislative
history indicates that some members of Congress believed they could
avoid that holding by abandoning the Supreme Being language.'29
Apparently they were influenced by language in Seeger suggesting that
Congress' use of the term "Supreme Being," rather than "God," showed
the exemption embraced a wide spectrum of religious belief.'80
123 The Government in Welsh conceded that the registrant's belief was held with
the strength of traditional religious convictions but claimed that, even after Seeger,
conscientious objector status could be denied to one whose beliefs had no religious
basis. 398 U.S. at 337-38. The Court held, however, that Welsh's beliefs qualified
him for conscientious objector status.
124 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965).
125 The Court in Welsh said that the "sincere and meaningful beliefs that prompt
the registrant's objection to all wars need not be confined in either source or content
to traditional or parochial concepts of religion." 398 U.S. at 339; see 380 U.S. at
184-85. Neither Seeger nor Welsh belonged to a religious group or adhered to the
teaching of any organized religion when they applied for conscientious objector status,
yet both their claims were upheld by the Supreme Court.
126 398 U.S. at 342-43. See 380 U.S. at 173 (those objecting "on the basis of
essentially political, sociological or economic considerations" excluded).
127 398 U.S. at 342. See id. at 339-40.
128 See note 5 supra. Although the Supreme Court decided Welsh subsequent
to the amendment, it was the 1948 version of the Act that the Court was interpreting;
Welsh had been convicted of refusing to submit to induction in 1966, prior to the
amendment.
129 See H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 346,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 15,428-29 (1967) (remarks of
Senator Edward Kennedy). But see id. 14,098, 14,119-20 (remarks of Congressmen
Edwards and Kastenmeier) ; id. 15,428 (remarks of Senator Russell).
130 See 380 U.S. at 174-76.
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It does not seem likely, however, that the statute will be read more
narrowly without the Supreme Being language than it was with it. The
issue for the Court in Seeger was whether the reference to a Supreme
Being narrowed the meaning of "religious training and belief" or left
it unaltered. The Court decided that the Supreme Being language did
not change the preexisting test of "religious training and belief"; it did
not decide that the Supreme Being language enlarged the definition of
religion or that the definition would be any narrower in its absence.'31
It seems then that the Welsh-Seeger test of who is sufficiently re-
ligious remains viable.'32 Accordingly, a draft board's duty in passing
on a conscientious objector claim is to decide whether a registrant's
objection is sincere, whether it is based on religious training and belief
within the meaning of Welsh and Seeger, and whether it runs to par-
ticipation in all wars.'3 3
B. Application of the Standard
Even if the standard is properly understood, there remains for
those who find the facts the elusive task of probing the registrant's state
of mind. Part of the problem may lie in the nature of the factfinder.
Board members are not sympathetic to conscientious objector claims.'3 4
13 See id. at 165, 173, 176.
_1
3 2 As indicated, note 6 supra, the test stated in Mr. Justice Black's opinion in
Welsh was adopted by the Court, although there is no opinion for the Court. Mr.
Justice Harlan, who had joined the Court's opinion in Seeger, had second thoughts
about that opinion as a matter of statutory construction, as well as disagreeing with
the statutory construction in Welsh. 398 U.S. at 344 (Harlan, J., concurring in
the result). He thought that Congress had intended to exempt only persons with
theistic religious beliefs. It did not intend to exempt adherents of nontheistic religions,
id. at 348-50, nor did it intend to exempt those whose beliefs were not acquired
through "religion" in the conventional sense, id. at 351-54. Justice Harlan thought,
however, that the statutory provision as properly construed violated the religion
clauses of the first amendment, id. at 356-61. He believed that when a statutory
provision is unconstitutional because of underinclusion, nullification of the provision
is not the only possible remedy. The Court may instead, if it deems it more appro-
priate, extend the statute's coverage to include more persons. Id. at 361-67. But see
id. at 367-69 (White, J., dissenting). It was on this reasoning that Justice Harlan
"adopt[ed] the test announced by MR. JUSTIcE BLAcK, not as a matter of statutory
construction, but as the touchstone for salvaging a congressional policy of long
standing that would otherwise have to be nullified." Id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring
in the result).
133 There are difficulties also in deciding whether a particular registrant's objec-
tion runs to all wars. See note 302 infra.
134 J. D~vis & K. DOLBEARE, LITTLE GROUPS OF NEIGiBORS 92, table 4.2, 108
(1968) ; Rabin, A Strange Brand of Selectivity: Administrative Law Perspectives on
the Processing of Registrants in the Selective Service System, 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv.
1005, 1019 (1970). Only 5% of the board members polled in a Wisconsin study
thought it was very important to defer conscientious objectors and 55% said that
conscientious objectors should not be deferred at all. Davis & Dolbeare, A Social
Profile of Local Draft Board Members: The Case of Wisconsin, in SEcrvE
SEaVICE AND AmERCAN Sociy 53, 73-74 (R. Little ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
A Social Profile]. See G. WAMSLEY, Sar-cniv SERvIcE & A CHANGING AMFMaCA
146 (1969) (suggesting local board hostility to "unconventional" claimants).
Board members also have peculiarly middle class values. The predominant
middle class composition, see note 229 infra & accompanying text, of the local boards
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Many are veterans 35 and they frequently belong to veterans'
organizations.1 36  All are persons whose sense of duty has led them to
volunteer their time 137 to the operation of the system of military con-
scription, 3 ' while the conscientious objector's claim for exemption is
based on a rejection of the military system itself. Prior to the recent
statutory amendments not only did the typical board have a bias, but
it also was an interested party. The board's basic responsibility was to
fill a monthly quota of men available for service; 189 when it allowed a
man to avoid military service, it had to find another to replace him. A
I-A-O classification leading to noncombatant service did count toward
can be explained partly by the fact that voluntary and uncompensated service on
the draft board is the sort of civic duty which members of the middle class are
accustomed to performing. Board members are frequent holders of other civicly
oriented nonpartisan offices. A 1966 study of local board members in Wisconsin
revealed, for example, that 26% of the members had held a position on their local
school boards. J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, supra at 65-71; Wamsley, Decision-Making
it Local Boards: A Case Study, in SEcTrM SRvicE AND AMERICAN SoclEry 83,
93-94 (R. Little ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Decision-Making].
135 A 1966 study reported that almost two-thirds of board members were veterans.
J. DAVIS & K. DoLBEaRE, supra note 134, at 57. NATIONAL ADVISORY CommissioN
ON SEIEcTIVE SERVICE, IN Puasurr OF EQuITY: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE?
19 (1967) [hereinafter cited as MARSHALL COMMISsioN REPORT]; G. WAmsLEY,
smpra note 134, at 94. Davis & Dolbeare put together statistics to conclude that the
average board in 1966 had three veterans, one of whom was a veteran of World
War I. J. DAVIS & K. DoLBEARE, supra at 57.
At least in several instances during World War II the selection of veterans for
service on the local boards was a deliberate statewide policy. A State Director of
Selective Service of a midwestern state explained his preference for veterans in the
following manner:
. . if a majority of the local board members were veterans, because of
their previous service and activities in various veterans' organizations, they
would have an understanding of service to the nation and a patriotic desire
to do the best possible for their country.
In the appointment of members of local boards, lists were obtained from
the various veterans' organizations, principally the American Legion, Veterans
of Foreign Wars, and the United Spanish War Veterans, as well as recom-
mendations from civic groups such as Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions, Chamber of
Commerce, and various labor groups, both CIO and A. F. of L. From these
lists men were selected and appointed as members of the individual local
boards, and boards of appeal throughout the state.
SELECTI'VE SERVICE SYSTEM, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM 191
(Special Monograph No. 3, 1951). For a discussion of the reliance placed on
veterans' organizations in the initial selection of board members after passage of the
1940 draft law, see G. WAmsLEY, supra at 128.
136 46% of Wisconsin's local board members belong to veterans' organizations as
compared to 6% for the United States adult population. J. DAVIS & K. DoLBEARE,
supra note 134, at 68, table 3.5. The comparatively high proportion of members
belonging to such organizations indicates a continuing military connection and a high
regard for conventional patriotism on their part.
137 Board members are not compensated for their services. 32 C.F.R. § 1603.3
(1972).
138 Rabin, supra note 134, at 1019. But see Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia),
Feb. 3, 1972, at 48, col. 1, reporting the request of the Pennsylvania State Director
to remove from a local draft board a 21-year-old member who had joined "to make
sure the views of people of [his] age [were] present in the board meetings" and
who followed a policy of granting deferments upon request because he was "against
making people go to war if they don't want to."
139 32 C.F.R. § 1631.6(a) (1972).
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fulfillment of the quota, but a I-0 classification did not.140 Section
5(d) of the new statute, when read in conjunction with an executive
order issued in July 1971,1" alters this situation by establishing a uni-
form national call. Men holding lottery numbers up to a specified
ceiling, periodically announced by the Director of Selective Service, are
vulnerable to being called, regardless of how many registrants falling
within this category a particular board might have.
If draft boards were purely neutral factfinders, however, they
would still have difficulty passing reliable judgments upon conscientious
objector claims. The boards, as earlier observed, are "not composed
of experts, real or purported, but of citizens of the neighborhood." 142
They may not understand the applicable legal rules and may be con-
founded by the lengthy and sophisticated statements some registrants
submit to explain their beliefs, particularly registrants without tradi-
tional religious affiliations. 4 '
Problems more basic than the nature of the boards are that often
there is little evidence available to substantiate or disprove the reg-
istrant's asserted belief, and that even when there is evidence to be
found, there is little likelihood that current factfinding procedures will
bring it to light. In the past, a local board typically utilized only the
following sources of information when it passed on the merits of a
conscientious objector application in the first instance: the registrant's
statements made in his Form 150, his other correspondence with the
board, and statements submitted by third persons whom the registrant
had requested to support his claim. Under the recent amendments the
same should be true except for those registrants who request that their
personal meeting with the board ... be held before the initial classifica-
tion instead of after it.145
1
4
0Id.
'4' Exec. Order No. 11,606, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1972).
142 Ex parte Stanziale, 138 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 797
(1943).
143 Board members do not develop skills because of the occasional nature of their
job and the small percentage of conscientious objector cases. See Rabin, supra note
134, at 1018; Rabin, supra note 36, at 650. Board members are often unaware of
existing regulations, J. DAvis & K. DOLBEARE, supra note 134, at 80, and controlling
precedents. Rabin, supra note 36, at 670. The System's tardiness in revising Form
150 following the Seeger decision served to exacerbate these difficulties. Hearings on
Selective Service & Military Compensation Before the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 417 (1971) (statement of Mr. Neier, Executive
Director, ACLU).
144 For a discussion of the relevance to this problem of the personal appearance
before the board, see text accompanying notes 180-94 infra.
145 Under the new regulations, registrants who claim conscientious objector
status have a right to meet personally with the board either before or after the
board's initial classification. 37 Fed. Reg. 5122 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
§ 1624.1). Other registrants' right to a personal appearance comes into play only
after the board has initially denied their requested deferment or exemption. Id.
[Vol.120:870
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Prior to the 1967 amendment of the draft law, it was not critical
that frequently the only evidence considered by the board was that
submitted by the registrant. Special procedures were available at a
subsequent stage to fill the gap. When a registrant appealed a denial
of a conscientious objector claim, the appeal board, on the basis of his
file, would make a determination whether the local board's action was
correct. If the appeal board also ruled against the registrant, the case
was referred to the Department of Justice for investigation and recom-
mendation.'46 The Department of Justice procedure started with an
FBI investigation, which ordinarily consisted of interviews with a
wide range of persons who had had contact with the registrant."7 After
the investigation was completed, the registrant, provided with a written
summary of the evidence in the FBI report,4 8 appeared before a hearing
officer,' 49 where he could contest the information in the report and
produce witnesses to support his claim.' 50 The registrant could be
represented by counsel at this hearing.'r'
The hearing officer was generally a private attorney who had
volunteered to perform this function without compensation. 52 After
the hearing, he reported his findings and conclusions to the Department,
recommending for or against a grant of conscientious objector status.
Despite these provisions a board may always request a registrant to appear before
it in the exercise of its investigative powers. 32 C.F.R. § 1621.15 (1972) (providing
subpoena powers). But such an interview on the initiative of the board will not
displace the registrant's right to have a personal appearance at his request.
Prior to the recent regulations, conscientious objectors, like other registrants,
had a right to a personal appearance on their request only after they were initially
classified. 32 C.F.R. §1624.1(a) (1972). The period from mid-1968 to mid-1970
is an exception, however. During that time local boards were instructed to hold a
preclassification interview, apart from any request on the part of a registrant, with
registrants claiming to be conscientious objectors to whom boards felt they could not
grant conscientious objector status. Local Board Mem. No. 41, SE.. SERv. L. REP.
2174 (as amended, 1968) (rescinded, 1970). That interview did not take the place
of the post-classification personal appearance. Id.
146 The 1940 statute first provided for the Department of Justice procedure. It
directed that the Department should, after "appropriate inquiry," hold a hearing
"with respect to the character and good faith of the objections of the person con-
cerned." Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
The provision was in effect until 1967. Military Selective Service Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1 (7), 81 Stat. 104.
147 Reisner, supra note 55, at 687 n.5; Smith & Bell, The Conscientious Objector
Program-A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. Prr. L. REv. 695, 701 (1958).
148 See Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Smith & Bell, supra
note 147, at 701-02; cf. United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
149 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
150 Smith & Bell, supra note 147, at 702.
'51 Office of the Attorney General, Mem. No. 41 (revised), § 104.1 (Apr. 2,
1956). The attorney could not, however, "object to any question or make any
argument concerning any phase of the proceeding," id. § 104.5, which was meant to
be conducted in an "informal, non-technical and flexible manner," id. § 104.1.
152 Reisner, supra note 55, at 688; White, Processing Conscientious Objector
Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry, 56 CAW. L. REv. 652, 654 (1968).
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The hearing officer's recommendation did not bind the Department.1
53
Nor did the Department's subsequent recommendation and advisory
opinion-based on the registrant's Selective Service file, the FBI in-
vestigation, and the hearing officer's report ' 54-bind the appeal
board,'55 which again passed on the registrant's classification. 5" It has
been estimated, however, that the board did follow the Department's
recommendation in ninety to ninety-five percent of the cases. 57  More-
over, the Department's recommendation was favorable to the registrant
in more than seventy percent of all cases. 5 8In 1967, Congress abolished the Department of Justice pro-
cedure.' 59 With larger draft calls, and the consequent increase in
appeals from unfavorable classifications, the Department was unable to
keep abreast of the cases, and Congress became concerned that the
procedure provided an attractive delaying tactic that could be used even
by those with no hope of receiving conscientious objector status. 60
During the period when this procedure existed, it appears that
many local boards routinely denied all but the most clear-cut con-
scientious objector claims because they considered the evidence they
had inadequate for making reliable determinations.' 6' As observed
above, only a denial would lead to departmental investigation and recom-
mendation. Similarly, the appeal board was likely to deny a claim
initially in order to elicit more evidence. 6' With the abolition of the
procedure, however, the only evidence available at any stage with which
to judge the validity of a registrant's claim is typically the evidence
153 Rabin, supra note 36, at 680, reports that the Chief of the Conscientious
Objector Section of the Department has estimated that the Department followed the
hearing officer's recommendation in approximately 75% of the cases.
154 Smith & Bell, supra note 147, at 702.
155 Exec. Order No. 10,714, § 1626.25, 22 Fed. Reg. 4273, 4275 (1957) (rescinded,
Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 Fed. Reg. 9787, 9792 (1967)).
156 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 613, as amended,
50 U.S.C.A. APP. §456(j) (Supp. 1972); Exec. Order No. 10,714, §1626.25(e),
22 Fed. Reg. 4273, 4275 (1957) (rescinded, Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 Fed. Reg.
9787, 9792 (1967)).
157 Smith & Bell, mtpra note 147, at 702 (90-95%) ; Gonzales v. United States,
364 U.S. 59, 72 (1960) (over 90%).
158 Estimate of the Conscientious Objector Section of the Department of Justice,
reported in Reisner, supra note 55, at 687. Smith & Bell, supra note 147, at 702,
reports that in 80%o of the cases approval of the claim was recommended. The
disparity may be due to a lower percentage of favorable recommendations during
the final years of the Department procedure, when many more registrants were
drafted and challenges to local board classifications markedly increased. See Reisner,
supra at 688.
15950 t.S.C. App. §456(j) (1964), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-40, §1(7),
81 Stat. 104 (1967).
160 See CIVILIAN ADVISORY PANEL ON MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT, 9 0TH
CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT TO THE HousE Comm. ON ARmED SERVICES (Comm. Print
1967); H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 346,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967).
161 See Rabin, supra note 36, at 668-70.
162 See id. 674; Smith & Bell, supra note 147, at 700.
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before the local board; no evidence will be gathered later to correct an
erroneous decision at the initial level,16 and local boards themselves
have no more evidence than that which they often deemed inadequate
in the past.
164
Although boards have power to conduct their own investigations,"6 5
they rarely do so.' GG Long accustomed to relying solely on evidence
163 Since the 1971 amendments there is one exception: Appeal boards now grant
personal appearances, 37 Fed. Reg. 5123 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
§ 1626.3(a)), which could produce additional evidence. That personal appearance is
likely to be duplicative of the personal appearance before the local board, however,
and all evidence before either board in the usual case still comes from the registrant
and sources that he provides. Systematic investigation on the part of the government
is utterly lacking.
164The unofficial transcript of the personal appearance in the case of O'Brien
v. Resor, 423 F.2d 594, 598-99 (4th Cir. 1970), suggests that some local boards may
have continued to defer to the appellate procedure after the reason for such deference
disappeared. O'Brien's second personal appearance was on November 14, 1967; the
amended Act was approved on June 13, of that year, and the Department of Justice
procedures were therefore not utilized in his case. The transcript reads (emphasis
in original) :
Mr. Ballard: Is there something you wanted to add to your case?
Me: No. I only wanted to discuss my classification of I-A so that I might
answer any of your questions and doubts.
Mr. Ballard: We don't actually have any questions. We studied your file
and feel we can't classify you I-0.
Me: Could you tell me why you made this decision. Is it because you doubt
some of my answers or convictions?
Mr. Ballard: We don't actually doubt your beliefs-it's just that you never
applied before.
Me: I realize I never applied before but according to the regulations there
isn't really any time stipulated for an individual to register as a conscientious
objector. According to the Supreme Court, it's simply whether or not an
individual is sincere and lives according to his beliefs in a Supreme Being.
Mr. Ballard: Well, there are many regulations concerning this and it's just
a hair-line border between them. We just don't feel we can give you the
classification.
Me: If you've read my material, you've seen I have lived according to my
convictions over the years. There are letters from friends who have known
me over the past four years, my roommate, professors, a minister, and my
brothers, who I'm very close to and who know my feelings. All of these
people have written because they feel I am sincere in my beliefs.
Mr. Ballard: Yes, we have read the letters and we believe you are sincere.
All of us as Christians don't believe in killing and when the time comes we
must think about it.
Me: Then it's just that I applied late.
Mr. Ballard: No, not really, it's just that you should appeal to the Board of
Appeals.
Older Man: Yes, I think it would be better for you if you appeal it. The
board seems to have more time for things like this. They have the time to
read your material and won't make any hasty decisions. Yes, I think it's best
to appeal it.
Me: But if you gentlemen feel I'm sincere why can't you classify me as a
conscientious objector?
Mr. Ballard: We certainly feel yoz're sincere. You certainly wouldn't drive
all the way from Baltimore on just a hunch. Why it's not just the expense
there's a lot of time involved.
165 See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
166 Reisner, supra note 55, at 710.
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submitted to them, their failure to change their approach since 1967 is
not surprising. The nonprofessional, volunteer nature of draft boards
also makes it difficult for them to change their ways. Board members
are unpaid .67 and typically spend only one or two evenings a month at
the job. 6' To have added the responsibility for investigating claims to
the heavy caseload the Vietnam conflict has entailed would have in-
volved a commitment of time that draft boards are unwilling to give.
For boards to rest their decisions solely on registrants' evidence
creates a troublesome situation. At least those registrants whose
biographical data presented in their Form 100 do not belie their claims,
and who have been advised by counsel from the time they first regis-
tered for the draft should, under that procedure, receive classification as
conscientious objectors, whether or not their claims are genuine. Even
registrants who seek conscientious objector status after their initial
registration should, with competent advice, be able to present papers
showing a prima facie case and nothing that casts doubt upon the claim.
If then the registrant's evidence alone can induce or compel the board
to grant a claim, claims can easily be fabricated, and a man's chances
of success within the Selective Service System will depend less on
whether he is a sincere conscientious objector than on the care he takes
in supplying data to his board.
Boards may respond by denying claims because they distrust the
registrant, even though no evidence supporting disbelief appears in the
record. They may suspect that evidence supporting the claim is fab-
ricated or that full investigation might produce contradictory evidence,
and they may justify denying a claim on simple disbelief since the
registrant bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to the ex-
emption. One can have little confidence in a selection of which claims
to disbelieve, however, when nothing in the file provides grounds for
doubting sincerity; it seems inevitable that genuine claims would be
denied along with false ones, and that some false claims would continue
to be granted.'69 To empower boards to deny claims on the basis of
167 32 C.F.R. § 1603.3 (1972).
168 Rabin, supra note 36, at 649-50.
169 Professor Ralph Reisner conducted a study of the bases for classification
decisions when the Department of justice procedure was in effect, see Reisner, supra
note 55, at 710 n.139, and concluded that the ultimate decision as to sincerity at that
time rarely rested on the applicant's own statements or such an elusive factor as his
demeanor during his brief personal appearance before the local board or the hearing
officer. Instead a registrant's inability to explain evidence that was revealed by the
FBI investigation and was contradictory to his claim was, according to Professor
Reisner, the most frequent reason for ultimate denial on the ground of insincerity.
Id. 710.
Under current procedures the registrant will not often be confronted with the
problem of having to explain adverse information, because typically no adverse infor-
mation will be produced. But those registrants for whom, if an investigation were
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mere disbelief would, moreover, make their discretion in granting or
rejecting claims unlimited and utterly unreviewable, a result particularly
troublesome when the board's impartiality is questionable. 70
In a somewhat different context, the Supreme Court has held that
a board is not free to reject a registrant's claim when nothing in his file
supports the rejection. In Dickinson v. United States,"' the Court
reversed the conviction of a man who had been denied a ministerial
exemption by the Selective Service System. The board's apparent
ground was disbelief of Dickinson's evidence, but there was nothing in
his file impeaching or contradicting his claim. The Court held that
"when the uncontroverted evidence supporting a registrant's claim
places him prima facie within the statutory exemption, dismissal of the
claim solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation is both contrary
to the spirit of the Act and foreign to our concepts of justice." 172 Its
ruling, it said, was consistent with the basis-in-fact test for "if the facts
are disputed the board bears the ultimate responsibility for resolving
the conflict-the courts will not interfere." "' Under the basis-in-fact
test "the task of the courts . . . is to search the record for some affirma-
tive evidence to support the board's overt or implicit finding that a
registrant has not painted a complete or accurate picture of his activi-
ties." 174 If, however, there is no proof "incompatible with the reg-
istrant's proof of exemption," boards must utilize their investigatory
powers to produce conflicting evidence before they can be upheld in
denying the claim."' 5
conducted, no adverse information would be uncovered, or those who would be able
to explain away any negative findings, suffer from the cloud of suspicion that hangs
over all claims because they are not checked out.
A later study by the same author compares present appeal board determinations
with pre-1967 ones. Professor Reisner concludes that "the critical difference . . .
lies in the greater use by appeal boards of a small number of absolute criteria by
which eligibility is judged. The decisions rendered by the Justice Department appear
to have been predicated on a less absolute, more individual appraisal of the applicant's
beliefs." Reisner, supra note 7, at 541.
170 See notes 134-41 supra & accompanying text.
171346 U.S. 389 (1953).
172 Id. at 397.
1"3Id. at 396.
174Id.
.75 Id. at 396-97.
The dissenters in Dickinson claimed that the Court had abandoned the basis-in-
fact test by "examin[ing] and weigh[ing] . . . purely factual determinations," id. at
400 (Jackson, J., dissenting) :
It will not do for the Court . . . to say on the one hand that the board's
action is not subject to "the customary scope of judicial review" and that
"the courts are not to weigh the evidence," and then on the other to strike
down a classification because no affirmative evidence supporting the board's
conclusion appears in the record. Under today's decision, it is not sufficient
that the board disbelieve the registrant. The board must find and record
affirmative evidence that he has misrepresented his case--evidence which is
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The rule of Dickinson applies somewhat differently to conscientious
objector cases. Two years after Dickinson, the registrant in Witmer v.
United States 176 argued to the Supreme Court that the Selective Service
System erred in denying his conscientious objector claim when he had
made a prima facie case of conscientious objector status and his file
contained no evidence incompatible with the claim. The Court ruled
that a board could legitimately deny the claim without any evidence
positively inconsistent with conscientious objector status. It distin-
guished the ministerial exemption at issue in Dickinson on the ground
then put to the test of substantiality by the courts. In short, the board must
build a record.
Id. at 399.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis also has claimed that the Court's refusal to allow
the board to find against the party having the burden of proof on the ground that it
disbelieves his evidence is inconsistent with the basis-in-fact test that the Court said
it espoused. 4 K. DAvis,. supra note 102, § 29.07, at 150.
An analogous issue in a civil trial is whether a judge should be permitted to
direct a verdict for the party having the burden of proof. Courts disagree on whether
it is ever permissible to direct a verdict when a plaintiff offers evidence that, if
believed, would entitle him to a verdict, and the defendant offers no contradictory
evidence. Some say that a verdict cannot be directed for the plaintiff because the
jury must pass upon whether he is to be believed and what inferences to draw from
his testimony. See, e.g., Alexander v. Tingle, 181 Md. 464, 30 A.2d 737 (1943);
Woodin v. Durfee, 46 Mich. 424, 9 N.W. 457 (1881). Others hold that the judge
may direct a verdict for the party bearing the burden of proof. He should do so in
those cases where the proponent has made a prima facie case and there is nothing
in the evidence that provides the factfinder with a reasonable basis for disbelieving
the proponent's evidence. He may direct a verdict even if persons supplying the
evidence have an interest in the outcome, for the fact that they are interested does
not by itself provide a basis for discrediting their testimony:
A jury has no greater or better right to act arbitrarily or unreasonably
in forming a judgment or opinion as to whether or not a witness speaks the
truth than it has to act unreasonably in arriving at any other opinion or
conclusion.
And there is no general rule "that the mere fact that a witness is interested in the
matter in controversy, in and of itself, without regard to other circumstances of the
case, makes it reasonable to disbelieve . . . his testimony . . . ." Jerke v. Delmont
State Bank, 54 S.D. 446, 459-61, 223 N.W. 585, 590-91 (1929), quoted in IX
J. WIGM ORE, EVIDENcE §2495, at 309 (3d ed. 1940). See also Ferdinand v. Agri-
cultural Ins. Co., 22 N.J. 482, 126 A.2d 323 (1956).
Wigmore considers the latter approach the better rule, IX J. WIGMoRE, szupra
§ 2495, at 306, and both he and James report it as the prevailing view. F. JAMES,
supra note 110, §7.11, at 279; IX J. WIGMOR, supra §2495, at 305. It is the
counterpart of the Dickinson rule in draft board cases except that under Dickinson
it is not a rule of reason, based on all the facts and circumstances of the particular
case, that determines whether the factfinder can disbelieve the registrant because of
his interest in the outcome; instead there is a per se rule that a board cannot discredit
the registrant unless it finds something else in the evidence to cast doubt on his
veracity. This difference may be explained in part because in draft board procedures
the board occupies the roles both of factfinder and judge; no case can be kept from
disposition by the factfinder in the absence of a per se rule, for, at this stage of the
proceedings, there is no separate third body to determine how a rule of reason
applies to the particular case. Moreover, that boards are likely to have to participate
in gathering facts adverse to the registrant, if any are to be gathered, presents a
special danger, without a counterpart in civil cases: that the factgathering process
will be short-circuited if the factfinder is permitted to rule against the registrant
because of a disbelief that lacks a basis in any evidence that has been gathered.
Under the quota system the danger was accentuated because the boards, unlike juries,
had an interest in the outcome.
176 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
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that good faith was irrelevant to that exemption, which required only
a showing of totally objective facts-that the registrant's regular voca-
tion was preaching and teaching religion. Conscientious objector cases,
by contrast, always involve the subjective issue of the registrant's
sincerity.1
7 7
Witmer added, however, that Selective Service authorities may not
rule against a registrant "solely on the basis of suspicion and specula-
tion" in conscientious objector cases any more than in others. A denial
based on insincerity can be sustained only if there is something in the
registrant's file that casts doubt on the registrant's veracity.' Witmer's
conviction was in fact sustained on the ground that his statements to
the board justified an inference of insincerity.1 9
As noted above, in many cases local boards meet with the reg-
istrant himself. As a result of the 1971 amendments, the same is now
likely to be true of appeal boards as well.' 80 While a registrant is in
full control of the evidence he presents to his board in writing, and can
draft it so that it clearly supports his position, he obviously cannot
predict, much less control, the board's assessment of his demeanor at a
personal appearance. If the board is entitled to reject a claim because
it concludes from its observations of the registrant that he is not telling
the truth, the registrant cannot be assured of success by the simple
expedient of filing a paper claim which is free of inconsistency.'"'
While there is an absence of square holdings on the subject, there
are suggestions in the case law that a board may properly disbelieve a
registrant because of his demeanor and reject his claim for that reason
alone. In Witmer, for example, the Court noted that "Witmer stated
his beliefs with apparent sincerity" '82 and that there was "no indication
anywhere in the record that his demeanor appeared shifty or evasive or
'77 Id. at 381. Cf. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. at 393 n.5.
178 348 U.S. at 381-82.
179 Prior to claiming conscientious objector status Witmer had claimed exemp-
tions as a farmer and as a minister, both of which claims had been frivolous; he
had made inconsistent statements about whether his beliefs permitted him to con-
tribute to the war effort in any capacity; and he had not adduced any evidence of
a prior expression of his conscientious opposition to participation in war. Id. at
382-83.
3
80 See 50 U.S.C.A. App. §471a(b) (1) (Supp. 1972).
181 A registrant might benefit, if this is the rule, by avoiding an appearance
before the board. Bypassing a personal appearance before the local board by
immediate appeal is not considered a failure to exhaust administrative remedies that
bars later judicial review. (This, at least, is the position of commentators, 3. GRF-
FrrHs, THE DRAn LAW 41 (2d ed. 1968); SF. SERv. L. REP. PRAcTICE MANUAL
12411 (1968), but there is no definitive judicial decision on the issue.) A board can
deprive a registrant of this stratagem by requiring him to appear before it, see
McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971); note 145 supra, but it may be
doubted whether the overburdened boards will be that farsighted in very many
instances.
182 348 U.S. at 382.
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that his appearance was one of unreliability .... 1 83 For this reason,
it explained, it was necessary, in order to sustain the conviction, to find
inferences of insincerity in the written statements Witmer had presented
to the board.
This language implies, however, that the mere fact that the reg-
istrant met personally with the board would not suffice as a basis in fact
for an unfavorable classification. When nothing in the record is un-
favorable to a registrant, an adverse classification will not be sustained
simply because, in its meeting with the registrant, the board might have
discredited his claim because of his demeanor. Such a finding on the
part of the board will not be presumed unless the board records its un-
favorable impressions in the registrant's file. A contrary rule would
undermine Dickinson's holding-that disbelief should not be inferred in
the absence of evidence to support the inference-in all cases where a
registrant appeared before his board. Witmer permits that result only
where the board makes an adverse notation concerning the registrant's
demeanor.'
Allowing a board to reject a claim by making an adverse finding
concerning the registrant's demeanor does provide a means of rejecting
claims that are perfect on paper but may in fact be insincere. Yet there
is little basis for confidence that the claims the board rejects on the
basis of demeanor will be those that in fact are insincerely made. The
typical hearing before the draft board does not provide a reliable basis
for separating the genuine claims from the contrived ones. Protections
which are deemed to enhance the reliability of the factfinding process in
judicial proceedings are absent: for example, a public forum,' the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 8" and the right
to counsel. 87 Inarticulate or poorly-educated registrants may be par-
ticularly prejudiced. 8 Prior to the 1971 amendments, the typical per-
183 Id.
184 Other cases indicating that a board may deny on the basis of demeanor
evidence are: United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37, 39 (6th Cir. 1968) ; United
States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808, 814-16 (2d Cir. 1960) (conviction affirmed on basis
of demeanor notation in record) ; Parr v. United States, 272 F.2d 416, 419 (9th Cir.
1959) (conviction reversed in absence of demeanor notation); Pitts v. United States,
217 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1954) (same); Campbell v. United States, 221 F.2d 454,
457-58 (4th Cir. 1955). But cf. Batterton v. United States, 260 F.2d 233, 236-37
(8th Cir. 1958).
185 See lit re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-72 (1948); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y.
56, 61-62, 65, 123 N.E.2d 769, 771-73 (1954).
186 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-06 (1965); Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959); 1 K. DAvis, sapra note 102, §7.05; V 3. WIGMoRE,
supra note 175, § 1367.
187 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
188 The lack of procedural safeguards before the local board may be more critical
now than it was prior to 1967. Previously the registrant who was unsuccessful
before his local board had an opportunity later for a hearing at which he could be
represented by counsel, was furnished a resumi of evidence that the FBI had
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sonal appearance before a local draft board lasted for only about ten
minutes.5 9  The regulations now suggest fifteen minutes as normal,
190
but that period is to include the three witnesses the registrant now may
present. Nervousness caused by the seriousness of the occasion, rather
than the lack of a genuine claim, could well explain any evasiveness on
the part of the registrant that occurs, and such a short interview cannot
usually provide a reliable basis for distinguishing one from the other.19
The lack of time allowed for the personal appearance is probably due, in
large part, to the volunteer nature of draft boards. 9 ' Time pressures
may also prevent board members from making a thorough study of the
registrant's file. A board unfamiliar with a registrant's claim cannot
maximize the utility of its hearing with the registrant to clarify or
expose the weak points in his case. A generalized interview of such
short duration is not an adequate means of testing sincerity.
Despite these shortcomings in present practice, there are probably
some occasions when a board could reasonably reject a claim because
the personal appearance persuaded it that the claimant should not be
believed. Because in the bulk of cases the personal appearance does not
provide a firm basis for determining the claimant's veracity, it may
nonetheless be unwise to allow a board to deny a claim on this ground
alone, rather than force it to unearth available evidence supporting or
discrediting the claim it suspects. 193 Empowering a board to reject a
claim on demeanor alone would create considerable danger that de-
meanor would be cited as the dispositive ground in cases where that
ruling was inappropriate. By citing a "shifty demeanor" or an "appear-
ance of unreliability" on the part of the registrant, a board could avoid
the burden of checking out a claim, yet render an unreviewable decision.
To be sure, there is now a right of personal appearance at the appeal
board and the Presidential board level. Their determinations, however,
if based on demeanor, will not be reviewable in court as long as the
registrant's appearance cannot be preserved in the record or recaptured
on appeal. A registrant seeking to challenge a classification in court
gathered, and was given an opportunity to rebut adverse evidence by his own testi-
mony, through witnesses, or by written evidence. See text accompanying notes 147-50
supra.
189 Interview with Selective Service officials at National Headquarters, in Wash-
ington, D.C., Aug. 1971. This estimate coincides with that which others have made.
See, e.g., Reisner, supra note 55, at 698 (10 minutes) ; Rabin, supra note 36, at 650
(10-15 minutes), 662 (10-20 minutes).
19037 Fed. Reg. 5122 (1972) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1624.4(c)).
191 Decision-Making, supra note 134, at 95, reports that things like dress and
posture become important in deciding whether to grant claims. See id. 97-98.
192 See text accompanying notes 167-68 supra.
193 Cf. Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, 3.).
1972]
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will therefore be effectively barred from judicial review if a finding
based solely on demeanor is legally sufficient.
Even a rule that a board cannot reject a claim on the basis of
demeanor alone if it has failed to conduct an investigation to produce
all available evidence would be insufficient to solve the dilemma. A
board that has investigated thoroughly might correctly disbelieve a
claim even though no evidence (other than the registrant's appearance)
supports disbelief. As will be more fully explored, 9' the quantum of
evidence an investigation produces cannot be dispositive. That there is
little evidence to prove the registrant's belief may not provide a basis
for disbelieving him; a failure to make external manifestations of one's
belief is not inconsistent with strong opposition to participation in war.
Nor is it conclusive that an investigation yields evidence supporting the
registrant. He is in full control of whatever evidence does or does not
exist on the subject of whether he entertains a particular belief. A
registrant whose activities support a conscientious objector claim could
have engaged in those activities simply to add to the persuasiveness of
his case before the draft board. If third parties attest to the sincerity
of his claim, they may themselves be insincere, or the registrant may
have persuaded them of the validity of his claim simply to improve his
chances of success.
Because the subject of inquiry is so elusive, the rule must either
allow the clever registrant to fabricate a foolproof conscientious ob-
jector claim (by not allowing the board to rest on demeanor), or permit
the draft board to deny conscientious objector claims at will in its un-
reviewable discretion. If we could trust to an adversary system to see
that evidence on both sides of a controversy were produced, and if we
trusted the factfinder on the subject of the dispute, we could have
greater confidence in a rule permitting denial of a claim on the basis
of demeanor alone.
III. THE "REASONS" REQUIREMENT
Prior to the 1971 amendments, the Universal Selective Service and
Military Training Act did not require boards to disclose their grounds
of decision. Although the Administrative Procedure Act required ad-
ministrative agencies to give reasons for their decisions, 95 the Selective
Service System has consistently been exempted from the APA.'96
194 See text accompanying notes 258-63 infra.
195Section 8(b), 5 U.S.C. §557(c) (1970). See also id. §§4(b), 6(d), 5
U.S.C. §§555(e), 558(c) (1970); MODEL STATE ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT
§ 11. Many states, however, do not require findings in cases tried by judges without
juries, and prior to 1930 federal equity courts were not required to make findings.
2 K. DAvIs, supra note 102, § 16.03. Moreover, under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, findings are not necessary in decisions in some cases. Id.
196 See note 56 supra.
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Before 1967, however, boards' failure to explain their decisions
was not of great importance in conscientious objector cases, because the
Department of Justice, when it made recommendations to the appeal
boards for disposition of conscientious objector cases, gave reasons for
its recommendations. Courts presumed that the Department's reasons
were shared by the appeal board whenever the board followed the re-
sult the Department recommended but did not specify reasons for the
classification. In Sicurell v. United States,"7 for example, the Depart-
ment based its recommendation of rejection on reasoning that the Su-
preme Court later held legally erroneous. The appeal board denied
Sicurella's claim without explanation. The Supreme Court ruled that
the "error of law by the Department, to which the Appeal Board might
naturally look for guidance on such questions, must vitiate the entire
proceedings at least where it is not clear that the Board relied on some
legitimate ground." 1' Similarly, when the Department recommended
denial of an exemption on alternative grounds, one of which was in-
valid, and the appeal board followed the recommendation without in-
dicating on which ground it relied, the classification would be reversed
because it might have rested on the erroneous ground. 9 9 Thus, the
courts were left without reasoning to explain the administrative deci-
sion only in cases where the appeal board, without explanation, re-
jected a recommendation that an exemption be granted. 0 Since the
.197348 U.S. 385 (1955).
.19
8 Id. at 392.
199 United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 416-17 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) ; Clay v. United States, 403 U.S.
698 (1971) (per curiam) ; Ypparila v. United States, 219 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1954) ;
Shepherd v. United States, 217 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Englander,
271 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (mem.); United States v. Erikson, 149 F. Supp.
576, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). This approach clearly makes sense in a case where the
record provides simply a basis on which the board might legitimately have found the
registrant disqualified. In such a situation it is possible that the Justice Department's
error led to misclassification because the board decided solely on an erroneous ground
and did not make the finding on which it could have legitimately denied the exemption
sought. In a case where the file shows positively that the registrant was disqualified,
however, one might quarrel with the rule requiring reversal because of faulty reason-
ing. If, for example, the Department recommended against a registrant on all
statutory grounds and was in error in its advice that the registrant was not sufficiently
religious and was insincere, cf. Clay v. United States, supra, but the registrant's file
showed clearly that his opposition extended only to particular wars, the doctrine
would seem to require that, in the absence of appeal board reasons for denial of the
exemption, its I-A classification of the registrant be held erroneous. While it is true
that the appeal board might have rejected the registrant's claim on erroneous reason-
ing, the fact remains that he is not entitled to that classification and that the record
reveals that, at least in result, the appeal board's decision was the only correct one.
For a court so to decide, however, might be deemed an usurption of the board's
function of classifying the registrant in the first instance. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
200 Of course, the reasoning available to courts for review might not in some
cases be the reasoning the appeal board actually employed.
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Department's recommendations were usually followed, those cases were
uncommon.
After abolition of the Department's investigatory procedure, how-
ever, registrants' files in most cases did not show the ground of deci-
sion. The anomalous situation resulting from courts' attempts to re-
view decisions whose rationale they could not understand fully explains
Congress' recent action.
A. The Need for a Reasons Requirement
As noted above,201 the ultimate issue the Court faced in Dickinson
v. United States2 .2 was whether a draft board can find against a reg-
istrant because it disbelieves him when no evidence supporting its dis-
belief appears in the record. In fact, it was not clear that the board in
that case had disbelieved Dickinson. The file failed to explain the
board's rejection of his claim.2"3 Moreover, it affirmatively appeared
that there had been an issue whether Dickinson's ministerial activities
should be considered his vocation when they were not compensated and
he supported himself by working as a radio repairman for five hours
a week. The Court held, however, that, under the statute, a man who
regularly devotes 150 hours each month, as Dickinson did, to preach-
ing and teaching his faith qualifies as a minister although secular em-
ployment is his sole source of support. This conclusion left no evidence
in the record supporting any legitimate ground for rejection of Dick-
inson's claim. There then remained for the Court the question whether
the board's determination might have rested on a basis not reflected in
the record: that the board did not believe Dickinson's factual assertions
were truthful.
To have sustained Dickinson's conviction on the ground that, even
though the file contained no evidence of insincerity, the board might
have disbelieved the registrant's claim would have made wholly unre-
viewable every case where the board took the precaution of stating no
reasons for denying a claim. If courts were to presume that the board's
disallowance of a claim was based upon disbelief of the claimant's evi-
dence, there would always be a "basis in fact." 204 A board would then
201 See text accompanying notes 171-75 supra.
202346 U.S. 389 (1953).
203 Since Dickinson was not a conscientious objector case, there had been no
departmental investigation.
204 Even after Dickinson a board's action would have to be sustained whenever
the registrant's file indicated a basis in fact for the result reached. If Dickinson had
been decided otherwise, however, the decision would have to be sustained also when
the file did not show a basis in fact, for it could always be presumed that a board
disallowed a claim because it disbelieved the evidence.
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be subject to reversal only when it had committed a prejudicial pro-
cedural error or had indicated gratuitously a reason for its decision that
was legally indefensible.
While the Dickinson Court refused to adopt that presumption, it
did not affirmatively require boards to disclose their reasons. The con-
sequence of the Court's approach is that if a record shows a basis for
rejecting a claim on any ground the administrative adjudication will
be upheld without regard to the actual reason for the board's denial.
In Dickinson the Court surmounted the problem presented by its ig-
norance of the board's reasoning by finding that each possible ground
would have been erroneous. Suppose, however, that there had been
some evidence in Dickinson's file contradicting his statement that he
regularly spent 150 hours a month as a minister. Whether or not that
evidence had in fact influenced the board's decision, it would have pro-
vided a basis in the record for the board to disbelieve Dickinson's
evidence. That this basis existed would have insulated his case from
further review, although in fact the board had discounted the contradic-
tory evidence and believed Dickinson's claim that he worked 150 hours
monthly as a minister, and had denied the exemption only because of
an error of law-a belief that Dickinson disqualified himself by spend-
ing five hours a week as a radio repairman. Only if the board had
stated the reasons for its decision would its error in denying Dickin-
son's claim have come to light.
To cite a more current example, there might be a basis in a reg-
istrant's file for believing his conscientious objection relates only to the
war in Vietnam, though other evidence-perhaps even the bulk of the
record-suggests his objection is to war in general. The draft board
has ruled against him without disclosing its reason. Without a rea-
sons requirement, a court must sustain the classification even if the
board has in fact decided that the registrant's opposition does extend
to participation in all wars. The board may have thought a registrant
must belong to a peace church to be exempted. Or, acting arbitrarily
and in contravention of Dickinson, it may simply have disbelieved the
registrant though there was no basis for disbelief in the record. In
neither case would the registrant be able to show that his classification
was illegal; there would be a basis in the record for a decision that the
draft board did not make-a decision that the registrant is a selective
conscientious objector.
Without a reasons requirement, the rules that a board lacks power
to resolve issues of fact against a registrant unless there is some evi-
dence unfavorable to him on that issue and that courts will not defer
1972]
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to board decisions on questions of law were, then, of no practical effect
whenever there was a basis in fact for ruling against the registrant on
any ground. A registrant could lose an exemption whenever there
was some evidence from which a factfinder could decide against him,
whether or not the factfinder did decide against him on the point. He
could be convicted though no factfinder-either court or draft board
-had ever thought that the facts on which his conviction was premised
were true.
Such a result would be possible in any system where a court did
not know the basis for decisions it reviewed and where the scope of
review was less than a preponderance of the evidence. In any such
case the court might affirm a conviction on a hypothesis supported by
the requisite amount of evidence, when neither court nor board had
considered that hypothesis truthful. The extreme narrowness of the
basis-in-fact standard of review accentuates the problem by making it
more likely that a registrant will be convicted on the basis of findings
that have never been made. Under that standard, a court must defer
to the board's classification even if the evidence unfavorable to the
registrant on a crucial issue is very weak. Yet the very weakness of
that evidence makes it likely that the board ruled in favor of the regis-
trant on the issue and denied his claim for exemption on some other
ground. Moreover, the smaller the amount of evidence needed to satisfy
the reviewing standard, the more likely it is to be present in the bulk of
the cases. With a basis-in-fact test that was strictly followed and with-
out a requirement that boards give reasons, the only cases where a
registrant could expect to correct an erroneous classification in court
would be those where all of the evidence on all of the issues unambig-
uously favored him.2"5
The deference to board decisions that absence of reasons made
necessary did not comport with what Estep 206 had indicated was the
205 The basis-in-fact test, when not coupled with a requirement that boards give
reasons, thus became equivalent to a rule that boards' decisions would be sustained
whenever there was any conceivable legitimate basis for their ultimate result. The
rule amounted to a presumption that the board correctly understood applicable law.
It did not result from a conscious policy that all board decisions should stand that
could have been reached legitimately whether or not they were so reached, cf.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."),
but was a rule of necessity-necessitated by ignorance of the board's actual grounds.
This was apparent since whenever the reason or reasons for the board's decision
appeared, courts did require a basis in the evidence for the reason or reasons given;
it was not deemed sufficient that the classification might be proper on other grounds.
Indeed, the presumption of correctness was sufficiently weak that a board would be
reversed when the record suggested it misunderstood an element of the applicable law
but did not show whether the error affected the classification it gave. See text
accompanying notes 195-200 supra.
206 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
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purpose of limited review of Selective Service determinations. The
basis-in-fact test was designed to allow boards rather than courts to
resolve conflicts in the evidence; it contemplated deference to factual
decisions that boards had actually made. If boards act in accordance
with the law, those decisions will not be unfavorable to the registrant
simply because there is a basis in fact for finding against him. The
basis-in-fact standard is a standard of review. Boards, by contrast,
have the duty to decide on the basis of all the evidence whether they
consider the registrant entitled to the claimed exemption; their func-
tion is to rule in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence.2"7
The policy is for courts to defer to findings that boards have actually
made in conformance to this standard, not to deny an exemption simply
because there is a basis for ruling against a registrant on some ground
when no factfinder has actually so ruled.
In sum, the failure of boards to state their reasons often precluded
significant judicial review. By the same token, the system was vulner-
able to the charge that it contravened Estep's mandate that only classi-
fications "made in conformity with the regulations" are final and that
courts will not sustain classifications resulting from lawless board ac-
tion. o8
207 When the evidence is in equilibrium, however, the registrant's burden of proof
causes him to lose.
208 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946). The absence of reasons might have been attackable
on constitutional grounds as well. That would depend upon whether it is constitu-
tionally required that draft boards' decisions be judicially reviewable. Estep did not
resolve the question, though it did say that to assume nonreviewability of a classifica-
tion in a criminal prosecution would be to "infer that Congress departed . . . far
from the traditional concepts of a fair trial . . . ." Id. See also Wechsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLUm. L. REv. 1001, 1004-07 (1965) ; H.M. HART
& H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 317-25, 328-40
(1953). Despite Justice Brandeis' comment that "[t]he supremacy of law demands
that there shall be opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule
of law was applied; and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was
conducted regularly," St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), the Supreme Court has not clearly held judicial
review, even of constitutional rulings by administrative agencies, to be constitutionally
required, let alone review of legal rulings having less than constitutional implications.
See generally 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 102, §§28.18-.19. But cf. Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). The present status of those
cases is analyzed in 4 K. DAvis, supra §§29.08-.09. The Court's enthusiasm for
avoiding resolution of the constitutional issue by finding that even statutes which
apparently preclude review in fact allow it, as the Court did in Estep, may serve as
some indication that lack of review is constitutionally suspect. See also, e.g., Harmon
v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam) ; Pennsylvania R.th v. Rychlik, 352
U.S. 480 (1957) ; Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955) ; Heikkila v.
Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1953); Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711
(1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22,
34 (1939); United States v. Williams, 278 U.S. 255 (1929). And even if judicial
review is not generally required by the Constitution, there may be special factors in
Selective Service cases that make it constitutionally necessary. Even a court that
deems the informality of Selective Service proceedings, the lack of procedural safe-
guards, and the possible partiality of the factfinder in themselves to be constitutionally
acceptable, might come to a different conclusion if Selective Service decisions were
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B. The Analogy to Juries
Juries commonly fail to "disclose their predicates of decision.2 0 9  It
may be argued that whatever reasons support that practice 21 0 apply
equally to draft boards. Draft boards and juries do have certain sim-
ilarities. Both are factfinding bodies composed of laymen without
legal skills, drawn from the community of the persons whom their de-
cisions affect. Differences between draft boards and juries neverthe-
less justify imposing different rules as to the degree and manner in
which they must account for their decisions. The salient differences
are in their functions, their constitutional status, and their composition.
1. Functions
While juries hear evidence in the presence of a judge, no judicial
officer is present at the proceedings that result in draft boards' initial
classifications. This difference makes draft boards' factual determina-
tions less subject to judicial supervision than are those of juries. A
judge observes all evidence the jury does, contemporaneously with the
jury, and can rule upon whether a jury can rationally arrive at a par-
ticular verdict.2 1' A draft board, by contrast, judges alone whether
there is sufficient evidence to support its decision.
at no stage subjected to judicial scrutiny. Moreover, the consequences of an erroneous
Selective Service classification are momentous. Even apart from the criminal liability
of a person who fails to comply with a Selective Service order, a person who does
comply must spend two years as a soldier, possibly in a combat zone. (Cf. Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), allowing limitations on judicial review where
criminal prosecution for noncompliance also was possible but where compliance cost
only money.) And conscientious objectors whose conscientiously-held beliefs prevent
them from entering the military are forced to serve the prison term. That sensitive
constitutional issues are involved in the area of conscientious objection, whether or
not a conscientious objector exemption is constitutionally required, see notes 289-91
infra, may also make it more important for judicial review to be available than in
cases where the issues are freer from constitutional implications. Cf. Ng Fung Ho
v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (requiring judicial determination of citizenship under
the fifth amendment though generally the finality clause of the deportation statute
was deemed to permit only more limited review).
209 While special verdicts and interrogatories to the jury to be answered along
with the general verdict are available devices for obtaining jury findings, they are
not normally required in civil cases, F. JAMES, supra note 110, § 7.15, at 295 (1965),
and are virtually never employed in criminal cases, see G. CLEMENrTsoN, SPECIAl.
VEmICTS AND SPECIAL FINDINGs BY JuRms 49 (1905) (only general verdict proper
in criminal case) ; United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180 (1st Cir. 1969) (terming
use of special interrogatories in that criminal prosecution "without precedent").
210 The reason commonly suggested, both by adherents and critics of the current
system, is that juries are less controlled, by the judge and by the law, when findings
are not required. See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-83 (1st Cir.
1969) ; G. CLEMENTSON, supra note 209, at 49; F. JAMES, sUpra note 110, § 7.15, at
293-99 (1965).
211 See generally F. JAMES, supra note 110, §§ 7.13, .16, .20. A judge also
exercises some control over what evidence comes before the jury, id. § 7.12, and can
guard against the jury being influenced by improper considerations. See generally
id. 280-336.
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The board's decision, like a jury's, is of course subject to later
judicial review. At that stage a judge can decide whether the decision
is sustainable. Under prevailing law, it will be if it has any basis in
the evidence. A judge cannot, however, review after the fact with the
same assurance as one supervising the factfinder contemporaneously,
for he cannot observe certain evidence, notably the demeanor of the
witnesses, which may have affected the factfinder's decision.
While draft boards, like juries, make factual findings, they also per-
form the role that trial judges fulfill in judicial proceedings: they de-
cide the applicable law. When one body decides both the law and the
facts in a case and that body is excused from stating its grounds of de-
cision, the law as well as the facts are shielded from effective review."'
In jury trials deference is paid juries' findings, which they need not
explain, but the law of the case remains wholly reviewable. That law
is ascertained by examining the court's rulings, the charge, and the in-
structions to the jury." 3 Since in draft board proceedings, no person
who is not on the board articulates on the record the law to be applied
in the particular case, the only way to prevent insulation of that law
from review is for board members themselves to reveal what they deem
the law to be. By doing so they will make possible more accurate
judicial review than is possible with juries; in jury cases the reviewing
court knows the law as it was told the factfinder, but it does not know
what the factfinder understood the law to be. 4  But if boards were
not required to give reasons, the reviewer would have substantially less
assurance what law was applied than it does with juries. 5
212 When judges try cases without juries and pass on both law and facts, the
same problem could arise. The Federal Rules avoid the problem by requiring judges
who try cases alone to indicate their bases of decision. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Cf. note 195 supra.
2-13 In Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), it was argued
that juries should decide both the law and the facts. The Court, over a strong
dissent, rejected that contention. Juries of course retain the power to disregard the
law as related to them by the judge, but the currently prevailing system is not to
inform them of that power but instead to stress their duty to follow the law. See
United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969). See also Van Dyke,
The Jury as a Political Institution, CENTER MAGAZINE, Mar. 1970, at 17 (suggesting
that jurors should be informed of their powers of nullification).
214 Even when the reviewer knows what the factfinder understood the law to be,
it cannot, of course, know whether the factfinder chose to disregard that law.
215A somewhat analogous system would involve not instructing the jury on the
law but informing jurors of the existence and availability of legal sources and telling
them to apply their conception of the law to the particular case without disclosing
what that conception is. See generally Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S.
51 (1895), discussed in note 213 supra. The analogy is not a perfect one, however,
because board members, though nonexpert in comparison to judges, are far more
professional than jurors. Draft boards are continuing bodies, and members are
expected to know the law they are to apply, though the expectation often fails in
19721
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2. Constitutional Status
Another factor supporting greater accountability for draft boards
than juries is that the deference paid juries' factual findings is required
by the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 Under
that amendment, a jury's findings cannot be reexamined except as per-
mitted under common law.217  By contrast, Congress is not obliged to
protect from review the factual findings of draft boards.21 Moreover,
as will next be discussed, the reasons underlying the constitutional lim-
itation on jury accountability do not apply to draft boards.
3. Composition
Nonreviewability of juries' factual findings is deemed a protection
to the individuals affected. Juries are thought to represent the people,
as opposed to the government. 19 But if friendliness of the factfinder
to the individual as against the system is the rationale for allowing its
decisions to be unreviewable, it would be folly to apply the same rule
to draft boards. As discussed previously, board members are excep-
tionally sympathetic to a system of conscription, have an interest stem-
ming from their inquisitorial function in deciding cases on less than
practice. See text accompanying notes 142-43 supra & note 143. jurors serve for a
much more limited term and are not required, or even encouraged, to have any
knowledge of the legal system other than that imparted by the judge during the
course of the trial.
216 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
217
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.
Id.
218 The Selective Service and Training Act, as interpreted in Estep v. United
States, 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946), and the basis-in-fact test there evolved, do,
however, oblige courts to defer to draft boards' factual findings.
219 See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1930). In Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court stated:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew
from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too respon-
sive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove
to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against
arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury
of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge.
Id. at 155-56 (footnote omitted).
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adequate facts 220 and, prior to recent amendment,22' also had an interest
stemming from the quota system in ruling against the registrant.
It may be argued that juries are trusted not because they favor
the people but simply because they temper legal technicalities with com-
mon sense, a characteristic that could, depending on the circumstances,
favor either party to a dispute. 2 They are under oath to follow the
law, but "jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual
administration." 223 If this is juries' raison d'&re, it is essential that
they bring to their decisionmaking the sense of the community.
If a group of citizens is representative, it is understandable that the
community might be willing to entrust to them the task of decision-
making on some matters of importance without requiring them to ac-
count for their decisions.224 To excuse juries, in theory at least selected
at random from the whole community,225 from disclosing the findings
behind their verdicts saves time and expense. It may even permit juries
to render decisions more in accordance with the community's sense of
justice than any formulated standards would allow.226  The same ra-
220At one time juries, as draft boards still do, performed the functions of
witness and investigator as well as factfinder. As neighbors of the parties involved,
jurors were expected to bring to the decisionmaking their personal knowledge of the
case, see J. THAYER, A PRELhimixARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
90-91, 94-95, 104 (1898), and they had the power to inform themselves from other
sources of the facts of a case so that their decisions would be correct. See 6
W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGL SH LAW 388 (1924); E. MORGAN, SoME
PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLo-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 17 (1956) ;
J. THAYER, supra at 91-94. Jurors have evolved to play quite a different role.
Indeed, jurors now commonly must swear to decide a case solely on the evidence
presented in the courtroom and they are often disqualified if they know the parties
to a controversy or have knowledge of the case from outside sources. Because
adverse parties separate from the factfinder have the responsibility of producing
evidence on the issues, it is more likely that all relevant evidence will come to light
than when one body is both factfinder and investigator and can affect the amount
of investigation it must do by its decisions on sufficiency of evidence.
221 See text accompanying notes 139-41 supra.
222Justice Holmes has said that juries "will introduce into their verdict a
certain amount-a very large amount, so far as I have observed-of popular prejudice,
and thus keep the administration of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings
of the community." 0. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in CoLLEcTED
LrA PAPERS 237-38 (1920). See Traynor, Fact Skepticisn and the Judicial Process,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 638 (1958); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and
Responsibility, 65 HAav. L. Rlv. 1281, 1286 (1952).
223 Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18 (1910).
224 But see E. Griswold, 1962-1963 Harvard Law School Dean's Report 5-6,
quoted in H. K_ vEN & H. ZElSi, THE AmmucAN JURy 5 (1966):
The jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the amateur. Why should anyone
think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways,
for their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding
controversies between persons?
225 Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-71 (1970).
See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 474 (1953).
226 See note 222 supra.
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tionale cannot support nondisclosure by draft boards, 27 when members
are appointed,22 8 not randomly selected, and when the middle class,
whites, and white-collar workers are grossly overrepresented at the
expense of the laboring and lower classes 229 and minority groups.
230
C. Feasibility of the Reasons Requirement
Until shortly before Congress imposed the reasons requirement,
courts generally had not questioned the absence of reasons in Selective
227 But see General Hershey's rationale for entrusting the drafting process to
nonprofessionals, text accompanying note 238 infra.
228 The statute provides for appointment by the President on the recommendation
of the state governor. Military Selective Service Act § 10(b) (3), 50 U.S.C. APP.
§ 460(b) (3) (1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. 1972). In
practice, many board members are selected by their predecessors, a practice that
perpetuates the nonrepresentative nature of the boards. Davis and Dolbeare reported
in their Wisconsin study that 39% of the local board members said that they had
been recruited by their local board and 43% said the newest member had been
recruited by the local board. J. DAvis & K. DoLrAFRE, supra note 134, at 66.
229 See 3. DAvis & K. DOLBEARE, supra note 134, at 58-60 (1966 study-3% times
as many proprietors-managers-officials on boards than in employed male population;
twice as many professionals and farmers; only :V( as many blue collar workers);
MARSHALL CoMMiss o REPORT, spra note 135, at 19 (1966 study-70% in white-
collar occupations; over 20% of those professional men; Y2 of remainder are farmers),
appendix 73-81; Decision-Making, supra note 134, at 122-26; Note, The Selective
Service, 76 YALE L.J. 160, 167 (1966).
230 In 1966 only 1.3% of board members were black, as compared with 11% in
the national male population. J. DAvIs & K. DoLBEAR, supra note 134, at 57;
Decision-Making, supra note 134, at 125; MARsHALL COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 135, at 19. Other minority groups were also underrepresented. Only 0.8% of
board members were Puerto Rican, 0.7% Spanish American, 0.2% Oriental, and
0.1% American Indian. Id. The 1971 amendments may, however, be instrumental
in reversing this trend of underrepresentation. In them, Congress requested the
President to appoint minority group members to local boards in proportion to their
population in a particular jurisdiction. Military Selective Service Act § 10(b) (3),
50 U.S.C.A. APP. §460(b) (3) (Supp. 1972), amending 50 U.S.C. APP. §460(b) (3)
(1970). More important, Congress lowered the maximum permissible term from
25 to 20 years and lowered the maximum age limit for local board service from
75 to 65 years. Id. These age requirements should have a significant impact on
the system. The Marshall Commission found in 1966 that 20% of all local board
members were over the age of 70. MARSHALL COMIMISSIOr REPORT, supra at 19.
Davis and Dolbeare concluded from the available statistics that the average board in
1966 had only one member under 50 and had at least one over 70. 3. DAvis &
K. DOLBEARE, supra at 57. Although the average age of local board members may
be lower today, the new length of service and age limits should still have a great
impact. National Headquarters estimated that the 1971 amendments would require
about 25% of all local board members to resign. 4 SEt.. SERv. L. REP. 44 (1971).
The resultant large number of openings as well as the congressional request provide
the System with the opportunity to remedy minority underrepresentation.
Prior to the 1967 amendments, the Marshall Commission recommended that board
members have a fixed term of 5 years. MARsHALL COMMISSION REPORT, supra at 5.
Congress responded by setting a fixed term, but made the limit 25 years. Military
Selective Service Act of 1967 §10(b)(3), 50 U.S.C. APP. §460(b)(3) (1970),
as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. APp. §460(b)(3) (Supp. 1972). Congress also, at the
suggestion of the Marshall Commission, MARSHALL CoMmIssioN REPORT, supra at 5,
made women eligible to serve on boards. Military Selective Service Act of 1967
§10(b)(3), 50 U.S.C. APp. §460(b)(3) (1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. APP.
§460(b)(3) (Supp. 1972). Until 1967, boards had been 100% male. MARSHALL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra at 19.
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Service cases 231 despite decisions under the Selective Service Act re-
quiring judicial review and precepts as to the essentials of such review
enumerated in other contexts. It is commonplace that review is not
apt to be meaningful when the reviewer does not know the basis of the
231 Shortly before the congressional mandate, however, most circuit courts of
appeal anticipated Congress by requiring that reasons be stated when conscientious
objector claims were denied. See, e.g., United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 472 (5th
Cir. 1971); Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970); United
States v. Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc); United States v.
Haughton, 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Gruca v. Secretary of the Army,
436 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971) ; United States
v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1297 (1st Cir. 1969). The timing of the courts' interest in the
issue is probably due to abandonment of the Justice Department's investigation of
conscientious objector claims. See text accompanying notes 159-60 supra. It is true
that claims for exemptions or deferments other than as a conscientious objector were
unaffected by the Justice Department procedure, but it was in conscientious objector
cases that courts initially required reasons, and most court-imposed reasons require-
ments appeared to apply only to denials of conscientious objector claims. See, e.g.,
United States v. Andrews, 446 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Broyles,
supra; United States v. Haughton, supra; Dunlap v. Volatile, 4 SasL. SERV. L. REP.
3114, 3115 (R.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1971). Contra, United States ex rel. Bent v. Laird,
4 SF.L. SERv. L. RF. 3739 (3d Cir. 1971) (hardship deferment) ; Townley v. Resor,
323 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (hardship deferment).
Courts did not often state their reasons for limiting the requirement to the
conscientious objector exemption. But see United States v. Andrews, supra; Dunlap
v. Volatile, supra. One important reason might be that conscientious objector and
ministerial claims account for the vast majority of Selective Service cases that appear
before the courts. Hansen, supra note 104, at 457 n.19. An absence of reasons in
ministerial claims, however, would not have as crucial consequences as in cases con-
cerning conscientious objectors. Since the ministerial exemption turns wholly on
objective criteria and the good faith of the registrant is not at issue, see text accom-
panying notes 176-77 supra, a board ruling on a ministerial exemption has much less
leeway in its decisionmaking than does a board passing on a conscientious objector
claim. In conscientious objector cases, where the registrant's sincerity is a key
issue, the reason for denial of a claim will be much less frequently apparent, since
a claim can be denied because of inferences from the facts in the record even when
there is no contradictory evidence in the record. See text accompanying notes 176-79
supra.
Other factors explain courts' greater urgency in requiring reasons for conscien-
tious objector claims than for deferments like hardship and occupational ones. There
is some discretion in the local board in granting hardship deferments, and at one
time there was discretion in granting occupational deferments as well. Because boards
had some input into the standards for those classifications, there was less need for
a court to have reasons to see whether the board had conformed to a predetermined
standard than there is in conscientious objector cases. For in conscientious objector
cases draft boards have never had discretion whether or not to grant claims, as
distinct from having leeway in the factual determinations they make and exercising
often unreviewable judgments in arriving at those factual conclusions. Boards are
supposed to follow a statute in conscientious objector cases, granting exemptions
only where they find the three statutory criteria are met and denying them only
when a criterion is lacking. See text accompanying notes 112-33 supra.
Along with the greater frequency of conscientious objector cases, other relevant
factors accentuated in conscientious objector claims may be board hostility to the
exemption and the expertise required to understand both the terms of the standard
and registrants' supporting statements. See text accompanying notes 134-43 supra.
Though these factors may make judicial review particularly necessary in those cases,
however, they do not undercut the need for judicial review in other contexts as well-
a need which the statute recognizes by applying the requirement generally.
It was primarily the inability to provide effective review that led those courts
that did so to impose a reasons requirement. See, e.g., United States v. O'Bryan
450 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1971); Rosengart v. Laird, 449 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Lumbard, J., dissenting) ; United States v. Stetter, supra; United States v. Stephens,
445 F.2d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1971) (Aldisert, J., concurring); Paszel v. Laird, 426
F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970) ; United States v. Broyles, supra; United States v. Haughton,
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decision to be reviewed ;232 that when agencies need not disclose the
basis of their decisions they can exceed with impunity the powers en-
trusted them;233 and that an agency's action "must be measured by
what [the agency] did, not by what it might have done." 234 The ab-
sence of reasons also arguably impinged upon the statutory right of
appeal, for courts had observed that losing parties who do not under-
stand the basis for rulings against them are ill-prepared to challenge
those rulings they believe are erroneous, let alone to accept them as
just.23 5 The most plausible explanation for the long-continued tolera-
413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Reese, 331 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ga.
1971); United States v. Dineen 327 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass. 1971); cf. Clay v.
United States 403 U.S. 698 (191) ; United States v. Lemmens, 430 F.2d 619 (7th
Cir. 1970); tnited States ex rel. Morton v. McBee, 310 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ill.
1970). Other commonly given explanations for imposing a reasons requirement were
that a claimant's right to a meaningful appeal within the Selective Service System
requires that he know the local board's basis for rejecting his claim, e.g., United
States v. Stetter, supra; United States v. Stephens, supra (Aldisert, J., concurring) ;
United States v. Dineen, supra; United States v. Lonseth, 300 F. Supp. 857 (D. Ore.
1969) ; United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), and that the
requirement avoids arbitrary or lawless behavior by local boards, e.g., United States
v. Broyles, supra; O'Brien v. Resor, 423 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1970); Townley v.
Resor, supra.
The scope of the requirement the courts imposed differed from the congressional
requirement not only in its limitation to conscientious objectors but in other ways as
well. Many courts seemed to require reasons only when the denial was on grounds
of sincerity, e.g., United States v. Abbott 425 F.2d 910, 914 n.5 (8th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Broyles, supra; United States v. Haughton, supra; United States
v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37, 39 (6th Cir. 1968). Many also appeared to require
reasons only when the registrant stated a prima facie case, e.g., United States v.
Weaver, 423 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1970). Contra, United States v. Stephens, supra
(Aldisert, J., concurring) ; United States v. Reese, supra. Courts imposing a reasons
requirement typically did not make clear the extent of the reasons they were requiring
of the board. See text following note 243 & accompanying notes 244-56 intfra.2 3 2 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) ("[T]he orderly func-
tioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the admin-
istrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.") ; United States
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935) ("We must know what
a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.") ;
City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 694-95 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
233 See, e.g., Schaffer Transport. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 92 (1957);
Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941). Concerning the dangers of leaving administrative agencies uncontrolled,
Justice Douglas has reminded us that "[absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the
beginning of the end of liberty." New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884
(1951) (dissenting opinion).
234 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93-94 (1943). See also id. at 87; Secre-
tary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 650-55 (1954) ; American Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 179 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
235 This reasoning was evident in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which the
petitioner contested a juvenile court procedure whereby prior to the hearing the juve-
nile's parents were told only of a general conclusion of delinquency. They were not
informed of the specific facts and charges involved until the hearing itself, and they
were given time to prepare to meet those charges only if they denied the facts. The
Supreme Court held the procedure constitutionally defective for lack of adequate no-
tice, saying that unless a party was informed of specific charges or factual allegations
in controversy and of the specific issues that had to be met to prevail, he could not
prepare adequately for the hearing. Id. at 31-34. Similarly, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), the Court held that "rudimentary due process," id. at 267, required
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tion of unexplained decisions in Selective Service cases is that the judi-
ciary was persuaded that practicalities required them to indulge in the
presumption that boards had correctly interpreted and applied the law.a 6
that prior to termination of public assistance benefits a recipient be given a hearing
preceded by "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termina-
tion." Id. at 267-68. The statement of reasons was necessary, at least in a case in-
volving factual issues, see id. at 268 n.15, so that a recipient could contest the factual
basis of the case against him and produce evidence in rebuttal. Id. at 266.
Gault and Goldberg could support a constitutional argument that a registrant in
a draft board case must be provided with the grounds for a decision against him.
When the registrant does not know the factual assumptions upon which the ruling
against him was premised or is not aware in what respect his claim might be legally
deficient, he may not address the point that is at issue. It is true that both Gault
and Goldberg concerned litigants understanding issues at an initial hearing rather
than at a stage of review, and they concerned understanding the charge made rather
than a decision made, but these differences should not be determinative. Unless a
party is made aware of the contentions advanced against him, he is unable to meet
those contentions, whether at an initial hearing or on review. In fact the dilemma
is more serious in draft board cases and in Goldberg than it was in Gault. An ad-
versary confrontation was contemplated at the hearing in Gault so the petitioner at
that time would learn the charges against him. The absence of any adverse party in
Goldberg and in draft board cases, however, makes it possible that a person will never
know the case against him and will never therefore be given an opportunity to meet
it.
Cases in the Selective Service area dealing with the registrant's right to see ad-
verse evidence in his file also lend some support to an argument that proceedings on
appeal cannot be fair unless the board to be reviewed has indicated the grounds for its
decision. In United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953), the registrant contended
he was improperly denied access to the report the FBI submitted after it con-
ducted its investigation into the sincerity of his conscientious objector claim. The
registrant's argument was that the hearing on the subject of his sincerity, which
the statute provided for, would be meaningless if he was unable to know the
contents of the report so that he could refute them. The registrant had been provided,
however, with a resum6 of the report fairly summarizing the adverse evidence but
omitting the names of the persons interviewed. The Court held it unnecessary under
the circumstances to disclose the report, over a dissent by Justice Frankfurter claim-
ing that the main purpose of a hearing-to give the registrant an opportunity to rebut
adverse evidence-was frustrated when the registrant was denied knowledge of the
source of the information. In the later case of Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S.
397 (1955), it became clear that the existence of a "fair resum6" was essential to the
Nugent holding. The Court held Simmons was deprived of the hearing the statute
guaranteed him when the FBI failed to furnish him with a resum6 of the information
its investigation produced. The Court said the fair resum6 that was required "is one
which will permit the registrant to defend against the adverse evidence--to explain it,
rebut it, or otherwise detract from its damaging force. . . . The Congress, in pro-
viding for a hearing, did not intend for it to be conducted on the level of a game of
blindman's buff." Id. at 405. Similarly in Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407
(1955), decided the same day as Simmons, the Court held that a registrant had a
right to a copy of the Department of Justice's recommendation to the appeal board:
"Just as the right to a hearing means the right to a meaningful hearing ... , so the
right to file a statement before the Appeal Board includes the right to file a mean-
ingful statement, one based on all the facts in the file and made with awareness of the
recommendations and arguments to be countered." Id. at 415.
These decisions do not, of course, control the issue of boards giving reasons, for
in Simmons and Gonzales the decisionmaling boards could consider information that
the registrant was unable to confront. If boards omit reasons, by contrast, review-
ing tribunals and the registrant are equally ignorant of the basis for the decision that
is to be reviewed. The registrant's major difficulty therefore is not in confronting the
adverse evidence as much as it is in securing his right to have the local board's decision
reviewed. Since the reviewing tribunal is unaware of the basis for the initial deci-
sion, its action appears less like review than like de novo decision with a very large
presumption against the registrant (the board's result being sustained if there is any
basis in fact that could support it).
236 See note 205 supra.
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Two characteristics of draft boards are pertinent in this connection:
(1) draft boards can lay no claim to expertness in the administration
of the law; and (2) the boards operate under heavy time pressure.
The point may be restated in the form of a question: Will the
reasons requirement, now formally adopted by Congress, debilitate mo-
bilization because board members, unschooled in law, will be unable to
give reasons for their decisions adequate to pass judicial muster? To
argue that boards of laymen cannot give sustainable reasons because
they do not understand the legislative scheme under which they are
operating and the rules they apply would prove too much; it would show
that the existing system of administering the Selective Service laws is
intolerable. If, on the other hand, the fear is that boards will be re-
versed though their bases of decision are essentially correct, simply be-
cause boards do not use legal niceties in explaining their decisions, and
if that fear is well founded, it militates against a reasons requirement.
The solution, however, is not to abandon the requirement of a rea-
soned decision but to refrain from requiring of boards of laymen a form
of decision they are unable to provide. Courts should simply require
boards to set out directly and in an informal, unsophisticated manner
their actual reasons for disposing of cases as they do."' If the statute's
complications preclude boards from giving actual reasons that comport
with the law, the solution is either to remove the complications from
the statute so that civilian boards can administer it, or to utilize boards
with the skill to follow it. It satisfies no policy to operate under a law
that cannot be correctly interpreted and applied by the agency to which
it is entrusted.
237 Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281 et seq.
(1970), boards of laymen acting as "part time administrators" under a complex
statute the terms of which are rather vaguely defined, Fulford v. Forman, 245 F.2d
145, 151-53 (5th Cir. 1957), have been required to render reasoned decisions. Under
the Act a "County Committee," comprised of three local farmers elected by the
farmers in the county, sets the quota permitted each farmer for tobacco, cotton, rice,
and peanuts. The quota is reviewable by a "Review Committee," an appointed body
of three other local farmers. In Austin v. Jackson, 353 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1965),
the Fourth Circuit, over the Government's protest that the Review Committee was
not qualified to write explanations of the great number of decisions it was called on
to make, imposed on Review Committees the "duty to render a reasoned opinion,"
saying the requirement was "especially important where the administrative tribunal
is lacking in legal expertise." Id. at 911. See also Stallard v. Review Comm., 275
F. Supp. 931 (W.D. Va. 1967). Despite the Secretary of Agriculture's dire predic-
tions as to the effect the decision would have on the administration of the program,
Letter from Secretary Freeman to Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, De-
partment of Justice, Jan. 1966, on file in the Department of Justice, five and a half
years after the decision the Department's Deputy General Counsel reported that there
had been only "five or so" instances in which the district court had remanded to the
Review Committee for an elaboration of its reasons, in addition to "several" where
the Department of Agriculture had itself asked the court to remand for elaboration,
and that the system was "working well." Telephone interview with Claude Coffman,
Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture, June 1971.
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Adding to board members' previous responsibilities the task of
explaining their decisions could arguably interfere with the ability of
the Selective Service System to mobilize manpower speedily. The
articulation of reasons is obviously an added demand, even if a simple
disclosure of the board's rationale is deemed sufficient. Thus, it might
prove necessary to increase the number of board members or the amount
of time that current members spend at their job. If this proved im-
practicable, a basic change in the structure of the current system-a
professionalization of the draft boards-might prove necessary. General
Hershey has warned against that course:
The people of the country will support a compulsory system
only to the extent that they have confidence in its fairness and
they will have confidence in a system only to the extent which
they themselves operate it. The Selective Service System is,
therefore, founded upon the grassroots principle, in which
boards made up of citizens in each community determine when
registrants should be made available for military service.
218
While the idea of having a man's "friends and neighbors" 239 rather
than a distant bureaucrat determine whether he must serve may, in the
abstract, seem attractive, it is questionable whether on balance that sys-
tem increases public confidence in the fairness of the draft.24" The un-
representative nature of draft boards detracts from the appeal of the
"friends and neighbors" concept; so, also, would the high price paid
for their volunteer character if the result is short shrift to requirements
of basic fairness.2 41  Nevertheless, the Selective Service has rested upon
238 L. HERSHEY, MEMORANDUM ON PRESENT OPERATIONS OF THE SYSTEM AND
LocAL DRAFT BoARDs, S. Doc. No. 82, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966).
239
The civilians were neighbors. They were, as it were, indigenous to the
soil. The men were well-known in the neighborhood. They were often per-
sonal friends or family friends of the men who were to be sent to war. They
had the intimate knowledge of family histories and of individual histories.
E. FrrzPATRici, CONSCRPTION AND AMERICA 46-47 (1940), quoted in Decision-
Making, supra note 134, at 104. The author was a State Director of the Selective
Service during World War I.
240 See J. DAvis & K. DOLBEARE, supra note 134, at 7, 172-90.
241 As against the disadvantages, an asserted advantage of having local men
classify registrants is that they know the men they draft. See Hershey, Review of
the Organization and Administration of the Selective Service System 9694. This is
no longer true, however, if it ever was so. J. DAvis & K. DOLBE.ARE, supra note 134,
at 94-99, 197; MAARSHaALL CoMMISSioN REPORT, supra note 135, at 20. If "friends
and neighbors" ever adequately described the local boards, the urbanization of Amer-
ica's population and high registrant mobility have, for the majority of the population,
reduced General Hershey's characterization to little more than a bitter joke. MA-
SHALL COMMISSION REPORT, supra at 20; J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, WHO GETS
DRAFTED 31 (1967) ; G. WAMSLEY, sipra note 134, at 112-16. Wamsley reports the
following comment by a local board clerk in an urban area who was asked whether
board members knew many of the registrants:
Oh no. They're familiar with the district, but they don't know the kids that
come in. You know the induction notices used to read: "Your friends and
192
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volunteer, local boards since 1917; the System has made great claims
for the "friends and neighbors" concept ;242 and Congress has con-
sistently rejected proposals to change the structure of local boards.243
D. Interpretation of the Requirement
The degree to which the reasons requirement can be executed by
boards as they are presently constituted depends in large part on how
one interprets the requirement that a board "furnish to [the] registrant
a brief written statement of the reasons for its decisions." It might
be deemed to direct boards simply to state the statutory ground of de-
cision. Boards could comply with that directive merely by informing
a registrant that his objection was found not to be grounded upon "re-
ligious training and belief"; that his opposition was found not to extend
to "participation in war in any form"; that he was deemed insincere in
his expressed belief; or any combination of these factors. The statute
may, however, require something more. It may require reference to
the evidence on which the board relied in reaching its finding that the
statutory criteria were unsatisfied. Or it may even compel the board
neighbors have selected you"--and it got so it made people so mad that they
dropped it. One fellow came in here boiling mad and said, "Who are these
friends and neighbors? I want to see them right now."
Id. 115.
242
It would be essential to avoid in any way interfering with the present
decentralized approach of the system which has proved so successful in con-
trast with the centralized ones of both the Federal and Confederate govern-
ments during the Civil War. The decentralized, or local board, or grassroots
operation of Selective Service began with the First World War and demon-
strated that the Nation would much more willingly support compulsory mili-
tary service operated by their neighbors at home, than they would a program
operated by a remote, impersonal organization.
Hearings on the Administration & Operation of the Selective Service System Before
the House Armed Services Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9993 (1966) (statement of
General Hershey).
The military establishment, the machinery of Federal Government, even the
machinery of state and local governments, appeared not close enough or in-
timate enough to deal with so vital and elemental an effort. The local board,
a group of neighbors deciding who from the neighborhood should be selected
for armed service, became the foundation on which the System was built, and
gave to it its universality and commonness.
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM , ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM
187 (Special Monograph No. 3, 1951).
[W]e are only seeking . . . about 1,000,000 out of 11,500,000, so there has
to be an equity decision.
Somebody has got to decide which one of the 11 is to be taken, and I do
want to impress upon all the fact . . . that the choice is being made by the
neighbors of the man .... "
Hearings on S. 4164 Before the Senate Comm. on Military Affairs, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 384 (1940) (statement of General (then Major) Hershey).
243 E.g., compare the MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 135, proposals
at 35-36, with the relatively minor changes in local board structure adopted in the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, §§1-23, 50 U.S.C. Ap. §§451-73 (1970),
as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. Ap,. §§451-73 (Supp. 1972).
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to explain why it found that evidence, as opposed to other contradictory
evidence, persuasive. Registrants will benefit from whichever of these
interpretations is adopted, for each possibility will augment the review-
ability of board classifications. The degree to which the registrant
benefits will vary, however, as will the weight of the burden the
requirement places on the board.
1. Simple Indication of Statutory Ground
Board members should hardly be overburdened by a requirement
that they simply identify the statutory basis of their decision. Pre-
sumably board members have reasons, even in the absence of a reasons
requirement, for denying a claim. The only new responsibility would
be to indicate succinctly what that reason is. To do so would take only
moments. In each case, every board member could be furnished a
checklist with three boxes, one for each statutory ground of decision.
The member could check the one or more grounds that showed his rea-
son for voting to deny in the particular case. The availability of these
checklists to the registrant and to the reviewing court would avoid the
anomaly of a court affirming the board's decision on a ground upon
which the board did not rely. It would also apprise the registrant of
the ground to which he should direct his argument on appeal.
This, to be sure, would not invariably narrow the issues. For ex-
ample, board members might have different reasons for denying a reg-
istrant's claim. Of three board members passing on a conscientious
objector claim, one might find the registrant selective, one might find
him nonreligious, and a third might find him insincere. As a result the
board would deny his claim. The registrant arguing that there was no
basis in fact for his classification would be in a position similar to that of
the registrant before a reasons requirement was imposed who had to
show that there was no basis on any statutory ground for denying his
claim.
One might argue that the proper approach is to have the board give
its reasons for denying a registrant's claim rather than have each mem-
ber do so, and that if a majority of the members cannot agree upon
grounds for denying the claim, the registrant prevails. In the ex-
ample given, since two out of three board members found for the reg-
istrant on each statutory ground, he should prevail in his claim, just as
he would if a single person were factfinder and were two-thirds con-
vinced of the registrant's case on each statutory issue. It is settled,
however, that when courts comprised of more than one judge decide
a case-civil or criminal-it is sufficient for a verdict that a majority
of the panel reaches the same ultimate conclusion although the reason-
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ing of the members of the majority differs. Similarly a jury must
agree on the ultimate verdict-guilty or not guilty in a criminal case;
judgment for the plaintiff or judgment for the defendant in a civil
case-but each jury member may reach that decision on differing
grounds.24 4 In the light of these rules it is difficult to argue that a
registrant whose draft board finds against him on the ultimate issue
is entitled to an exemption because there is no majority for any par-
ticular ground of decision against him.
Even though board members might use differing reasoning to
find against a registrant, registrants would benefit from boards' ex-
pression of their statutory grounds of decision. In most cases board
members would agree as to one or more possible grounds of decision,
and thereby eliminate those grounds from the case. Even where all
possible grounds remained, if it were a close question whether there
was a basis in fact on any particular ground to support the board's
denial of an exemption, awareness that a majority of board members
favored the registrant on that ground might influence the court's deci-
sion. Most important, when one of three board members found against
the registrant on each statutory ground, a basis in fact on one ground
(on which two board members found for the registrant) would not be
enough to sustain the classification. To sustain the decision made by
a majority of the board there would have to be a basis in fact to sup-
port a decision against the registrant on two statutory grounds.
There is one situation, however, where despite boards' indication
of statutory grounds a registrant may still have to show that no evi-
dence supports any statutory basis of decision: if a majority of board
members finds that the registrant has failed to satisfy any statutory
requirement for exemption-that on the basis of his statement he does
not satisfy the religious training and belief requirement and is a selec-
tive objector, and that he is insincere as well. Similarly, the registrant
will benefit less from the statement of grounds when a majority gives
two grounds than when it states only one. Unscrupulous board mem-
bers might increase the likelihood of having their decisions upheld by
automatically indicating all statutory grounds when they found against
a conscientious objector claim. Yet a rule that board members could
indicate only one ground of decision would be artificial and unrealistic.
244 A problem similar to that of the draft board whose members differ in their
reasoning could arise with a jury in a special verdict situation. A jury might, for
example, find for the defendant on every finding submitted to it but its verdict on the
ultimate conclusion might be against him because jurors found against him on differ-
ing grounds. If the apparent inconsistency between the findings and the general
verdict is so explainable, the general verdict should stand. Otherwise the submis-
sion of the special verdict would change the outcome of such a case. The general
rule is that both verdicts should stand if possibly consistent. See, e.g., Kirkendoll v.
Neustrom, 379 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1967).
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Certainly in some cases board members can in perfectly good faith de-
termine that an applicant fails to satisfy the statutory criteria in more
than one respect.
No remedy for this situation is apparent. It was noted earlier
that when the Department of Justice made recommendations to appeal
boards in conscientious objector cases and recommended against a
registrant on more than one ground, a classification was reversed if the
Department had erred in one of its assessments. 245 The principle should
not carry over to a statement of reasons by draft boards. The rationale
for the rule as to the Department of Justice-a rule which applied only
when the appeal board did not indicate the reasons for its decision-was
that it was impossible to know on which ground or grounds the appeal
board had rested. It might have rested solely on the ground on which
the Department gave erroneous advice. When a draft board, by con-
trast, finds against a registrant on three statutory grounds and is in
error as to only two of them, it has still found against the registrant
on a legitimate and sufficient basis.
2. Identification of Evidence Relied Upon
While registrants are aided by a rule requiring that they be in-
formed of the statutory ground of board decisions, they would benefit
more if board members were required as well to indicate the evidence
in the registrant's file on which they rely in denying his exemption.
A registrant appealing the classification his local board has given him
would be much better able to meet the issue by supplementing his file
before the appeal board if hewere aware of the evidentiary basis of the
board's decision. Without disclosure of the evidence relied on, he
might be unaware that certain evidence was significant to the disposi-
tion of his claim. Aware of its importance, he could present to the
appeal board any additional information showing that the evidence the
local board relied on was untrue or that the inference drawn from the
evidence was unwarranted. Additionally, he might show that the evi-
dence cited did not constitute a proper basis in fact.
If the appeal board rejects a registrant's claim, he cannot contest
his classification in court by supplementing his Selective Service file.
Nonetheless, the registrant would benefit from the focusing of the issue
that knowledge of the evidentiary basis for the board's decision would
bring. The reviewing court, in order to uphold the decision of the
appeal board, would have to find that the evidence the board relied on
provides a basis in fact for the denial. It would not suffice that there
was other evidence in the record that could constitute a basis in fact
245 See notes 199-200 supra & accompanying text.
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if board members had rejected the relevance, reliability, or persuasive-
ness of that evidence. Courts would thus be applying their narrow
scope of review to the decision actually made. If board members dif-
fered in the evidence they relied on in rejecting a registrant's claim, the
grounds of decision of a majority of the voting members would have
to constitute a legal basis for the rejection.
A requirement that boards give the evidentiary basis for their de-
cisions thus would protect against upholding legally erroneous decisions
on the hypothesis that the board relied upon evidence it actually dis-
credited. It would also bring to light legal errors by the board. One
mistake it might either reveal or correct is board reliance on evidence
outside the file. For example, the regulations forbid a board to reject
a claim because of statements at the personal appearance unless it tran-
scribes the statements and places them in the file. Without a require-
ment that the board cite the evidence relied upon, a court would have
no means of learning that the actual basis of decision was evidence that
the board had failed to incorporate in the record. The board might
be sustained on the basis of other evidence which had not in fact per-
suaded it to rule against the registrant.24
Boards may also rely on evidence that is factually insufficient to
support their result. When all the evidence supports the claim that a
registrant became a conscientious objector at age eighteen, the fact that
he worked in a munitions plant at age sixteen is not a basis in fact for
a decision that his conscientious objector claim is insincere. A more
common situation is for a board to rely on a factor that courts have
said is legally insufficient to support denial of a claim. For example,
a board that relies solely on lateness in filing to show insincerity would
have its classification overturned. Interesting legal questions would
arise if a board gave the fact that a registrant was not a churchgoer as
one of several grounds supporting its finding that his opposition was
not the product of "religious training and belief"; or if a board pointed
out that a registrant had said he would kill in self-defense as one rea-
son for its ruling that the registrant was a selective objector. Courts
have ruled that a person need not be a churchgoer, or even a member
of an organized church, to qualify for exemption. Nor need a person
renounce the use of force in self-defense. It is unclear, however, whether
these facts are regarded as immaterial or whether they are merely
246 If, after the reasons requirement, boards are required to reveal the evidence
for their rulings, a board that simply cited "inconsistent statements at the personal
appearance" as the basis for its denial on grounds of insincerity would have its classi-
fication overturned because the supporting evidence did not appear in the file. A board
could avoid this result by complying with the rule that it include in the file all evi-
dence upon which it relies; it would spell out what the registrant's inconsistent state-
ments were.
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deemed legally insufficient when unaccompanied by other evidence ad-
verse to the registrant.2 47
To require boards to specify the evidence on which they have re-
lied would doubtless impose a greater burden than a simple requirement
that they state the statutory ground. The burden should not, however,
be overwhelming. Presumably board members are aware of the evi-
dence that persuades them even in the absence of such a requirement.
If they are not, the requirement may serve an added beneficial purpose
of increasing the care with which they make their decisions. Simple
expedients could be adopted for identifying the evidence that influenced
the board. A board could, for example, mark with red pencil those
portions of the file which were the evidentiary basis of decision. (If
board members differed in their evidentiary basis, each could use a
different color pencil or each could submit a marked copy of the file.
A board could adapt to the situation where there was more than one
statutory ground, each with a separate evidentiary basis, in a similar
manner.) Even in the most complex situation, adding to the decisional
process the burden of marking the evidentiary material significant to
it should not add more than a few minutes.
3. Statement of Rationale
Only if boards must give more than their statutory and evidentiary
bases of decision and explain as well their rationale-why they con-
sider the evidence on which they rely to be persuasive-would they be
obliged to write opinions. Arguably the phraseology of the new statu-
tory requirement-the board "shall, upon request, furnish to [the]
registrant a brief written statement of the reasons for its decisions"-
suggests that this is in fact the requirement.248 If so, as discussed
earlier,249 the reviewing court should be content with an informal and
unrefined statement of the board's reasoning. It should demand only
247 That these facts are legally insufficient to provide a basis in fact for denial of
conscientious objector status is clear, see text accompanying notes 6-7 supra, and
since "any evidence" can serve as a basis in fact, this would suggest that they are
no evidence at all. Courts have not said, however, that these facts are immaterial
but simply that they are "consistent with conscientious objector status," United States
v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 1969) (willingness to use force in certain
circumstances not a proper basis for denial), or that they do "not necessarily negative
a conscientious objection," Shepherd v. United States, 217 F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir.
1954) (use of force). See United States v. Harris, 1 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3360 (D.
Ore. 1968) (defendant's refusal to be baptized as Jehovah's Witness and thereby be-
come true member of the faith not basis in fact for denial of I-0 claim).
248 The regulations require the board to "record its reasons" for rejecting a
claim in his file and to inform the registrant of those reasons when he is notified of
his classification. 32 C.F.R. § 1623.4(c) (1972).
249 Text accompanying note 237 supra.
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enough to satisfy itself that the board has not misunderstood the critical
considerations. Boards might tend to be more careful in the processes
of decisionmaking if they had to spell out, however succinctly and in-
formally, their reasoning processes. 25 °  Moreover the requirement, so
construed, would expose some errors that would not be evident from
a mere citation of the statutory ground and of the evidence relied upon.
The need for statements of boards' reasoning is reduced, however,
in decisions that are not to be reviewed further within the Selective
Service System because of the rule that courts must uphold a board's
decision whenever it is supported by a basis in fact.25' In some cases,
boards' explanations might disclose a legal error, or an explanation
might be necessary before the court could understand why the cited
evidence lends any support to the decision. Generally, however, since
courts are not concerned with the persuasiveness of the evidence cited
in the light of any conflicting evidence, and since the registrant to pre-
vail must show that no evidence in the file supports his classification,
an identification of the statutory ground of decision and the evidence
on which the board relied will allow the court fully to perform its func-
tions. The same would not be true before an appeal board or the Presi-
dential board, because their task is to determine the registrant's classi-
fication on the basis of all available evidence.252  Boards' explanations
of their adjudications are more likely to augment the accuracy of the
decisionmaking process at this stage by enabling the registrant and the
appellate board to explore the validity of the earlier determination. In
cases where it is clear that a registrant can obtain further review within
the Selective Service System, therefore, a board ruling against him
might be required to state its rationale. Unless the basis-in-fact stand-
250 Judge Frank once said that the most important purpose of the findings re-
quirement in trial courts was "that of evoking care on the part of the trial judge in
ascertaining the facts .... Often a strong impression that, on the basis of the evi-
dence, the facts are thus-and-so gives way when it comes to expressing that impres-
sion on paper." United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 694 (1942). Contra, Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in Cases Where Juries Are Waived, 4 U. CHi. L. REv. 218, 228-29 (1937).
251 The standard of review in the Agricultural Adjustment Act cases requidng
Review Committees to give their reasoning, by contrast, was a substantial evidence
standard. See, e.g., Jones v. Hughes, 400 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1968). See note 237
supra.
252 If the appeal boards' classifications were truly de novo and earlier determina-
tions were not at all influential, reasons for the earlier determinations would not be
necessary to their functions. Despite cases saying appeal boards' determinations are
de novo, however, it is clear that earlier rulings are of at least some influence. If
they were not, demeanor could not have been of any influence prior to the recent
amendments, unless it was fully described in the record, for appeal boards did not
grant personal appearances. Yet pre-1971 cases seemed to indicate that simply an
adverse notation as to demeanor in the record would be a sufficient basis for a court
to sustain an appeal board's classification. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375,
382 (1955) (analyzing facts in record only after finding no indication of "shifty or
evasive" demeanor); United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808, 814-16 (2d Cir. 1960).
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ard is abandoned, a statement of the grounds and evidence relied upon
might suffice in cases where only judicial review seems likely.253
E. Evaluation of the Reasons Requirement
Whichever interpretation of the reasons requirement prevails, it
will serve in some measure to increase the effectiveness of judicial re-
view. It should also stimulate boards to exercise greater care in mak-
ing their determinations. If an interpretation requiring specification of
either the boards' evidentiary basis or their full reasoning is adopted,
the requirement could also go far towards controlling any tendency
boards might have to pick a ground of decision arbitrarily, that is, to
choose it not because it reflects their actual reasoning processes but be-
cause it will withstand judicial scrutiny.
Either of these two interpretations would limit the extent to which
a board could undermine the purposes of a reasons requirement by citing
all possible reasons. As previously noted, a board operating under a
requirement that it simply state its statutory grounds could list all
statutory bases for finding against a claimant. Under a rule that a
board must indicate the evidence on which it relies, however, it would
be more difficult for a board to impede effective review by this tactic.25" 4
Likewise, a requirement that the board state its reasoning would inhibit
any tendency in this direction.255
If one of the more demanding interpretations of the reasons re-
quirement is adopted, there will also be less likelihood of improper re-
liance on demeanor evidence. The vexing question whether a board
should be empowered to reject a registrant's story on the basis of de-
253 The rules as to which cases go to the Presidential board make it impossible
for an appeal board to ascertain with certainty all cases where further review within
the system will be had. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra. If the suggested
approach were adopted, local boards should give full reasoning in all cases, and the
Presidential board would never be required to give full reasoning. Appeal boards
would have to do so, at least in cases where the appeal board was not unanimous.
If appeal boards gave full reasoning only in such cases, there would be some instances
-those where the State or National Directors appealed-where the appeal board had
not given full reasoning but where there would be further review within the Selec-
tive Service System.
254 A board could do so only by indicating every piece of evidence that could
possibly support its decision as an independent basis of decision. The tactic would
backfire, however, if the board neglected to state that the grounds were independent
of each other. Moreover, if a board indicated a great deal of evidence in the file,
including evidence that could not possibly support its decision, the bad faith of the
board would be apparent, and a court should rule that the board had not complied
with the requirement.
255 If a board required to spell out its reasoning could state all possible reasons as
independent bases of decision, the registrant could be deprived of all benefits the rea-
sons requirement provides. As a practical matter, however, the board would usually
be unable to eliminate the benefits of the requirement in this way. It might decrease
the helpfulness of the requirement by maximizing the number of independent reasons
it gives, but as long as it does not cover all possibilities, it will not eliminate the
utility of the requirement.
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meanor alone was adverted to earlier. If demeanor is deemed sufficient,
boards at the least should have to describe fully what it was in the
registrant's demeanor that influenced the board. A bare declaration
that the registrant seemed "shifty" or gave an "appearance of unre-
liability" would not insulate the administrative decision from reversal.
Requiring in this fashion a fuller description of demeanor should cut
down on any tendency boards may have to make adverse demeanor
findings automatically as the easiest way to deny a claim.
The requirement might also contribute to the reviewability of
demeanor evidence. The usual rule of review-that a board's decision
will be sustained if any evidence supports it-still admits of an inquiry
whether in the particular case demeanor provides "any evidence" sup-
porting rejection of the registrant's claim. The registrant's demeanor
is obviously not always sufficient to serve as an independent basis for
decision against the registrant, even if there is a rule that demeanor can
serve as the sole basis in fact. A requirement that the board must de-
scribe fully the registrant's demeanor (or, additionally, give its reasons
for considering the demeanor influential) would make it possible for a
court to make a more informed judgment whether in a particular case
the demeanor evidence does constitute a basis in fact for disbelieving
the registrant.256
IV. REMAINING PROBLEMS
Despite the improvement the reasons requirement represents, the
administration of the Selective Service System remains seriously
flawed. The virtue of that requirement is that it will bring more into
the open what boards are doing and thus make it more probable in any
given case that the ultimate decision is in accord with the prevailing
rules. To the extent that past difficulties in accurately discerning who
is a conscientious objector lay in the rules themselves, however, the
2 56 The reasons requirement could cut down on board misuse of demeanor in
another way as well: the requirement will clarify just how strong the demeanor evi-
dence against a registrant is. A court might require a particularly strong showing
of demeanor evidence to support rejection of a registrant's claim in cases where the
file shows a very strong case for the registrant on the paper record, or where it shows
obvious sources of relevant information that the board has failed to pursue. Under
the basis-in-fact test, however, it would seem improper for a court in this way to
balance the strength of the registrant's case against the strength of the demeanor
evidence. The sole inquiry that test allows the court to make is whether demeanor
serves as any basis in fact for the board's decision; theoretically that determination
should be made without regard to other evidence in the registrant's file. Moreover,
it is conceivable that the board's description of demeanor will show it to be a basis
for disbelieving only some of a registrant's evidence but not enough to defeat a prima
facie case. The registrant then would have satisfied his burden of proof unless there
were other unfavorable evidence in the record, or unless the registrant's insincerity
as to some evidence can be affirmative evidence against him, allowing disbelief of
other of his evidence. Cf. Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952).
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reasons requirement has little ameliorative effect. Other reforms could
improve the situation. Thus, lengthier personal appearances with full
procedural rights could be guaranteed registrants; the power of boards
to deny a classification because of demeanor could be limited to situa-
tions where no more concrete evidence is available; exaggerated defer-
ence to boards' factual findings could be avoided by frank adoption of a
broader standard of review than the basis-in-fact test; means might be
sought to make the factfinding body more representative of the popula-
tion. One of the most significant ways to reform the decisionmaking
system would be to provide for meaningful investigation of conscien-
tious objector claims. This could be done by reinstituting a Depart-
ment of Justice investigation of the kind that existed until mid-1967.57
Alternatively, draft boards themselves might be required thoroughly to
investigate before any deference could be given to their factual deter-
minations. This approach might well require professionalizing draft
boards so that members would have adequate time to spend at the job.
Even if the full range of reforms were provided, however, prob-
lems of unreliable conscientious objector determinations would remain.
There would be cases where investigation would not help because there
simply is nothing to confirm or refute a registrant's own statement in
support of his claim. Moreover, present criteria for conscientious ob-
jector status-whether a registrant's belief is sincerely held and "oc-
cupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemp-
tion" 2 ---are too elusive to admit of reliable application. 259  Impartial
and full consideration of claims based on all available evidence will not,
therefore, provide assurance that the conscientious objector exemption
is being correctly and uniformly applied.
In all conscientious objector cases there are inherent difficulties.
The determination depends on the registrant's state of mind in relation
to a subject which is peculiarly personal and which involves a complex
of emotional, psychological, and ideological factors. Moreover, the
incentive to dissemble or falsify is extreme. In instances where it is
available, the factfinder can take some comfort in circumstantial evi-
dence casting light on the honesty of the registrant's self-serving state-
257 The inability to keep up with the caseload that apparently led to abolition of
the procedure could be avoided by appropriating funds to hire sufficient staff to handle
the caseload. See text accompanying notes 159-60 supra.
258 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
2 59 In United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 10 (1953), though decided at a time
when the exemption was interpreted as limited to the traditionally religious and when
the Department of Justice investigatory procedure was in effect, the Court nevertheless
recognized that "[i]t is always difficult to devise procedures which will be adequate
to do justice in cases where the sincerity of another's religious convictions is the
ultimate factual issue."
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ment of his beliefs. The man who can show membership in a tradi-
tionally pacifist sect, for example, has convincing circumstantial evidence
of his opposition to participation in war. Even for him, however, the
evidence is not conclusive; he might have joined simply to strengthen
his conscientious objector claim. If he joined the sect at an early age
and if his participation in religious activities has been regular and full,
the credibility of his claim increases.260 Even so, it is possible that he
is a farsighted dissembler.
A registrant who is religious in a traditional sense but who is not
a member of a peace church has a more difficult task. Such a registrant
must rely on circumstantial evidence to convince the board not only that
the teachings of his church are central to his life, but also that he has
in good faith reached the conclusion that those teachings forbid his
engagement in war.
Most troublesome for the factfinder, however, are the cases in
which the applicant for conscientious objector status has no church
affiliation. The claims of some persons without traditional religious
affiliations may be clearly provable or disprovable. Generally, however,
they are the least susceptible of accurate determination. An unaffiliated
registrant may be totally sincere, yet have no objective evidence to
corroborate his assertion that he believes it would be wrong for him to
participate in war.2"1
The registrant who can do no more than describe his inward
beliefs is in a dilemma: his claim may not be believed simply because
it is easily fabricated and impossible to prove or disprove 62 The draft
board shares the problem: if it were to reject all such claims on the
ground that the registrant had never performed an overt act that
showed, even circumstantially, that his claim was legitimate, it could
well reject the claim of a registrant who was, under Seeger and Welsh,
entitled to a conscientious objector exemption. If, on the other hand,
260 See note 261 infra.
261 In fact, studies show that draft boards are most likely to grant claims by
members of pacifist churches, that persons affiliated with other churches are the next
most favored group, and that persons not affiliated with any church have the most
difficult time having their claims sustained. Rabin, supra note 36, at 657-58; Reisner,
supra note 7, at 531-35. But cf. Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 700 (1971)
("[T]he Selective Service System must be concerned with the registrant as an
individual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious sect, if any,
to which he may belong.") Registrants are also aided by affirming their belief in a
Supreme Being. Reisner, supra at 531. Interestingly enough, the Reisner study
indicates that while church affiliation (and particularly affiliation with traditional
peace churches) is often controlling, the length of time of affiliation and the regularity
of church attendance as reported by the registrant to the draft board seem unimpor-
tant. Id. 538.
262 Compare this situation to the dilemma of conscientious objectors when there
is no procedure for investigating conscientious objector claims; see text accompanying
notes 163-69, 185-93 supra.
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it invariably accepted such claims in the absence of evidence to impeach
them, disingenuous registrants would receive conscientious objector ex-
emptions to which they are not entitled. By hypothesis, there is
nothing to which the draft board can look that will reliably guide its
determination.
To be sure, not all nonaffiliated objectors will lack objective evi-
dence relevant to their sincerity. Some will have manifested their
beliefs through action or by making statements indicating opposition to
war. It is likely, however, that their lack of religious affiliation will
make it more difficult for them than it would be for a church member
to show that those actions or statements reflect a belief that substantively
qualifies. Opposition to war qualifies one for the exemption only if it
is (1) directed to all wars and (2) founded upon moral or religious
principle and not just pragmatic considerations. The fact of religious
affiliation obviously will assist materially in convincing a board that the
basis for opposition is moral or religious. When traditional religion is
the foundation of a belief it may also be more easily deemed to extend
beyond a particular war to war in general. Nonaffiliated objectors who
can point to antiwar actions or statements as evidence of their opposi-
tion to war may still run a heavy risk that those actions or statements
will be dismissed as merely political or as directed toward a particular
war.
263
Objective evidence is helpful not only in proving that a registrant
is sincere in his belief that he should not participate in war; it may also
tend to show that the belief is held with the requisite depth-that it
"occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the ex-
emption." Here again, objectors lacking traditional religious affilia-
tions may be disadvantaged: 264 the kind of evidence they have, antiwar
statements or activities, for example, may be quite consistent with a
merely political belief or one directed only at a particular war. Again,
the presence of some objective evidence may be insufficient to provide
the board with a firm basis for distinguishing the valid claims from
263 Although a man clearly could consistently oppose the Vietnam conflict and
also be entitled to conscientious objector status, Professor Reisner reports that when
a file shows opposition to the Vietnam war a registrants chance of receiving a con-
scientious objector classification from an appeal board substantially lessens. Reisner,
sipra note 7, at 530. On the basis of a limited sample he also reports that "[o]pposi-
tion to the Vietnam War was only slightly less decisive as a negative factor in the
cases that underwent Justice Department review." Id. 541.
264 That traditionally religious objectors will be at an advantage with respect
to the depth requirement is clear since the very function of the depth requirement
is to define religion-to determine whether a man's opposition to war is the product
of "religious training and belief" in the statutory sense. See text accompanying notes
117-25 supra & notes 123, 125.
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those that are contrived or are legally inadequate under the statutory
standard.
Whether a particular registrant holds his belief with the requisite
depth may indeed be an even more elusive issue than the question of
sincerity. One who has a sincere belief that he should not participate
in war may himself be uncertain whether his belief "occupies a place in
[his] life . . .parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one
who clearly qualifies for the exemption." 265 If the possessor of a belief
in all honesty is unable to determine whether his belief meets the statu-
tory criteria, it is clearly beyond the competence of an outside factfinder
to make that determination with accuracy. The board may well resort
to deciding the issue of depth according to categories of registrants,
rather than assessing the particularized beliefs of individual registrants.
Theoretically, a traditionally religious man might also be found
disqualified from conscientious objector status because of lack of depth.
He might have a sincere belief that stemmed from religious affiliation
that it was wrong for him to participate in war, yet the belief might not
be sufficiently important to him or central to his existence to meet the
law's requirement. In practice, however, draft boards faced with
claimants having traditional religious affiliations and objecting with
apparent sincerity to participation in war in any form are apt to presume
that the beliefs are held with the requisite depth-to presume it simply
because of the impossibility of actually determining whether the depth
criterion is satisfied.
Even if investigation of conscientious objector claims were pro-
vided, therefore, determinations of conscientious objector status would
continue to be unreliable.266  In many cases-most frequently, but
certainly not exclusively, cases involving nonaffiliated registrants-there
would still be no adequate factual basis for deciding whether a reg-
istrant satisfied all of the statutory criteria. Whether the lack of an
adequate factual basis for decision would ultimately redound to the
benefit of the registrant is uncertain. It would not if there were enough
in the record to provide a basis in fact for a decision against him on
any ground. In that situation, the board could indulge its suspicion
of the registrant, or its hostility to him, by simply seizing on that
ground. Similarly the registrant would not benefit from the lack of
adequate evidence if the board could hold against him by findings on
demeanor and have its decision upheld. If, on the other hand, de-
265 Uncertainty might arise either from a registrant's failure to understand what
degree of depth is required-that is, what is "the place . . . filled by the orthodox
belief in God of [a registrant] who clearly qualifies--or from a registrant's inability
to ascertain the exact degree of his own depth of belief.
266 Investigation would, however, improve the situation. See note 169 supra.
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meanor alone were deemed a legally insufficient basis for denial, and
if a registrant is sufficiently resourceful to present a claim believable on
its face and of such a nature that investigation yields no evidence con-
trary to it, the situation is the same as when claims are not investigated:
any person who is able to state a claim that is legally sufficient to justify
conscientious objector status and who has the temerity to fight an
adverse Selective Service determination in court should eventually have
his conscientious objector claim sustained whether his claim be truthful
or not.
Unless required by necessity, we should be reluctant to employ a
standard for conscientious objection that is likely in any substantial
percentage of cases to lead to unreliable results. An erroneous dis-
position of a conscientious objector claim entails harsh consequences.
The unfairness to a registrant sentenced to prison because of erroneous
classification is obvious. There is also a cost to the nation in pros-
ecuting and imprisoning a man who could perform some beneficial
service that does not conflict with his conscience. On the other hand,
the attainment of conscientious objector status by men who are insincere
in their claims is grossly unfair: the direct result of their erroneous
classification is that other men must take their place.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The public has lost confidence in the administration of the draft.
In 1941, at a time (pre-Pearl Harbor) when the public was very
divided over the wisdom of having a conscription system, a Gallup
Poll showed nevertheless that ninety-three percent of the public believed
that the draft had "been handled fairly," and only seven percent thought
otherwise 6' 7 By 1966, however, only forty-three percent felt that "the
way [the draft] works is fair," though "[t]he vast majority of
Americans favor[ed] drafting young men for military service." 268 A
presidential commission that in 1967 made recommendations concerning
the Selective Service System also came to the conclusion that the draft
is unevenly administered.2 69 Subsequent to the 1967 amendments, testi-
267 G. WAmsLEY, supra note 134, at 1.
2 68Id. 2. For a summary of complaints leveled against the draft in the mid-
1960's, together with the Selective Service System's rebuttal, see Hearings on the
Administration & Operation of the Selective Service System Before the House Comm.
on; Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9985-96 (1966).
2 69 MARS HALL CozmnmnssioN REPORT, supra note 135. The Commission was ap-
pointed in 1966 by President Johnson. See Exec. Order No. 11,289, 31 Fed. Reg.
9265-66 (1966). It was headed by Burke Marshall, a former Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States, and it came to be known as "the Marshall Commission."
Most of the recommendations the Marshall Commission made concerning the
administrative restructuring of the system were not adopted. The congressional
debate on reform of the nation's draft laws, which culminated in the Military
1972l
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mony before congressional committees suggested that widespread in-
equities still existed. ° One source of dissatisfaction has been the lack
of centralization and the extent of discretionary decisidnmaking, which
have combined to produce a lack of uniformity.7 Another is that the
system of exemptions and deferments makes it more likely that socially
and economically disadvantaged persons who are qualified for service
will be drafted, than will members of more privileged groups. 2 Pro-
cedural changes in the way the draft is to operate have been one means
adopted by lawmakers to increase the fairness of the system .2 " Another
Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. A''. §§451-73 (1970), as amended, 50
U.S.C.A. APP. §§451-71a (Supp. 1972), can be found in Hearings on the Admin-
istration & Operation of the Selective Service System Before the House Comm. on
Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) ; Hearings on S. 1432 Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; Hearings on Extension of
the Universal Military Training & Service Act Before the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; S. R Pa. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ;
H.R. REP. No. 346, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967) ; CIVILIAN ADVISORY PANEL ON MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT,
90TH CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT TO THE HOUSE Comm. ON ARMED SERVICES, (Comm.
Print 1967) (the "Clark Report," authored by a panel chaired by General Mark
Clark, was appointed by the Armed Services Committee to give Congress a basis for
examining the draft independent of the Marshall Commission).
270 Hearings on S. Res. 39 Before the Subcoinm. on Administrative Practice &
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 58-78, 378
(1969) ; Hearings on Selective Service & Military Compensation Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (statement of Senator Ken-
nedy), 339 (statement of Mr. Caplan) (1971); Hearings on Administration &
Operation of the Draft Law Before the Special Subcomm. on the Draft of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12,809 (1970) (statement of Repre-
sentative Harrington).
271 See, e.g., Hearings on S. Res. 39 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
378 (1969) (pronouncement on Selective Service System adopted by the United
Church of Christ); Hearings on Selective Service & Military Compensation Before
the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (statement of Senator
Kennedy), 339-42 (statement of Mr. Caplan), 400 (statement of Lutheran Church)
(1971); MARSHALL CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 135, at 17-29, 41-42; J. DAVIs
& K. DoInARE, supra note 134, at 198-99, 207.
272 Hearings on Selective Service & Military Compensation Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 388 (1971) (statement of William
Keeney) ; Hearings on Administration & Operation of the Draft Before the Special
Subcomm. on the Draft of the House Armed Services Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
12,809 (1970) (statement of Representative Harrington); MARSHALL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 135, at 9-10, 21-26; J. DAvis & K. DOLBEARE, supra note 134, at
15-17, 129-52.
273 Although the 1971 amendments enacted some of the procedural changes often
called for-statement of reasons for rejecting registrants' claims, presence of quorum
of local board at personal appearance, right to appear before classification, and the
right to present witnesses-many of the perceived procedural shortcomings have not
been remedied. Among these are the nonrepresentative character of the Selective
Service boards, the absence of a right to counsel at local board proceedings, the
absence of a right to a transcript of local board proceedings, Hearings on Selective
Service & Military Compensation Before the Senate Conm. on Armed Services,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 425-26 (1971) (statement of Mr. Neier), and the lack of local
board awareness regarding the state of the law. Hearings on S. Res. 39 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1969).
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has been to create a truly random system of selection-as the lottery
commenced in 1970 is designed to be 274-among all those equally
vulnerable to service and to cut back deferments and exemptions that
create privileged groups of persons able to minimize their vulnerability.
In contrast to the notion that General Hershey made popular-that the
Selective Service System should, through the use of deferments, channel
manpower into activities it considers in the national interest 275-the
current conception is of a system where deferments and exemptions are
minimized, the largest possible number of men is eligible to serve, and
the choice of who actually shall serve is dictated by chance. 6
As a result the fatherhood, occupational, and student deferments
have been substantially cut back in recent years.2 7 The conscientious
objector exemption, however, has remained substantially unchanged,
though it is at least equally susceptible to inequity in its administration.
It may be that advantaged persons are more likely to be conscientious
objectors than are the disadvantaged-at least objectors of the not-
traditionally-religious variety recognized in Welsh and Seeger. At any
rate, the sophistication and the ability to hire counsel put one at a great
advantage in formulating a sustainable conscientious objector claim and
274 The path for a random selection process was cleared by repeal of § 5 (a) (2)
of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 which preserved the "oldest first" induc-
tion system. Act of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-124, § 2, 83 Stat. 220. Two days
later, President Nixon, pursuant to his rulemaking power, adopted a system of random
selection. Proclamation No. 3945, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,017 (1969), 50 U.S.C. App. § 455
(1970).
275 Hearings on the Administration & Operation of the Selective Service System
Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9620, 9623 (1966)
(testimony of General H-ershey) :
I do not believe we are so rich in human resources that we can afford
deliberately to ignore opportunities we have to channel people into training
and the application of training. There are enough factors over which we
have no control which interferes with the development of the potential of
our citizens, and with the best utilization of that potential when it is devel-
oped. By deferment we can influence people to train themselves and to use
the skills they acquire in work critical to the Nation, in civilian or in military
life.
See also 1965 Din. SEL. SERV. ANN. REP. 18; SECrvE SERVICE AND CHRONOLOGY
30 (1965).
276 See, e.g., Hearings on S. Res. 39 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 986
(1969) (article by Senator Kennedy in EVENT, June 1969).
27750 U.S.C.A. App. §456(h) (Supp. 1972), amending 50 U.S.C. App. §456(h)
(1970). Compare Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 Fed. Reg. 9787, 9791 (1967), with 32
C.F.R. § 1622.25 (1972) (student deferments). Compare Exec. Order No. 11,360,
32 Fed. Reg. 9787, 9791 (1967) (III-A deferment to any male with child or children
and bona fide family relationship), with 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30 (1972). Compare Exec.
Order No. 11,527, 35 Fed. Reg. 6571 (1970), with 32 C.F.R. § 1622.22 (1972) (occu-
pational deferments).
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in having it ultimately sustained. The conscientious objector exemption
may, then, be criticized on the ground that the privileged have the
easiest access to it-a criticism also leveled at the occupational and
student deferments. In addition, its administration is unfair because the
inherent difficulties of determining who is a conscientious objector make
that classification much more susceptible to false claims than any others.
The problem of inequitable administration would of course be eased
if objective criteria were used-if, for example, one were to make
membership in particular peace churches the sole test of conscientious
objection."' The intractable difficulty is in arriving at objectively
provable criteria that include all to whom we wish to extend the ex-
emption without allowing the exemption to be claimed too broadly.
Alternatively, the problem of proof in conscientious objector cases could
be met by minimizing the attractiveness of the conscientious objector
exemption,279 thereby decreasing the incentive to make false claims and
making more credible those that are made. Our present system, with
respect to I-0 objectors, is an uneasy compromise: we do burden the
objector in return for his avoidance of military service by making him
perform alternative service. The burden is largely purposeless, how-
ever, because it is not sufficiently great to remove the incentive for false
278 The Draft Act of 1917 followed this approach, at least on paper. It required,
as a prerequisite to conscientious objector status, membership in a church whose doc-
trine forbade participation in war. Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76,
78. During that period, the exemption did not permit conscientious objectors to remain
civilians. Draftees were deemed members of the military from the date of issuance of
their induction order. See M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, CoNscRn'ToN OF CONSCIENCE 12
(1952).
What conscientious objector exemption there was, however, was not in practice
always limited to members of peace churches. Local board treatment of the exemption
varied, since the War Department did not prepare a list of recognized peace churches.
I SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 52 (Special Monograph No.
11, 1950). But every person who claimed upon induction that he was a conscientious
objector, whether or not he was a member of a peace church and whether or not he
had been certified as a conscientious objector by his draft board, was segregated from
the other soldiers in military camp. See U.S. SECRETARY OF WAR, STATEMENT COX-
CEINING THE TREATMENT OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE Ai my 17 (1919)
[hereinafter cited as STATEMENT]; M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, .mipra at 13.
Seven months after the enactment of the Draft Act, the Secretary of War legiti-
mated the practice of treating all objectors alike by issuing an order that not only all
religious objectors but also those with "personal scruples against war" should be con-
sidered conscientious objectors. STATEMENT, mtpra at 39. That order was not publi-
cized out of a fear that knowledge of it would encourage persons to make false claims
of conscientious objection, id. 17, but in March of 1918 the President confirmed that
broadening of the category of conscientious objectors in an executive order. Id. 39-40.
279 Another approach might be to keep the public from knowing how advantage-
ously conscientious objectors are treated in comparison to other persons. This was
tried at times during World War I. See, e.g., note 278 supra. The isolation of the
Civilian Public Service Camps where objectors were placed during World War II is
also partially explainable on this ground. See M. SIBLEY & P. JAcOB, supra note 278,
at 225-26.
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I-0 claims; 280 the I-0 objector (but not the I-A-O objector28) is
much better treated than the ordinary soldier." 2
280 To the extent that the burden constitutes work that contributes to the national
interest, it can be explained on that ground. In large part, however, it is explicable
only as a concession to public opinion, which might be outraged if those refusing mili-
tary service were not made to perform any service at all.
The government has rationalized the various kinds of alternate service it has pro-
vided for in the course of our history on the ground that they both respect the con-
scientious objector's beliefs and make him contribute in some way to the national
interest The alternate service provisions may be found at Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, ch. 144, § 1(q), 65 Stat. 86 (1951), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.
APP. § 456(j) (Supp. 1972); Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720
§ 5(g), 54 Stat. 889; Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78. See also
MILLER, STORIES FROM BEaHeERN LIFE 137-38 (1942), quoted in 1 SELECTIVE SERVICE
SYSTEM, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 42-43 (Special Monograph No. 11, 1950). In
fact, however, it is unlikely that the contribution conscientious objectors' service has
made has equalled the costs and effort expended in imposing the requirement on them.
During World War I only about 1200 men were furloughed to farms, STATEMENT,
supra note 278, at 25; Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. U.Q. 253, 271
(1919) (1300 men), but a great deal of energy at very high levels went into the prob-
lem of how to deal with those objectors. See generally STATEMENT, SUpra. Moreover,
a Board of Inquiry consisting of three prominent persons including Harlan Fiske Stone,
then Dean of Columbia Law School and later Chief Justice of the United States, spent
approximately a year interviewing persons claiming eligibility and passing on the
merits of their claims. M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, supra note 278, at 14. The 151 Civilian
Public Service Camps that existed to provide alternate service for fewer than 12,000
conscientious objectors during World War II often filled their day with makework.
In terms of costs it is most unlikely that the expense of setting them up and admin-
istering them was met by work performed. Id. 89, 209, 224-36. But see id. 124-51.
Much effort is expended under the current system as well in assigning persons to jobs
that qualify for alternate service.
In addition to a lack of returns for the efforts expended, there are other indications
that a primary reason for the alternate service scheme is to place some burden on the
1-0 registrant. See generally Silard, Invalid Disruption Riles for CO Alternative
Service, 3 COLUM. SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 136 (1971). Several Selective
Service rules for dealing with 1-O's are explainable only on this rationale. Local
Board Mem. No. 64, SEL. SEav. L. REP. 2183 (1962, amended 1968) (rescinded, 5 SEL.
SEav. L. REP. 8 (1972)), for example, provided that the registrant's work should be
performed outside of the community where he resides and that the position the regis-
trant receives "should constitute a disruption of the registrant's normal way of life
somewhat comparable to the disruption of a registrant who is inducted into the Armed
Forces.' See Local Board Mem. No. 98, SEL. SERV. L. REP. 2200:7 (1969) (rescinded,
5 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 8 (1972)). For the current rules, see note 11 supra. Moreover,
the alternate service requirement was abolished in the 1948 draft law, Selective Service
Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612-13, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 456(j)
(Supp. 1972), and was revived in 1951 because of a hostile public reaction to total
exemption. See D. JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FREEDOMS 17 (1963)
(illustrating the government's desire to avoid public hostility to overly permissive treat-
ment in formulating World War I legislation) ; M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, supra at 239-40
(for an instance of congressional reaction at the end of World War II to what it con-
sidered undue favoring of conscientious objectors).
281 See note 284 infra.
282 The 1-0 objector has no greater likelihood of having to perform alternate
service than the I-A registrant has of having to serve. His term of service is no longer
than that of the ordinary soldier, and he fulfills it not in the military but in a civilian
occupation that typically involves no unusual danger. He participates in choosing his
job, and he is treated on equal terms with civilian employees. See text accompanying
notes 10-14 spra & note 11.
The burden imposed on 1-0 objectors as a group, while it may have served the
function of placating the public, has never been sufficient to remove the incentive for
false 1-0 claims. The World War II experience with Civilian Public Service Camps
probably placed on the objector the heaviest burden this nation has ever imposed. For
some persons the hardship of that service was equal to military service. Objectors'
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In keeping with the objective of decreasing the incentive for false
conscientious objector claims, it is proposed that conscientious objectors
not be exempted from entering the military. Persons who are drafted
who have conscientious scruples against killing other persons should,
however, be relieved from all obligation to kill. Objectors to killing
should be self-selecting; that is, persons should be admitted to this
category at their election and without any criteria concerning source of
opposition, reason for opposition, depth of opposition, and so forth.
2 3
likelihood of service and period of service was comparable to that of the nonobjector,
and the danger involved in his work was less. Conscientious objectors, however, were
given no compensation for their services. Persons in need of funds, either for them-
selves or for their dependents, and who could not find an organization to finance them,
consequently found alternate service less appealing than military service would have
been, and some, because of this factor, abandoned their scruples and entered the mili-
tary. See M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, supra note 278, at 89-90, 112, 216-24. For persons
who could bear the financial burden, however, alternate service remained more attrac-
tive than military service. The incentive for false claims remained, therefore, for those
who could afford alternate service.
283 The proposed scheme appears in many ways to duplicate that utilized in World
War I once it is remembered that the statutory limitation during that period to mem-
bers of pacifist churches was not in fact observed. See note 278 supra. Even during
World War I, however, though personal scruples against fighting were recognized,
there were substantive limitations on the exemption. The sincerity of a man's con-
scientious objection had to be established, see Stone, supra note 280, at 258, 263, and
political or selective objection to war was never recognized, STATEMENT, supra
note 278, at 32 (public statement issued by Secretary of War) ; W. KELLOGG, THE
C NSCIrbTIOUS OBjEcToR 29-30 (1919) ; Stone, supra at 267.
Not only was the scope of who would qualify for the exemption different in World
War I than in the proposed scheme, but also the scope of duties that the conscientious
objector had to perform differed. Under the proposal, objectors would be under obli-
gation to perform military duties not related in some direct manner to killing. The
World War I statute also provided that no person should be exempt from service in
any capacity that the President should declare to be noncombatant. Selective Draft Act
of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78. In practice, however, objectors could acquire a broader
exemption. Between May 1917, when the Draft Act was enacted, and March 1918, the
President did not define noncombatant service. During that period all conscientious
objectors were members of the military and were segregated in the military camps.
See note 278 supra. Some tried to minimize their identification with the military
establishment beyond what noncombatant service would seem to allow, see G. HERsn-
BERGER, WAR, PEACE, AND NONRESISTANCE 128 (1944), and the government did not take
a hard line with regard to such objectors. In September 1917, for example, the Secre-
tary of War issued an order that Mennonites not be forced over their objections to
wear military uniforms. STATEMENT, supra at 17. (This is not to say, of course, that
official policy was invariably adhered to in the camps. See M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB,
supra note 278, at 15.) When the President finally defined noncombatant service, he
limited it to service within the military in the medical, quartermaster, and engineering
corps. He also provided, however, that those who would not accept noncombatant
service should continue to be segregated and should not be subjected to "punitive
hardship" because of their conscientious beliefs. Those persons were subject to court-
martial if their sincerity was questioned; if they were sullen and defiant in attitude;
or if they were active in propaganda. Otherwise, their beliefs were respected as long
as they kept themselves and their surroundings clean and engaged in regular exercise.
STATEMENT, supra at 18-19.
A few months later the War Department adopted a policy for disposing of the
segregated objectors: persons sincerely objecting to noncombatant service could ful-
fill their military obligation by being furloughed to a farm selected by the government.
Any pay they received at the job in excess of that of a private in the military had to
be turned over to the civilian branch of the Red Cross. STATEMENT, supra at 19-23;
Stone, supra at 258. Only those who would accept neither a furlough nor noncom-
batant service were to be court-martialed.
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To avoid the problem of the military not having available enough per-
sons willing to engage in combatant service, conscientious objector
service would have to be made equally onerous. If with either type of
duty there were an equal chance of serving in combat areas 284 and
conscientious objector service were not in other respects more pleasur-
able than combatant service, it would seem that a sufficient number of
persons would still be available for combat. If events proved otherwise,
the conditions of conscientious objector and combatant service would
have to be adjusted so that there would be a sufficient number of com-
batants.2 5  One of many ways that this might be done is to make the
term of service for combatants shorter than that for those with objec-
tions to fighting. Another is to adjust differences in pay or in fringe
benefits; that has the disadvantage, however, of its effectiveness as an
In practice, then, the conscientious objector's options during World War I were
much more similar to the system today than appears from the face of the 1917 Draft
Act. And World War I is the only period when this country has required conscien-
tious objectors even formally to become members of the military. During the Civil
War any person subject to the Draft Law could satisfy his obligation by providing
a substitute or paying $300 into the War Department to procure a substitute. Draft
Act of 1864, ch. 13, §§ 4, 5, 13 Stat. 6-7. Special consideration was given to religious
objectors who could, if they accepted induction, be assigned to hospitals or to the care
of freedmen and, if instead they paid $300, could have it applied to the benefit of sick
and wounded soldiers. Id. § 17, at 9. The only other period of conscription by our
national government is from 1940 to the present. At no time during that period has
any form of military service been forced on those conscientious objectors who were
recognized and whose conscientious objections extended to it. From 1940 to 1946 such
objectors were assigned to Civilian Public Service Camps. Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§ 456(j) (Supp. 1972); Exec. Order No. 8675, 6 Fed. Reg. 831-32 (1941). Under
the 1948 Draft Act no service at all was required of those objectors. Selective Serv-
ice Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612-13, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§ 456(j) (Supp. 1972). In 1951, the current alternative service provision was estab-
lished-involving individual assignments to civilian jobs rather than public service
camps. Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch. 144, § 1(q), 65 Stat. 86
(1951), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §456(j) (Supp. 1972).
284 In fact, under the current system a man with a I-A-O classification is likely
to be assigned as a medic and is more likely to serve in a combat zone and be exposed
to dangerous duties than is a I-A soldier. A. TATUM & J. TucHIaNsKY, GUIDE TO
THE DRAFT 208 (1969). That situation would probably change under the proposed
system, however, because of a large increase in the number of noncombatant classi-
fications. The greater danger of I-A-0 status today, and the consequent apparent
sincerity of an applicant for that status, may be partially responsible for the (pres-
ently illegal) practice of some draft boards of automatically granting applications for
I-A-O as opposed to 1-0 status. See Rabin, supra note 36, at 669. See also id. 651-
52, 670-72. Another likely cause under the quota system was that I-A-O's counted
towards a draft board's quota, though I-O's did not. Note 140 supra.285 While such adjustments may seem awkward and impracticable, they are
necessary even under a scheme like the existing one in a total or near-total mobiliza-
tion situation. Such a calculus was made, for one example, during World War I.
At that time, the scope of the conscientious objector exemption was determined only
after a preliminary survey of the number of objectors who would be involved. The
administration concluded that because the objectors were not numerous "a very gen-
erous and considerate mode of treatment" would be possible. D. BEAVER, NEWTOx D.
BAI:ER AND THE AMERIcA WAR EFFORT: 1917-1919, at 232 (1966). It sought to
eliminate the problem of the generosity of the exemption attracting false claims first
by limiting the exemption to members of peace churches, see Hearings on the Selec-
tive Service Act Before the Hotse Comm. on Military Affairs, 65th Cong., 1st Sess.
9 (1917), and later by keeping secret the generosity with which the objectors were
treated, see note 278 supra.
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incentive varying with the wealth of the particular draftee.2" 6 (Adjust-
ments could be made either by classification-so that the desirability of
a particular classification in terms of the danger, discomfort, and/or
rewards involved would be the relevant criterion--or they could be made
according to the particular assignment that an individual received-in
which case all persons who in fact served in a war zone, for example,
doing work of equal danger would be treated the same way whether they
were classified as combatants or noncombatants.)
The best approach would equalize the burden on conscientious ob-
jectors with that on other persons and also have the advantage of not
forcing to enter the military many of those objectors with conscientious
scruples against entering: Congress could retain alternate service for
those opting for it if, at the same time, it increased the likelihood of
service for those who chose to perform it in a civilian capacity. Under
such a system persons who registered for alternate service might, for
example, have to serve automatically, regardless of whether their lottery
numbers would make them liable to induction if they were willing to
enter the military. Some conscientious objectors to military service,
however, would still have to enter. A system of automatic alternate
service could operate only for those persons expressing their desire for
such service prior to the determination of their lottery number. There
would have to be a subsidiary system for persons becoming objectors or
registering their objection only after their lottery position showed a
likelihood that they would be vulnerable to military service. Such
persons would have to enter the miliary but would be able to elect a
noncombatant status that was equalized, to avoid false claims, with
combatant service.257
Under any of these versions of a self-selection proposal some per-
sons who have deep-seated religious beliefs that it is wrong for them
to enter the military will be forced either to violate their consciences or
be liable to imprisonment; and, under any but the last version, a great
many persons may be subject to that dilemma. That is the most ap-
parent objection to adopting a self-selection system.2 8 This Article
2S6 See note 282 supra & note 288 infra.
287 Compare this to the situation of the person whose objection is late in
crystallizing under the present system, see notes 304-05 infra & accompanying text.
2 8
8 Another objection that might be raised, and that was raised when the House
bill prior to the recent statutory amendment provided for a third year of alternate
service for I-0 objectors, H.R. REtP. No. 433, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1971), is
that conscientious objectors are discriminated against, in violation of the first amend-
ment free exercise clause and of the fifth amendment due process clause, when they
are made to serve for a longer time than other draftees. A similar objection could
be voiced if objectors were paid less, or if they were made more likely to serve.
The objection is not fatal to the proposal. If there is a self-selection system for
noncombatant service and if persons not compelled by conscience choose noncom-
batant rather than combatant service, it must be because that service, though more
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vill not discuss the question, thoroughly explored elsewhere, 5 9 whether
the first amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion requires
an exemption from military service for conscientious objectors. While
a colorable argument can be made that an exemption is required, 9 ' lan-
guage in Supreme Court opinions has consistently expressed the view
that the exemption is an act of legislative grace and that conscientious
objectors could constitutionally be subjected to the same military
service as other citizens. 291  Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently
onerous than combatant service in some respects, is altogether not less desirable.
Even if there were not a self-selection system, one would have to ask, in determining
whether the types of service were equal, whether those not conscientiously compelled
to take noncombatant service might be equally content with it. Simply showing a
longer period of service would thus not show a discrimination against the conscien-
tious objector.
There might be created, however, such a disparity in the periods of service that
the conscientious objector could show discrimination against him. If in a self-selection
system the only persons choosing to become noncombatants were those compelled by
conscience not to kill, it would seem to indicate that the conditions of noncombatant
service in the aggregate were substantially more burdensome than those of combatant
service. The fact that persons compelled by conscience continued to sign up for non-
combatant service would not show equality because those persons by definition would
not be exercising a choice.
Even if conscientious objectors in that situation could show they were being
treated more harshly than other persons who serve, they would also have to cross the
hurdle of showing that the harsher service was unconstitutional. For the govern-
ment would doubtless argue that since it could constitutionally require conscientious
objectors to enter the military as combatants, see text accompanying notes 289-93
infra, it can constitutionally instead put each objector to a choice betveen entering
as a combatant and performing a harsher form of service. Whether the government
would prevail in that argument should depend upon whether the requirement of
harsher service is to some extent necessitated by the grant of the privilege not to
serve as a combatant (assuming that this is a privilege and not a right). See
French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.. 234 (1961).
The only instance from history where a case of discrimination might plausibly
be made is in the World War II failure to compensate 1-O's serving in Civilian Pub-
lic Service Camps. See note 281 supra. Failure to pay conscientious objectors is a
poor means of equalizing their burden with nonobjectors because the degree of equal-
ization varies with the circumstances of the individual. To the rich objector, alternate
service might still seem vastly superior to military service, whereas to the poor man
alternate service might be an utter impossibility. The discrimination therefore is
limited to the poor conscientious objector; it is not against I-O's in general.
289 See, e.g., R. DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15-20
(1963); W. KATz, RELIGION AND AxsmlcA, CONSTrrUTIONS 20-21 (1964); P. KIm-
LAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 37-49 (1962) (discussing cases) ; Brodie & Souther-
land, Conscience, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court: The Riddle of United
States v. Seeger, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 306, 319-27; Conklin, Conscientious Objector
Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcasco v. Watkins, 51 GEo. LJ. 252 (1963) ;
Donnici, Governmental Encouragement of Religious Ideology: A Study of the Cur-
rent Conscientious Objector Exemption From Military Service, 13 J. PUB. L. 16
(1964) ; Mansfield, Conscientious Objection--1964 Term, 1965 RELIGION & PUB. OaDE
3, 59-81; Note, 34 U. CHL L. REv. 79 (1966).
290 See, e.g., Brodie & Southerland, supra note 289, at 319-27; Freeman, Exemp-
tions from Civil Responsibilities, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 437, 444-53 (1959). Hochstadt,
The Right to Exemption From Military Service of a Conscientious Objector to a
Particular War, 3 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-Cv. Lmn. L. REv. 1, 37-50 (1968); Macgill,
Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. REv.
1355, 1389-93 (1968).
291 See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931), overruled on
other grounds, Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) ; Hamilton v. Regents,
293 U.S. 245, 266-68 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring) ; Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918). Cf. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 572-73 (1945).
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held that under congressional legislation at least two kinds of religious
objectors must enter the military,292 and it has found no constitutional
problem with the legislation even where the religious objector was not
exempt from the obligation of killing.293
It seems likely, then, that the constitutionality of the proposal
would be sustained. The question still to be faced is whether it is wise
to impose the obligation of entering the military on the convinced
conscientious objector. The primary case in favor of doing so is that
only by that means can a system of conscription relieve all those deeply
opposed to killing other persons from a legal obligation to do so. Our
current scheme is to allow conscientious objector status to a few and,
if their conscientious scruples extend that far, to relieve them fully
from military duty. Though the scheme may appear more humane than
one obliging conscientious objectors to enter the military, it is not more
humane when one considers the price paid for allowing total exemption
to the few. In the first place, a system of selection is made necessary
and, as discussed above, that system is peculiarly and inevitably un-
reliable. Members of established peace churches and persons well repre-
sented by counsel are particularly favored in the selection scheme.
There can be no doubt that valid claims are denied with considerable
frequency. Those unfortunate enough to have their claims denied are
subject to full military duty, including the duty to kill. But serious as
they are, the inaccuracies of the selection process are not the only area
of concern. The current test for conscientious objection as well as being
difficult of application is also irrational in its limitations. Under present
rules, some persons with conceded religious opposition to entering the
military are nevertheless put to a choice between entering and
imprisonment.
292 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (the selective conscientious
objector) ; Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971) (the person whose conscien-
tious objection does not crystallize until after the mailing of his notice to report for
induction). The cases are discussed at text accompanying notes 294-306 infra. It is
worth noting at this point, however, that while the Court in Gillette confined to se-
lective objectors its holding that requiring service did not violate the free exercise
clause, the Court in Ehlert gave some indication that it thought it constitutionally
permissible to require all conscientious objectors to perform noncombatant service.
The Court said that "[t]he only unconditional right conferred by statute upon con-
scientious objectors is exemption from combatant training and service," 402 U.S. at
102 (emphasis in original), and that the right to alternate service "arises only if a
registrant's 'claim is sustained by the local board.'" Id. at 103 (quoting from the
Selective Service statute). Cf. Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256, 258 (1968). While
the statement is nonsense-since it would indicate that the denial of a I-0 classi-
fication by a board is unreviewable, which plainly is not the law-the fact that the
Court said this was statutory policy and indicated no doubts as to its constitutionality
is some evidence of the view it would take were the constitutionality of such a pro-
vision actually before it.
293Although persons like the objector in Ehlert have an opportunity to have
their conscientious objector claim sustained before they are assigned to combatant
duty, see text accompanying note 306 infra, selective objectors, like those involved in
Gillette, can be put to a choice between combatant service and imprisonment.
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In Gillette v. United States,9 ' the Supreme Court held that the
Selective Service statute does not grant a conscientious objector exemp-
tion to persons whose opposition is to participation in a particular war
rather than war in general and that the exemption, as limited, is consti-
tutionally permissible. The Court did not rest its decision that Con-
gress could constitutionally differentiate in its treatment of selective
objectors and general objectors on the ground that selective objectors'
opposition to participation in war is necessarily less profound or that it
is necessarily political and not religious. On the contrary, the Court
assumed that the objections of the petitioners in the cases before it were
sincere and religious in nature.2 95  One of the petitioners, Gillette, was
a humanist. The other, Negre, was traditionally religious; he was a
devout Roman Catholic. The Catholic Church is not pacifist but
maintains that there are just and unjust wars. While the institution
has not taken a position on the justice of the Vietnam conflict, it imposes
on each member the duty of reaching his own conclusion whether a
particular conflict is just and refraining from participating in those
conflicts that are unjust. For a Catholic to participate in a conflict he
has concluded is unjust violates his religion in the same way it would
for a Quaker to be forced to participate in any war.296
The Court held that nevertheless it did not violate the establish-
ment clause for the Selective Service statute to cause disparate treat-
ment of Quakers and Catholics. In the Court's view, the aim of the
statute was not to favor one religion over another, and though it had
that effect, it was justified by a neutral, secular purpose.29 T That pur-
pose principally was the government's interest in having a "fair, even-
handed, and uniform" selection process.29 It was thought that recog-
nizing selective objection would interfere with this goal because of the
difficulties of distinguishing the religious selective objector from one
294401 U.S. 437 (1971).
295 Id. at 440-41, 447, 458.
296 See id. at 441. With regard to the Roman Catholic "just war" doctrine, ,see
generally J. RYAN, MODERN WAR AND BASIc ETHIcs (1933); G. VANN, MORALITY
AND WAR (1939).
29T The Court held also that for the same reason the limitation to universal ob-
jectors does not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment as an arbitrary
and capricious enactment. 401 U.S. at 449 n.14. On the same ground it rejected a
claim that the statute violated the free exercise clause by requiring religious selec-
tive objectors to serve in violation of their religion: a valid and secular governmental
purpose justified the burden placed upon the selective objector's exercise of his re-
ligion. Id.
2
98 Id. at 455. The Court mentioned other secular purposes for the exemption as
well-e.g., the recognition that conscientious objectors were unlikely to be effective
soldiers and the unwillingness to put conscientious objectors to a choice between their
conscience and imprisonment-Id. at 452-53; but those purposes apply equally to the
sincere selective objector.
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whose dissent was merely political. If selective objection were recog-
nized, the Court reasoned
[t]here is a danger that as between two would-be objectors,
both having the same complaint against a war, that objector
would succeed who is more articulate, better educated, or
better counseled. There is even a danger of unintended re-
ligious discrimination-a danger that a claim's chances of
success would be greater the more familiar or salient the
claim's connection with conventional religiosity could be made
to appear.
2 99
Finally the Court thought
[I] t is not unreasonable to suppose that some persons who are
not prepared to assert a conscientious objection, and instead
accept the hardships and risks of military service, may well
agree at all points with the objector, yet conclude, as a matter
of conscience, that they are personally bound by the decision
of the democratic process. The fear . . . is that exemption
of objectors to particular wars would weaken the resolve of
those who otherwise would feel themselves bound to serve
despite personal cost, uneasiness at the prospect of violence,
or even serious moral reservations or policy objections con-
cerning the particular conflict.
. . . [R] eal dangers . . . might arise if an exemption
were made available that in its nature could not be adminis-
tered fairly and uniformly over the run of relevant fact
situations. Should it be thought that those who go to war are
chosen unfairly or capriciously, then a mood of bitterness and
cynicism might corrode the spirit of public service and the
values of willing performance of a citizen's duties that are the
very heart of free government 00
While these considerations may be true for selective conscientious
objection, they are also true of the conscientious objector exemption
when selective conscientious objection is not recognized. The Court
did not take the view in Seeger that to recognize persons as conscien-
tious objectors who are not religious in the traditional sense would
seriously impair the fairness with which the Act is administered because
it would become very difficult to distinguish the legitimate conscientious
objector from the spurious claimant,3 ' although the argument was as
2 9 91d. at 457.
3 00 1d. at 459-60.
301 See Brief for the United States at 38, 80-82, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1964).
Similar reasoning caused the Secretary of War to reject the efforts of some to
have World War I legislation include nonreligious as well as religious objectors. See
D. JoHNsoN, mipra note 280, at 15-17. He said that extending the exemption beyond
recognized peace churches would open the way for "self-serving declaration[s]." Hear-
ings on the Selective Service Act Before the House Comm. on Military Affairs, 65th
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valid there as in Gillette.10 2  The persons denied conscientious objector
exemption in Gillette seem to have objections to entering the military 3 0'
and participating in war that are, in some cases at least, as strong as
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1917). And Senator Phelan arguing against extending the ex-
emption beyond members of peace churches, stated: "If we respect an organization
. . . that has for a long time, not in contemplation of this war or any other war, con-
scientiously declared its principles, it would be well for us to do it without opening
the doors to every slacker who, without any sincere and long-established convictions
might declare also his so-called 'conscientious scruples' in order to avoid service."
55 CONG. Rc. 1399 (1917).
302 In fact, it is unlikely that administrative problems concerning the draft would
appreciably increase if selective objection were recognized. It is difficult to believe
that the Gillette holding will deter many persons who are legally counselled from
seeking conscientious objector status, for the line between a selective and a universal
objector is not easily defined or proved. The holding instead has made prerequisite to
conscientious objector status one more administrative finding where the well-advised
and the willing-to-fabricate will be advantaged over the ignorant and the honest.
The objective evidence (if there is any) of many registrants objecting only to
particular wars is unlikely to show whether the registrant's opposition is particular-
ized or general. Those registrants, then, who are willing to dissimulate can claim
universal rather than selective opposition. In most cases where objective evidence
precludes the fabrication, the evidence would also show the registrant disqualified be-
cause his opposition is political rather than "religious" in the statutory sense.
The problem of isolating the selective objector is not limited to instances of out-
right falsehood. Many selective objectors could in good faith characterize their ob-
jections as universal, if they were aware of the possibility. When two wars are in
progress and a man feels willing to fight in one but not the other, it is clear that his
objection is selective. Whenever he objects to all present wars, however, his selec-
tivity is much less clear. Gillette leaves room for an argument that a man should not
consider himself disqualified because he thinks he might be willing to fight in some
future conflict: "Unwillingness to deny the possibility of a change of mind, in some
hypothetical future circumstances, may be no more than humble good sense, casting
no doubt on the claimant's present sincerity of belief." 401 U.S. at 448. The Court
said "there is an obvious difference between present sincere objection to all war, and
present opposition to participation in a particular conflict only," id., but if one pres-
ently objects to all present wars the line is much less clear. Similarly draft manuals
counsel that one may claim universal objection though he might have been willing to
fight in past wars, see, e.g., A. TATum & J. TucHInSlY, supra note 284, at 190
(1969); CENTRAL Co mrrT-E FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, HANDBOOK FOR CON-
SCIENTIOUS OBJEcToRS 44-45 (10th ed. 1970), and the case of Sicurella v. United
States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955), can be read to support this conclusion. Clearly the de-
gree of certainty a man has as to whether he would or would not have fought in an-
other war is one factor in deciding whether he is a universal objector. But with such
uncertain tests of what constitutes selective objection it is difficult to believe the Su-
preme Court's Gillette holding contributed to a "fair, evenhanded, and uniform" selec-
tion process.
303 It might be unnecessary, if the current scheme did recognize selective ob-
jection, for selective objectors to receive I-0 status rather than entering the military
and then declining to support or participate in the particular conflict to which they
object. Since currently the objector cannot be sure that he will not be used in the
conflict to which he objects if he enters the military, it is reasonable for him to object
to entering at all. The alternatives would be either to violate his conscientious be-
liefs, or to enter and obey orders only until he was asked to participate in the conflict
to which he objects. At that time he would face court-martial for refusing to obey
orders and be subject to the military justice system. His selective objection would
not be a defense, just as it is not in the civilian system where he would face prosecu-
tion if he refused to enter the military at all. United States v. Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
483, 40 C.M.R. 195 (1969). See Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6, § VB1, SEL.
SERv. L. REP. 2326 (Aug. 20, 1971). For another bar to the objector raising his
defense before the military tribunal, see id. § VB2. See also Negre v. Larsen, 418
F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), aff'd sub nomr. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971).
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the objections of universal pacifists; yet they must be willing to kill or
else face imprisonment.
There is another instance as well in which the Supreme Court has
recently held that persons conscientiously opposed to participation in
war must enter the military. In Ehlert v. United States, the Court
decided that one whose conscientious objection crystallizes after the
mailing of his notice to report for induction may not raise his con-
scientious objector status before the Selective Service board or in
defense of a criminal prosecution for refusing to submit to induction.304
The only way he will be able to raise his conscientious objector claim is
by entering the miliary and seeking release as a conscientious objector
under military procedures. 0 5
304 Although the regulations require reopening of the registrant's classification
with its consequent rights to personal appearances and appeal whenever the regis-
trant presents a new prima facie claim of conscientious objection, see notes 33-35
supra & accompanying text, the rule differs for claims made initially after the mailing
of the induction notice. The local board cannot reopen those claims unless it "first
specifically finds there has been a change in the registrant's status resulting from cir-
cumstances over which the registrant had no control." 37 Fed. Reg. 5123 (1972) (to
be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2). In Ehlert, the Supreme Court was to decide a
conflict among the circuits as to whether a registrant becoming a conscientious ob-
jector after the mailing of his notice to report for induction (a) necessarily was, (b)
might or might not be, or (c) could not be a circumstance beyond the registrant's
control (a) requiring, (b) permitting, or (c) not allowing the board to reopen. The
issue was of some moment for, while a claim maturing at that late date might be
sincere and otherwise entitled to recognition, the tool for delay that ability to force
reopening always gives the registrant, see note 34 supra, might be particularly sus-
ceptible to misuse and particularly destructive of orderly induction procedures if it
were available after the mailing of a notice to report.
The Court's opinion does not make absolutely clear which of the three holdings
as to the application of the regulation it adopted. Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion for
the Court begins with the statement: "The question in this case is whether a Selec-
tive Service local board must reopen the classification of a registrant" for a postin-
duction notice claim, 402 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added), whereas the body of the
opinion speaks as though the issue is whether the board is permitted to reopen. See,
e.g., the closing sentence, which states: "[W]e hold that the Court of Appeals did not
misconstrue the Selective Service regulation in holding that it barred presentation to
the local board of a claim that allegedly arose between mailing of a notice of induc-
tion and the scheduled induction date." Id. at 107-08 (emphasis added). The Court's
reasoning best accords with the second quoted sentence and with the view that the
Court has concluded that a board may not reopen such a claim. It accepted the
government's interpretation of the regulatory language that the "circumstances" be-
yond a registrant's control had to be "objectively identifiable" and "extraneous"--such
as injury to the registrant which made him eligible for a physical deferment. Id. at
104-05.
It might still be argued by a late-crystallizing conscientious objector whose
change of heart was prompted by such an "objectively identifiable" circumstance that
he falls within the group whose late claim can be heard, but late conscientious ob-
jector claims as a general class will not qualify for late reopening. The Senate, ap-
parently not content with the holding of Ehlert, sought a provision in the 1971 amend-
ments prohibiting induction of conscientious objectors whose claims arise after receipt
of an induction notice. The House conferees, however, were adamant in their opposi-
tion to this proposal. The Senate receded "with the understanding that in unusual
cases, local boards would have the discretionary authority of extending to such regis-
trants a hearing on their late claim if the circumstances so warranted." H.R. REP.
No. 433, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971).
305 The result in Ehlert was dependent on the Court's conclusion that it did
"not leave a 'no man's land' time period in which a claim then arising could not be
presented in any forum." 402 U.S. at 102. The registrant whose claim was late in
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The plight of the conscientious objector whose objection was late
in crystallizing is obviously less severe than that of the selective objector
in that he need enter the military only for purposes of seeking release.
During the time he is seeking release he is not to be assigned to duties
in conflict with his conscience, 306 and he will be faced with the prospect
of total military service only if his claim of conscientious objection is
denied. Nevertheless it is an instance where a person whose conscience
and/or religion forbids him to enter the military at all-not merely to
refrain from combat-is forced either to face imprisonment or to enter
the military in violation of his conscience.
Under the proposed self-selection system, selective conscientious
objectors, late objectors, and others who, for one reason or another,
would not presently qualify for alternate or noncombatant service could
be relieved from the duty of killing other human beings if they elected
to perform, instead, whatever noncombatant service was available to
objectors. (Under the increased-likelihood-of-service variant, preserv-
ing alternate service, some of these persons could also qualify for al-
ternate service, but those who filed their claim after their lottery number
was determined would be required to enter the military.) A basic
supposition underlying this proposal is that the most compelling reason
for a person to seek exemption from military service is that he has
conscientious scruples against taking human life and that it is therefore
arising could present it to military authorities after induction. If a man does not
enter the military, however, either because his principles forbid it or because he is
ignorant that entry is the only avenue for further pursuit of his claim, he has no
forum and no defense to criminal prosecution. The result is harsh for such a
registrant, once one admits, as the Court does, id. at 104, that the registrant's con-
scientious objection may be sincere.
The result could have been avoided without giving the registrant power to cause
any great delay in his induction. The Court could have held that a draft board
should pass, on a case-by-case basis, on whether there has been a change in status
resulting from circumstances beyond the registrant's control, see note 304 supra, and
that a proper component in this inquiry is whether the registrant is sincere in his
claim. The decision on whether the registrant qualifies for reopening then would
incorporate a decision on the merits. If the registrant were found insincere, his case
would not be reopened and he would not gain rights to personal appearances and an
appeal. He would, however, have had an opportunity to convince his local board.
More important, if he then refused induction, he could raise any local board error in
denying his conscientious objector claim as a defense to his criminal prosecution.
The Second Circuit prior to the Ehlert decision adopted such a solution. See
Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970).
A simpler method of preserving a criminal defense for the registrant who refuses
induction, and a method that involves no delay whatsoever in the induction pro-
cedures, would be to allow a registrant whose objection crystallized late, once he
has refused induction and is to be criminally prosecuted, to have a hearing before his
local board on whether he did become a sincere conscientious objector and to have
the board's conclusion reviewable by a court, according to the usual basis-in-fact
standard of review, in defense to the criminal prosecution. If registrants with late
conscientious objector claims do, however, lose all forums by refusing induction,
there should at least be some assurance that when faced with the choice whether to
submit they be meaningfully advised of the consequences of the decision.
306 Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6, §VIH, SzL. SERV. L. REP. 2330
(Aug. 20, 1971).
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more important for society to grant that exemption to all persons
sincerely seeking it than it is to respect the beliefs of persons who feel
it is wrong for them to enter the military at all.3" 7 To force a person to
do an act that is forbidden by his religion may possibly be a more
serious impingement on his freedom than to forbid him to do an act
that his religion requires.3 °8 More important, when the required act
is one that society itself regards as abhorrent in most circumstances,
there is particularly persuasive reason for honoring the individual's de-
cision that he cannot in good conscience comply.
A person may, of course, believe that it is wrong to enter the
military just as strongly as others believe that it is wrong to kill, and
society's toleration of diverse religious philosophies should not gen-
erally depend upon whether a religion's views are understandable or
acceptable to society as a whole.3 0 9  Nevertheless it does seem proper,
or at least permissible, for society, when it is exempting a group from a
generally-imposed obligation, to make a judgment that an aversion to
killing is of a different order in the scale of values than an aversion to
doing other things-for example, entering the military, wearing a uni-
form, bearing arms 310 and to give recognition to that objection while
refusing to recognize other objections that it views as less compelling. 311
307 Indeed, it is either expressly stated or implicitly assumed by those who con-
tend that the conscientious objector exemption is constitutionally required that the
source of the requirement is the fact that in the military one may be forced to kill, an
act normally vigorously frowned upon by society.
308 This argument is made in Stone, supra note 280, at 268; Clark, Guidelines
for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HAxv. L. REv. 327, 345-46 (1969); Macgill, supra
note 290, at 1390-91 (1968).
309 Cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85:
The validity of what [an applicant for conscientious objector status]
believes cannot be questioned. . . . [Such an inquiry is] foreclosed to
Government. As M,. JusTIcE DouGLAs stated in United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944): "Men may believe what they cannot prove.
They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.
Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incompre-
hensible to others." Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to
reject beliefs because they consider them "incomprehensible." Their task
is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held
and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.
310 A case can be made that those who limit themselves to alternate service are
more principled than those willing to engage in noncombatant service because they
refuse not only to participate directly in killing but also to be any part of a system
that has that as its aim. The rationale, however, would carry over to non-
payment of any taxes to support the war, and perhaps even to nonpayment of any
taxes to a government that engages in war. Moreover, in anything short of a total
mobilization situation, a conscientious objector who declines to serve at all in the
armed forces does not thereby reduce the number of persons who will serve or the
number of lives that will be taken. He simply withdraws himself from the system
so that another person must take his place. If one focuses on those facts, the I-A-O's
role appears at least as principled as the I-O's.
311 Conscientious opposition to governmental obligations other than military ones
by the same token is not by any means generally honored. See, e.g., Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29
(1905); cf. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946).
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Even under the current scheme of conscientious objection where we
have satisfied groups like the Quakers by allowing them the option of
alternative service, we make discriminating judgments about the im-
portance of various religious objections concerning war and we honor
some more than we do others. Jehovah's Witnesses have long taken
the position that performing alternative service, as well as entering the
military, is in violation of their conscientious beliefs."' Their religious
objection has not been recognized, and they have been put to the choice
of violating their convictions in this respect or facing imprisonment. 3
Others have found it contrary to their conscience to register for the
draft,314 or to pay taxes to support the war,315 but Congress has not
honored their objections even when they are as sincere and as deeply
felt as interests that are respected. The precise line which has been
drawn in the past was influenced by political forces, 316 and doubtless
such forces shall continue to shape the policy for the future. But if
principle were to govern, it would seem that the interests now recog-
nized as sufficient to justify the grant of permission to perform
alternative service in lieu of noncombatant service-that it violates a
man's conscience to be any part of a system that attains its objectives
by destroying human beings; that the conscientious objector cannot
wear a uniform because he believes it indicates approval of military
312 See Tietz, Jehovah's Witnesses: Conscientious Objectors, 28 S. CAL. L. REv.
123, 130 (1955). The religion's official doctrine is that each individual Witness
should interpret for himself what implications Witness doctrine has for his action.
M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, supra note 278, at 35. In practice, however, it is expected
that a Jehovah's Witness will not accept alternate service. Id.
313 During the 1940's and the 1950's from 80 to 90% of all conscientious ob-
jectors involved in criminal prosecutions were Jehovah's Witnesses. See Smith & Bell,
supra note 147, at 711, 714.
314 Cf. McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971).
31r See, e.g., Joan Baez' refusal to pay income taxes, reported in N.Y. Times,
Apr. 16, 1965, at 35, col. 2. The government ultimately, but without her cooperation,
recovered the money due from her. N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1966, at 72, cols. 1-2. Com-
pare the Dunkards' religiously-based refusal during the Indian Wars either to
render military service or to pay a commutation fee, and the government's subsequent
extraction of the fee, described in 1 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION 32 (Special Monograph No. 11, 1950).
316 During the period when the World War I exemption was being formulated,
the Quakers, the Mennonites, and the American Union Against Militarism (a
precursor of the American Civil Liberties Union) were active in working for an
exemption. The provision that finally emerged was influenced by the fact that the
peace churches' principal concern was an exemption for themselves, see, e.g.,
G. HERSHBERGER, supra note 283, at 114-19, and the American Union Against Mili-
tarism's attempts to win recognition for all religious objectors was undermined by
their efforts on behalf of political objectors as well. See D. JOHNSON, supra note 280,
at 14-18. The political maneuvers leading up to the World War II conscientious
objector provisions are described in M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, supra note 278, at 45-52.
During that period the peace churches and the ACLU did originally push for an
exemption for absolutists and for nonreligious objectors as well as for the cat-
egories ultimately exempted, but they failed in that endeavor. See NATIONAL
SERVICE BOARD FOR RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS, CONGRESS LOOKS AT THE CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR (1943).
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objectives; that it is wrong to minister to an injured military man since
that will enable him to resume his destructive duties sooner "!-are
more akin to the interest in not paying war taxes, or the Jehovah's
Witness' objection to performing even alternative service, than they are
to the conscientious objector's conceived duty not to kill.3 1
The virtues of the present proposal are that it would recognize the
most compelling interest in avoiding combatant service and that it could
operate far less capriciously than the present system of selecting ob-
jectors and granting them privileged status, by granting exemption
from combatant service to all who profess conscientious objection to
taking life and by requiring them to perform noncombatant service of
comparable risks and burdens.
317 These are the arguments that the manuals for draft registrants most com-
monly suggest using in support of the position that a man's conscientious objection
will not permit him to serve in a noncombatant capacity. See, e.g., CENTRAL Com-
MITTEE FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
41 (10th ed. 1970).
31s Along with their lobbying, see note 316 supra, another probable reason for
recognition of the interests of groups like the Quakers is their respectability. See 1
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 42 (Special Monograph
No. 11, 1950); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Adopting a system that would require us to imprison a substantial.
number of Quakers might not sit well with the American people. Yet imprisoning
Jehovah's Witnesses for observing their religious beliefs creates little stir. The
proposed system would put Quakers and Jehovah's Witnesses alike, together with
nonreligious persons holding the same beliefs, to a choice between observing their
beliefs and facing imprisonment or performing noncombatant service. The imprison-
ment of many persons presently allowed to perform alternate service might well
result. On the other hand, once the unavailability of the alternate service route
became established, a number of persons from peace churches whose members now
regularly receive a 1-0 exemption might well enter the military. The World War I
experience provides some basis for this prediction. While some persons followed
their faith in refusing noncombatant service even when it was not clear that such
a refusal would go unpunished, see note 283 supra, a great many persons chose to
serve in a combatant capacity contrary to the tenets of their faith. The segregation
of conscientious objectors in the military camps led more than 80%o of the more than
20,000 persons inducted who had received certificates from their draft boards that
they were entitled to noncombatant status as members of peace churches to
abandon their exemption from noncombatant service. STATEMENT, supra note 278,
at 16. Similarly, the World War II objectors who renounced the Civilian Public
Service Camps because they needed to be compensated for their work, while fewer
in number, illustrate the obvious proposition that not all objectors are beyond being
influenced by the legal provisions as to whether they must enter the military and by
the rewards or penalties attached thereto.
